Order Number 9311859

The emergence of the Delhi Sultanate, 588–685/1192–1286

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Duke University, 1992

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THE EMERGENCE OF THE DELHI SULTANATE

588-685/1192-1286

by

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Department of History
Duke University

Date: April 27, 1992

Approved:

John F. Richards, Supervisor

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of History in the Graduate School of Duke University

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Abstract

(History)

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The subject of this dissertation is the emergence of the Delhi Sultanate from 588/1192 to 685/1286. In these years one branch of the Shansabanid dynasty of Ghur in Afghanistan established a precarious hold over some urban centres in north India. The early commanders were military slaves of Sultan Mu`izz al-Din, the Shansabanid ruler of Ghur. Upon their master's death they established their separate domains in north India. My study focuses upon how the principality of Delhi under Sultan Iltutmish emerged as the paramount Sultanate in north India. For Delhi's paramountcy to be confirmed, its Sultan had to derive support from the areas that had been recently conquered. I show how Iltutmish associated religious specialists in his enterprise of establishing a Sultanate which was also seen as a sanctuary for Muslims in north India.

My study then examines changes within the ruling elite, and the structure of the Delhi Sultanate after Iltutmish's death. In the conflicts which occured after 633/1236, the Delhi Sultanate extended into the countryside and developed its agrarian base. Finally, I have shown how the developments in the post-Iltutmish era promoted mysticism until rather than relying upon religious specialists, mystic saints started finding favour with the Delhi Sultans.

I focus upon two parallel trends visible during the period of my study: the first, the organisation of politi-

cal power which led to conflict between Sultanate commanders and, on a different level, with the autochthenes. The second, where a stable Muslim society emerged, frequently distanced from the political world of the military commanders, yet influenced by, and supportive of the Delhi Sultanate because the fortunes of the Muslim community were believed to be associated with it.

The study is based upon information present in contemporary chronicles and sufi texts written in the Persian language. I have relied upon the methods used by prosopographists and scholars of religion working on medieval Europe and the central Islamic lands to understand the society and culture of the elites, the changes in the political system, and the manner in which politics, religion and society were interrelated.

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PREFACE

The Sultans of Delhi have attracted the attention of scholars and laymen for generations. Their history is filled with romance, conquerors, and tragic heroes. It was a time of mystery when the Qutub Minar was constructed, a Queen ruled from Delhi, and capricious monarchs moved capitals back and forth, held awe-inspiring ceremonial courts, reduced prices or introduced paper currency. In the hands of a master story teller it made a captivating story which occupied students like me for days on end.

There was more to the Delhi Sultanate as I discovered during my lengthy graduate career, but little which could be satisfied by the existing literature on the subject. Scholars like Muhammad Aziz Ahmad and Khaliq Ahmad Nizami presented summaries of the Persian sources of the period, complete with an appendix on the character of the monarch.[1]

1. Muhammad Aziz Ahmad, Political History and Institutions of the Early Turkish Empire of Delhi (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, University of the Punjab, 1987 reprint), Khaliq Ahmad Nizami, "Foundation of the Delhi Sultanat", "The Early Turkish Sultans of Delhi" in A Comprehensive History of India: The Delhi Sultanat (Delhi:

These scholars argued that if a monarch was strong, and morally upright, he had a stable government. A.B.M. Habibullah provided even more questions than answers: How could the Delhi Sultanate be "founded" by Turks, if the initial invasions were carried out by the Ghurids from Afghanistan? Which traditions influenced the making of the Delhi Sultanate: Turkish, slave or Muslim? How, if at all, were they interrelated? If the Sultanate was constantly besieged by Hindus waiting to recapture their homelands, how did it manage to survive? How could the Delhi Sultanate be threatened by Hindu resurgence in Kamrup and Orissa if those areas had never been occupied? How could Balban be obsessed with Turkish racial purity if he deployed Afghans all around Delhi?[2] These were admittedly small positivist questions, but they serve to explain the chill that ran through a well meaning scholar testing the waters of the early Middle Ages in Indian History.

As one delved deeper into the subject of the Delhi Sultanate, the questions concerning the period became even more fundamental: Why do economic historians of the Delhi Sultanate pass hurriedly over the thirteenth century, and

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People's Publishing House, 1982 reprint).

2. A.B.M. Habibullah, <u>The Foundation od Muslim Rule in India</u> (Allahabad: Central Book Depot, 1976 edition).

into the fourteenth?[3] How can slaves be nobles?[4] If the Sultanate had a bureaucracy, chief ministers et al., how is it that a civil service did not administer the state?[5] When I decided to look at some of these questions in greater detail, I came across the only major disagreement amongst scholars writing on the Delhi Sultanate. Peter Hardy warned students that the medieval chronicles would not contain the answers to the questions with which they approached their sources,[6] but Khaliq Nizami and Irfan Habib assured their readers that this was not the case; Diya al-Din Barani, for example, was a scientific, reliable historian.[7]

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3. W.H. Moreland, The Agrarian System of Moslem India (Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, 1968 reprint), Irfan Habib, "Agrarian Economy" "Non-Agricultural Production and Urban Economy" in The Cambridge Economic History of India (Delhi: Orient Longman Limited, 1984 reprint).

4. S.B.P. Nigam, Nobility under the Sultans of Delhi (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1968), Kanwar Muhammad Ashraf, Life and Conditions of the People of Hindustan (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1988 reprint).

5. Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, The Administration of the Sultanate of Dehli (Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, 1971 edition), R.P. Tripathi, Some Aspects of Muslim Administration (Allahabad: Central Book Depot, 1978 reprint).

6. Peter Hardy, Historians of Medieval India: Studies in Indo-Muslim Historical Writing (London: Luzac and Company, 1966 reprint).

7. Khaliq Ahmad Nizami, "Zia-ud-din Barani" in Historians of Medieval India ed. M. Hasan (Delhi: Jamia Millia Islamia, 1968), pp. 37-52, Irfan Habib, "Barani's theory of the History of the Delhi Sultanate" Indian Historical Review 7 (1981): 99-115.

My sense of being out of my depth was profound, and it was fortunate that I was firmly led away from the Delhi Sultanate and spent some years studying Islam, the early evolution of the Muslim community, the history of Iran, and Europe. The historiography in these fields had their own set of problems with anachronism, teleology and reification, but the mere fact that they were recognised as historiographical concerns was a major step for a student raised on a diet of consensual opinions on what happened in the Middle Ages in India. It also provided me with the valuable background that I needed in religion, Iranian and central Asian history, to understand the presuppositions influencing Delhi Sultanate scholars when they studied subjects such as mysticism, `ulama, nobility, bureaucracy, Turks, or military slavery.

It had been my original intention to study the nature of political relationships between 1206 and 1351, but as my study grew I realised how difficult it was to study merely political relationships without focussing upon how they were embedded in society, religion and the state. Much like the Delhi Sultans I was slow in changing, and I am grateful to Professor John Richards for posing a sufficient number of awkward queries to make my study broader in scope and shorter in the period that it was originally supposed to cover. It was fortunate that I did this for while I was in the middle of writing my dissertation, Peter Jackson pub-

lished an article which studied the institution of military slavery in the Delhi Sultanate.[8] It was encouraging to note that another scholar had independently come to the same conclusions on some points, but it was a relief that my work was no longer delimited as sharply as it had originally been.

The subject of this dissertation is the emergence of the Delhi Sultanate from 588/1192 to 685/1286. These were the years in which one branch of the Shansabanid dynasty of Ghur in Afghanistan breached the defences of the indigenous rulers and established a precarious hold over some urban centres in north India. The early commanders were all military slaves, bandagan, of Sultan Mu`izz al-Din, the Shansabanid ruler of Ghur. After the initial invasions these military commanders proceeded to consolidate their control over their separate domains. My study focuses upon how the principality of Delhi under Sultan Iltutmish emerged as the paramount Sultanate in north India. This was a very rapid political transformation, aided by the Mongol invasions in the vicinity of the subcontinent. Although the Delhi Sultans were military commanders, the construction of the Delhi Sultanate had to rely upon more than the armed might of its monarch. For Delhi's paramountcy to be con-

8. Peter Jackson, "The Mamluk institution in Early Muslim India" Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1990): 340-358.

firmed, the Sultan had to derive support from the areas that he had recently conquered. I show how Iltutmish associated the religious specialists, the `ulama, in his enterprise of establishing a Sultanate which was also seen as a sanctuary for Muslims in north India. The death of Iltutmish and the years of conflict altered the composition of the elites and the nature of the Delhi Sultanate. The transformations in the structure of the Delhi Sultanate, its access to the countryside and consolidation of an agrarian base were also a consequence of these years of conflict. Finally, I have shown how the developments in the post-Iltutmish era promoted mysticism until rather than relying upon the `ulama, the mystic saints started finding favour with the Delhi Sultans. The dissertation focuses upon two parallel trends visible during the period of my study: the first, the organisation of political power which led to conflict between Sultanate commanders and, on a different level, with the autochthenes. The second, where a stable Muslim society emerged, frequently distanced from the political world of the military commanders, yet influenced by, and supportive of the Delhi Sultanate, because the fortunes of the Muslim community were believed to be associated with it.

I have had a long graduate career, and the opportunity to work with many teachers. Mr. Muhammad Amin of St. Stephens College, kept me riveted with his stories about

the Delhi Sultanate, and sparked curiousity in a period which eventually changed my life. Dr. D.E.U. Baker showed by example what teaching commitment is all about. Professor Stanley E. Brush of the University of Bridgeport, introduced me to the history of Islam and the central Islamic lands. My wife and I will always remember the warmth with which he and Beverley supported our academic and personal ventures as young foreign graduate students in an alien land. I am grateful to Professor John Woods, Barney Cohn and C.M. Naim of the University of Chicago, for their encouragement years after our formal academic relationship had come to an end.

The warmth and support of the members of the Department of History, Duke University, has exceeded my wildest expectations. In my years of experience as a student and teacher I have yet to see a university department make as concerted an attempt to gear its organisation to the needs of its students. I can hardly thank individually the many friends that I have made here, but certainly let me record the help that was always forthcoming from the members of my dissertation committee: Professors John F. Richards, Charles Young, Kristen Neuschel, David Gilmartin, Jan Ewald and Jack Cell.

I really do not know how to acknowledge the support that I have received from John Richards. I was extraordinarily fortunate that he was both my supervisor and a

concerned friend. I would also like to thank Ann Richards for the gracious hospitality that she provided during my stay in Durham.

My long graduate life has been the cause of considerable anxiety to my friends and relatives. Friends like Sanjay Subrahmanyam and Muzaffar Alam have kept me glued together during crucial phases of dissertation writing. Robin and Usha provided my family with a safe haven in Delhi and have gone far beyond the relationships engendered by "law". My parents have been unusual in encouraging and helping their son make a career in the uncertain world of academics. They have always come through when the going was tough, which was, unfortunately, most of the time. I know they disregard all the financial assistance that they have provided over the years as immaterial, but without their support, material and otherwise, I would not have been able to come to Duke at all.

If my wife did not disagree with my opinions so much I would have put her as the co-author of my dissertation. We have discussed, and argued about many of the ideas in my work. It would never have gotten written without her willingness to share the burden of the enterprise. She worked, and cooked while I retreated into my ivory tower, and I will be forever indebted to her. Other than babysitting the children, she had to nurse me back, time and again, to my writing. Although my children wondered if my dissertation

would ever be history, they sought in their own ways to ensure that it would be completed. Shefali wrote notes of encouragement, and Sikandar helped by typing in his opinions on the latest draft.

I want to finally remember Shankar, a person who looked after the extended Kumar family, raised two generations, gave affection and had a deep abiding faith in all of us. He probably had no knowledge about what I was engaged in, but that it was important to bhaiya, brother, was sufficient for him. I owe him thanks that I can never convey.

Chapter 1

THE SULTANATES OF NORTH INDIA: THE MU`IZZI MALIKS IN HINDUSTAN

A century and a half (1030-1186) of frontier squabbling between the Rajput principalities and the Ghaznavid domains in the Punjab intensified in the late twelfth century with incursions into north India from the Sultanate of Ghur in Afghanistan.[1] In the late twelfth century the Sultanate of Ghur was divided into the three principalities of Ghur, Ghazni and Bamian. The Ghurid invasions into north India were commanded by Mu`izz al-Din Muhammad b. Sam (569/1173-602/1206), who governed the principality of Ghazni. Mu`izz al-Din's elder brother, Ghiyath al-Din Muhammad b. Sam

1. The argument for continous military exchanges on the North-West frontier of South Asia from the seventh century onwards has been convincingly argued by John F. Richards, "The Islamic Frontier in the East: Expansion into South Asia" South Asia 4 (1974): 91-109. On the Ghaznavids in the Punjab see C.E. Bosworth, The Later Ghaznavids: Splendour and Decay. The Dynasty in Afghanistan and Northern India (1040-1186) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).

(558/1163-599/1203), was the Sultan of the Ghurid dominions with his head quarters in Ghur.

While Ghiyath al-Din's political and military concerns were largely restricted to Khurasan and into Khwarazm, Mu`izz al-Din's agenda consisted of plunder raids into north India to support Ghurid interests within the central Islamic lands. In Iran and Afghanistan, north India was seen as a milch cow to sustain larger political ventures in Khurasan. Thus, although Mu`izz al-Din was motivated by other concerns, the chronicler Juwaini, could only ascribe economic considerations to the Sultan's raid into north India after his reversal at the battle of Andkhud (601/1204-5).

> Finally in the year 602/1205-6 he [Mu`izz al-Din]....(decided).... to make a beginning by an inroad into India for the purpose of mending the affairs of his retainers and followers, who had lost all their gear and accoutrement during the last few years of campaigning in Khurasan. Upon arriving in India, he was able by one victory that God granted him to repair all the deficits of treasury and army.[2]

2. `Ala al-Din `Ata Malik Juwaini, Tarikh-i Jahan-Gush trans. John A. Boyle, The History of the World-Conqueror (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1958) vol. 1, pp. 325-326. Juwaini misunderstood the reason for Mu`izz al-Din's campaign into north India. It was not launched with the aim to recoup monetary and other losses resulting from campaigns in Khurasan. The intention instead was to subdue the Khokar rebellion that challenged Ghurid establishments in the Punjab. See Minhaj-i Siraj Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri ed. Abdul Hay Habibi (Kabul: Anjuman-i Tarikh-i Afghanistan, 1963) vol. 1, pp. 403-404.

Juwaini may have been ignorant of Mu`izz al-Din's "actual" motive in raiding north India, but his own conclusion was based upon the popular reputation of the fabled wealth of South Asia. The plundering of north Indian temple hoards could restore lost fortunes in a twinkle. It helped that South Asia was a land of heathens, for it was then, also, a commendable act. It became incumbent upon righteous Muslim monarchs to carry out war, <u>ghazw</u>, against the idolaters for the greater glory of the Muslim community.

Mu`izz al-Din was not the first Muslim ruler to lead military campaigns into India looking for plunder; the famous Ghaznavid Sultan Mahmud (388/998-421/1030) had preceded him. Unlike earlier raids, however, Mu`izz al-Din intended to perpetuate Ghurid exploitation of South Asian resources. Thus, he occupied urban centres and appointed military personnel to administer the areas recently seized by Ghurid arms.

The extension of Mu`izzi domains into north India to facilitate the extraction of plunder has been plotted by several chroniclers. The remnant Ghaznavid principality of Lahore was seized in 582/1186. In 587/1191 Tabarhind (modern Bhatinda) was occupied and, after the second battle of Tarain (588/1192) against the Chauhan Rajputs, Mu`izz al-Din seized Kuhram, Mirath, Hansi, and Delhi. In 590/1194 Kol (modern Aligarh) was seized and after the defeat of the Gahadavala Rajput King Jaichandra, Benaras was occupied.

Subsequently, Ajmer in 591/1195 and in 592/1196 Thangir/Bayana were captured. The year 593/1197 saw raids into Gujarat against the Rai of Nahrawala, Ujjain and Khalaji raids into Bihar and Bengal. In 594/1197-8 Budaun was seized, and the next year Qanauj. In 597/1200-01 Gwalior, and in 599/1202 Kalinjar were occupied. Subsequently, itinerant plunder and consolidatory raids continued as in the case of Budur in 600/1203-4, or in the Koh-i Jud in 602/1205-6, but the Mu`izzi expeditions for conquest seem to have come to an end. This change coincided with the death of Mu`izz al-Din (602/1206).


In the twenty years or so of active political intervention in north India it is doubtful if Mu`izz al-Din altered the material or social life of the region. Yet, during this time period, elements from the conquering army were deployed and garrisoned in far flung centres on the eastern frontier of the Ghurid dominion. These groups of Ghurid military personnel in north India, led by Maliks, Amirs and Sipahsalars, relied upon Mu`izz al-Din for reinforcements. By 1203, however, with Mu`izz al-Din's increasing preoccupation with affairs in Afghanistan, Khurasan and Khwarazm, his subordinates in north India gradually mobilised their own armed retinues and attracted a service gentry to meet their (often more than basic) demands. With Mu`izz al-Din's death in 602/1206 his subordinates in north India made perfunctory acknowledgements of Ghurid author-

ity; by 626/1229 an independent Sultan of Delhi was recognised in Baghdad by the `Abbasid Caliph and was given the right of governance over the Muslim community in north India.

More than Mu`izz al-Din's campaigns, it was his subordinates and the way they were organised in north India, that had an impact on the future development of the Sultanate. The Ghurid structure of political relationships was held to be the only legitimate one for the better part of the thirteenth century and its traditions of governance, the rights to power and influence occupied by specific individuals and groups, was one that succeeding regimes had to come to terms with. The way in which Mu`izz al-Din's subordinates were deployed can only be understood, however, in the larger context of the political system of the Ghurid Sultanate. Mu`izz al-Din's appanage of Ghazni was a part of the larger domains controlled by the Shansabanid family, and his rights to governance were derived from the fact that he was a grandson of `Izz al-Din Husain, also entitled Abu al-Salatin, the father of Sultans. As a part of the Ghurid political world, Mu`izz al-Din relied upon the political traditions that had existed within his family to guide him in the arrangement of his dominion in Ghazni and north India.

TABLE 1

THE SHANSABANID LINEAGE



INDEX

1 etc. Indicates generations within the family of 'Izz al-Din Husain. The rights of the family of Shansab were preserved by his descendent Amir Banji who dispossessed the lineage of Shish. After an indeterminate number of descendents from Amir Banji, Amir Suri controlled Ghur. Malik 'Izz al-Din Husain "Abual-Salatin" (Father of Sultans) was a descendent in the 6th generation from Amir Suri.

* indicates daughter: (daughter) *married to "x".

I etc. Refers to Shansabanids who were regarded as Sultans of the Ghurid dominions.

- # I Sultan Saif al-Din Suri 540/1146–544/1149.
- # II Sultan Baha al-Din Sam 544/1149.
- # III Sultan 'Ala al-Din Husain 544/1149–556/1161.
- # IV Malik Nasir al-Din Ghur 556/1161.
- # V Malik Saif al-Din b. 'Ala al-Din 556/1161–558/1163.
- # VI Ghiyath al-Din Muhammad 558/1163–599/1203.
- # VII Muizz al-Din Muhammad 599–/1203–602/1206.
- # VIII Ghiyath al-Din Mahmud 602/1206–609/1212.
- # IX Baha al-Din Sam b. Ghiyath al-Din 609/1212–610/1213.
- # X 'Ala al-Din Atsiz 610/1213–611/1214.
- # XI Ziya al-Din b. Shuja al-Din 611/1214–612/1215.

GHUR etc.: All upper case names are appanages held by members of the Shansabanid lineage. The important ones mentioned in this genealogical chart are: FIRUZ KOH; BAMIAN; MANDESH; GHUR; WAJIRISTAN; MADIN; JARMAS; GHAZNI; TUKHARISTAN; NISHAPUR.

> indicates a transition in title or appanage. For eg.:
(i) When Malik Ziya al-Din b. Shuja al-Din was given the appanage of Nishapur and the title of Sultan, he was also given a new title: 'Ala al-Din. This has been indicated as: Ziya al-Din > 'Ala al-Din.
(ii) On Qutub al-Din Muhammad's death his unfinished capital of Firuz Koh was occupied by Baha al-Din Sam. Subsequently when 'Ala al-Din succeeded his brother he also transferred his capital to Firuz Koh.
These transitions in appanages have been indicated as: MANDESH > FIRUZ KOH; WAJIRISTAN > FIRUZ KOH.

Mother #1 etc.: Juzjani reports that the seven sons of Malik 'Izz al-Din Husain had three different mothers. Of the three mothers we can only be confident that mother #3, a Shansabanid, was a wife of the Malik. Of the others, one was a concubine, and the other a servant. The social status of the mothers did not cause their sons to be disinherited. I have therefore indicated the women as mothers with the additional information about their social background.

I The Ghurid Sultanate and kinsmen of Sultan Mu`izz al-Din:

The fame and importance of Sultan Ghiyath al-Din and his brother Mu`izz al-Din in the politics of twelfth century Afghanistan and eastern Iran was disproportionate to the humble origins of their family. The eponymous founder of the lineage, Shansab, and his descendants were fairly insignificant tribal chieftains who gradually identified their homeland with the region of Mandesh on the south bank of the Heri Rud. A recognisable transition in the prominence of the descendants of Shansab was noticeable from the chieftainship of `Izz al-Din Husain whose reign (493/1100-543/1146) coincided with the period of decline of the Ghaznavid and the Seljuq Sultanates. In the emerging power vacuum three of `Izz al-Din Husain's sons were, in turn, able to succeed their father and improve the position of the Shansabanid family in central Afghanistan.[3]

`Izz al-Din's progeny can be distinguished into two separate groups according to descent and privilege. The more favoured sons were the five sons of a princess of the Shansabanid lineage, and the future Sultans of Ghur belonged to this conjugal union. The other group were chil-

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3. See C.E. Bosworth, "Notes on the pre-Ghaznavid history of eastern Afghanistan" Islamic Quarterly 9 (1965): 12-24, and idem, "Ghurids" in Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd edition, op. cit., s.v..

dren of Turkish mothers who were of poor social status, and their sons were therefore excluded from leading the family (see chart 1).[4] Other than this element of seniority a system of horizontal succession rights to the supreme office of chieftainship prevailed within the Shansabanids of this generation. Sultan Saif al-Din Suri (died 544/1149) was succeeded by his brothers Baha al-Din Sam (died 544/1149) and `Ala al-Din Husain (died 556/1161). This also indicated the presence of corporate rights to inheritance; the patrimony of the father was not the sole inheritance of any one son but belonged to all of them. It was as a recognition of this right to the father's inheritance that Sultan Saif al-Din proceeded to distribute the Ghurid patrimony amongst his brothers. While he retained Istiah as his capital, Baha al-Din Sam received the ancestral lands of Mandesh, `Ala al-Din the territory of Wajiristan, Nasir al-Din Mahmud received Madin and Shuja` al-Din `Ali's son Diya al-Din, after his father's early death, succeeded to Jarmas. The eldest brother Qutub al-Din was given the appanage of Warsar and he proceeded to construct his capital at Firuz Koh. Fakhr al-Din Mas`ud, son of a Turkish concubine, kanizik, received Kashi to which Bamian was

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4. The mother of Fakhr al-Din Mas`ud was a concubine of Turkish origin, and that of Qutub al-Din was a servant, khadim, of the other mothers. Since the father and mother of the other five brothers were Shansabanid, the right of succession devolved upon their progeny. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 385.

added by Sultan `Ala al-Din Husain (544/1149-556-1161). The two half-brothers were obviously dissatisfied with the extent of their inheritance. As a result, Qutub al-Din revolted and fled to the Ghaznavid court where he was killed, and Fakhr al-Din was placated by a subsequent increase in the size of his dominions.[5]

Other than appanaging, the sense of the prevailing tradition of corporate solidarity within the family was evident in the large number of marriages within branches of the lineage. The descendants of Baha al-Din Sam b. `Izz al-Din Husain, about whom we have most information, received or gave brides to all the collateral lineages barring Qutub al-Din Muhammad and his descendants (see chart 1). Again, no seniority amongst the lineages in bride-giving or bride-taking seems to have existed and this complements the general sense of corporate egalitarianism that existed within the Shansabanid family.

The formation of the far-flung Ghurid state during the reign of Ghiyath al-Din b. Baha al-Din Sam (558/1163-599/1203) might have provided the opportunity for the

5. Ibid, vol. 1, pp. 335-336, 340. Juzjani seems to be uncertain about Fakhr al-Din's appanage; Kashi is mentioned as a probability, ghalib zan, p. 336. Subsequently, p. 380, Juzjani mentions that after Sultan `Ala al-Din Husain's victorious campaigns in the region of Tukharistan, the throne of Bamian, takht-i Bamian, was given to Fakhr al-Din. This was obviously a later addition to the half-brother's appanage and may have been provoked by a fear of his dissatisfaction (like that of Qutub al-Din) with the earlier dispensation. See below.

exclusion of some collateral lineages within the Shansabanid family and the creation of a more centralised state apparatus, but this does not seem to have happened. Changes due to attrition did take place within the Shansabanid kin group. Qutub al-Din, died circa 543-544/1148-49, and Saif al-Din, died 544/1149, had no male progeny and therefore their claims lapsed in favour of their affinal relatives. Neither did the establishment of the head quarters of the lineage in Firuz Koh by 544/1149 serve to create a more formal structure of governance and authority for the Ghurid dominions. Through the long reign of Ghiyath al-Din Muhammad, 558/1163-599/1203, the appanaging of territories to collateral lineages continued. The descendants of Malik Fakhr al-Din Mas`ud became associated with the principalities of Bamian and Tukharistan. These were now seen to be the patrimonial property of each family. On Fakhr al-Din Mas`ud's death his eldest son, Shams al-Din, succeeded to the territory not by the appointment of the Ghurid Sultan but according to the will of his father, ba wasiyat-i pidar.[6] In fact all evidence points to the fact that Ghiyath al-Din encouraged the process of appanaging of the Shansabanid patrimony amongst the remnant members of the kin group. The grandson of Malik Shihab al-Din Muhammad, Shihab al-Din `Ali was allowed to continue

6. Ibid, vol. 1, p. 387.

undisturbed in Madin, and out of new conquests in Khurasan the appanage of Nishapur was created for Malik Diya al-Din `Ali b. Shuja al-Din `Ali and Sarakhs for his brother-in-law Taj al-Din Zangi b. Fakhr al-Din Mas`ud. Through the alliances formed by the grants of these new appanages Ghiyath al-Din might have hoped to balance the increasing prominence of some of the more resourceful cousin lineages, notably that of Fakhr al-Din Mas`ud located in Bamian.[7]

The most important appointment of Ghiyath al-Din's reign was that of his brother Mu`izz al-Din to the appanage of Ghazni in 569/1173. The Ghuzz were cleared from the region and Mu`izz al-Din given the right to govern the lands of the Ghaznavid Sultanate in eastern Afghanistan and western Punjab.[8] Mu`izz al-Din helped Ghiyath al-Din on some of his campaigns in Khurasan and Khwarazm, but other-

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7. Ibid, vol. 1, pp. 355-356, 359-360. Juzjani noted that Malik Fakhr al-Din Mas`ud was not supportive of Ghiyath al-Din's succession to the throne. The Malik felt that since he was the eldest of the seven sons of `Izz al-Din Husain and none of his brothers were alive, hech baqi na-mandeh, the throne of Firuz Koh was rightfully his. In the ensuing conflict Ghiyath al-Din and Muizz al-Din defeated Fakhr al-Din. It was some years afterwards that the brothers cultivated Shams al-Din Muhammad b. Fakhr al-Din Mas`ud. Subsequently, the Bamianid collateral lineage again became ambitious, and it was in part an attempt to neutralise them that Ziya al-Din received so much attention from the two brothers. After Ghiyath al-Din's death (599/1203) his brother Muizz al-Din, based in Ghazni retained lordship over the Ghurid dominions for himself, and appointed Ziya al-Din, now honoured by the title of Sultan `Ala al-Din, to the appanage of Firuz Koh. See Juzjani, Tabaqat..., vol. 1, pp. 369-372.

8. Ibid, vol. 1, p. 396.

wise expended all his energies in consolidating and enlarging his appanage which included north India. The hierarchy and the degree of mutual autonomy between the two brothers was reflected on the sigilla on their coins. Ghiyath al-Din, as the senior brother was Sultan al-`azam, the supreme Sultan, Mu`izz al-Din was Sultan al-mu`azzam, the great Sultan.[9] Despite the paramount position occupied by the Ghurid Sultanate in Eastern Iran and Afghanistan in the late twelfth century, and the honour bestowed upon it from the `Abbasid Caliph, the Shansabanid government never made the transition from a loose patrimony of autonomous principalities led by a senior kinsman. Effectively each kinsman was supreme in his own appanage.

This system of governance and distribution of power influenced the level of Shansabanid participation in Mu`izz al-Din's campaigns into north India. Mu`izz al-Din's rights to north India were seen as an extension of his appanage of Ghazni and just as the collateral lineages protected their inheritance, Mu`izz al-Din guarded the rights to his assignment jealously. It was in part because of a fear of an attack from his kinsmen in Afghanistan, that Mu`izz al-

9. John Deyell, Living without Silver: The Monetary History of early Medieval North India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 359, coin no. 238, 239. Although Mu`izz al-Din would occasionally use the title Sultan al-`azam (see #s 240, 242, 245), he apparently never presumed to do so when his brother's name was also included on the coins.

Din retained Ghazni as his capital, and spent most of his time there. He led military campaigns into north India, but after the initial invasions, his subordinates looked after the organisation of the conquered areas and the remission of plunder, (ghanima).

The need to maintain sole control over his appanage and monopolise the wealth of north India ensured that Mu`izz al-Din would not allow his kinsmen to participate in the raids into the subcontinent. Juzjani noted that the only Shansabanid who was involved in campaigns in north India was Malik Diya al-Din the son of Shuja al-Din `Ali. There were affinal ties between the two cadet branches of the family through Mah Malikah, the daughter of Ghiyath al-din Muhammad b. Baha al-Din Sam, who was married to Malik Diya al-Din.[10] Although Malik Diya al-Din was older than Ghiyath al-Din and Mu`izz al-Din, and both brothers referred to him as "lord", khudawand, the Malik seems to have been without an appanage of his own and was dependent upon the generosity of the two brothers.[11]

There is a fleeting mention in Juzjani of Malik Diya

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10. Also known as Malikah Jalal al-Dunya wa al-Din. See Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 369.

11. Ibid, vol. 1, pp. 360, 369-370 and the discussion above.

al-Din's presence in the first battle of Tarain 587/1191.[12] It is interesting to note, however, that Malik Diya al-Din's participation in the battle of Tarain was not included by Juzjani in the chapter on the affairs of Sultan Mu`izz al-Din but in that section of the chapter on the Malik where his diverse services, khidmat, to the Sultan were extolled. It was as a consequence of the quality of these services that Malik Diya al-Din eventually won for himself a prestigious appanage in Afghanistan. After the successful campaigns in Khurasan in 596/1199-1200, Diya al-Din was given Nishapur as his appanage together with the title of `Ala al-Din in recognition of his relative independence. The degree of confidence between Mu`izz al-Din and Sultan `Ala al-Din was evident when with the death of Sultan Ghiyath al-Din Muhammad in 600/1203, rather than co-opting Ghur within his own appanage, or appointing his brother's son Baha al-Din Sam to his father's principality,

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12. Ibid, vol. 1, p. 370. Habibi's edition, following the India Office and the Royal Asiatic Society manuscripts, also includes Sultan Ghiyath al-Din's name as one of the participants in the battle. This is in the section on Malik Diya al-Din and the inclusion of Ghiyath al-Din's name here seems to be a mistake. In the more complete narration of the battle in the section on Mu`izz al-Din, p. 399, Juzjani makes no mention of Ghiyath al-Din's presence at the scene of the conflict. H.J. Raverty, who also used these manuscripts, must have corrected this error in his translation of Juzjani's chronicle. In the chapter on Malik Diya al-Din he excludes Ghiyath al-Din's name as a participant in the battle. See, Minhaj al-Din Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri trans. H.J. Raverty (New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, 1970) p. 393.

Mu`izz al-Din assigned Firuz Koh to Diya al-Din.[13]

By 600/1203 Mu`izz al-Din was the most powerful member in the Shansabanid family. With his brother's death, Mu`izz al-Din assumed the right to dispense appanages to kinsmen of his choice. The only area where he never allowed any kin intervention was his own appanage. To a large extent it had been the military resources provided by the material and bullion plunder of north India that gave Mu`izz al-Din an edge over his relatives. Given the structure of power relations within the Shansabanid family it is not surprising that Mu`izz al-Din was not willing to share this resource with any of his kinsmen. North India was a domain that, excluding exceptional intrusions by kinsmen, remained an extension of the appanage of Ghazni and therefore the privileged domain of Mu`izz al-Din. No kinsman, other than those who were clearly subordinate to Mu`izz al-Din were allowed to function in the north Indian marches.

II Free-men subordinate to Sultan Mu`izz al-Din:

While the resources generated by north Indian plunder forced Mu`izz al-Din to guard his appanage from his kinsmen, the opportunities to make a quick fortune attracted a diverse body of free-individuals into the Sultan's service.

13. See Juzjani, <u>Tabaqat-i Nasiri</u> ed. Habibi, vol. 1, pp. 360, 369-372.

These free-individuals differed vastly in social background and status, but it is interesting to note that the entrenched elite class in Ghur did participate in and lead campaigns in north India, but were either not allowed to or did not find it worth their while to remain on the frontier. Some like Malik `Izz al-Din Husain b. Kharmil were also participants in the larger Ghurid endeavour for political paramountcy in Eastern Iran and Khwarazm. These were "Maliks and those who were close, aqriba`," to Sultan Mu`izz al-Din.[14] Juzjani reported that `Izz al-Din Kharmil was installed in Sialkot after the plunder of Lahore in 581/1185-1186.[15] Subsequently Salar Kharmil, together with Qutub al-Din Ai-Beg, were reported to be attendant, dar muwafaqat rakab-i `ala', upon Sultan Mu`izz al-Din and led the van of the army, muqadamah-i lashkar, in the campaign against Rai Jai Chand of Benaras (590/1194).[16] There are no further references to Kharmil's activities in north India but it is clear that his area of deployment was eventually transferred to Afghanistan.

In 601/1204-5 he led the van of Mu`izz al-Din's army against the Qara Khita forces at Andkhud. Sensing Mu`izz

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14. This is the title of the list of free-individuals who served Mu`izz al-din in Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 405.

15. Ibid, vol. 1, pp. 397-398.

16. Ibid, vol. 1, p. 417.

al-Din's weak military position `Izz al-Din Husain withdrew from the imperial camp with his followers just before the battle where the Ghurid forces suffered a disastrous defeat.[17] After the death of Mu`izz al-Din in 602/1206, `Izz al-Din continued to occupy a prominent place within the Ghurid political dispensation as the governor, wali, of Herat. His disenchantment with Ghurid political fortunes was evident from his vacillation between joining the Khwarazm Shah or remaining in the service of the Ghurids.[18]

`Izz al-Din is also interesting for his social background. Together with the lineage of Shish, the descendants of Kharmil, were the closest to an aristocratic class in Ghur. While the lineage of Shish had always been socially prominent as the political competitors of the Shansabanids, the lineage of Kharmil gained social and political privileges through the self-less conduct and sacrifice of their ancestors, Kharmil Sam Husain and Kharmil Sam Banji, who had served Sultan `Ala al-Din Jahan-Suz (544/1149-556/1161), the uncle of Ghiyath al-Din and Mu`izz al-Din.[19] Given `Izz al-Din Husain b. Kharmil's social standing in

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17. Ibid, vol. 1, p. 402.

18. Ibid, vol. 1, pp. 307, 412-3, and Juwaini, Tarikh-i Jahan-Gush trans. Boyle, vol.1, pp. 328-329, 333-334.

19. On Kharmil Sam Husain and Kharmil Sam Banji, the two brave warriors, pahalwan, of Sultan `Ala al-Din Husain see, Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 342. On the Shansabanid conflict with the lineage of Shish see ibid, vol. 1, pp. 324-326, 351-2, 354-55.

Ghur it is not surprising that he succeeded in arranging a lucrative appanage in the heartland of the Ghurid state for himself rather than serve in the peripheries of the Ghurid dominion on the north Indian frontier.

Another individual, sharing some similarities with Malik `Izz al-Din, was Malik Husam al-Din `Ali Karmakh about whom we have far less detail. Malik Husam al-Din was the governor, wali, of Multan and in 582/1186 was appointed to Lahore. Like `Izz al-Din Husain, Husam al-Din also improved his stock until he too was recognised as one of the "Maliks and those who were close, aqriba`" to Sultan Mu`izz al-Din.[20]

Both maliks were freemen, and both had participated in the early campaigns of Mu`izz al-Din. Although the information is less clear about Malik Husam al-Din `Ali Karmakh, the absence of any further reference to him even in the context of the strategic governorship of Lahore leads one to conjecture that like `Izz al-Din Kharmil, he too was eventually deployed in Afghanistan.

Hasan Nizami provides us with further examples of Ghurid elites from Afghanistan who were active on the north Indian frontier. He refers to Jahan Pahalwan Asad al-Din, Asad al-Din Arsalan Kalij, `Izz al-Din b. Muaiyyid al-Din Balkhi, Sharaf al-Din Jarah and Nasir al-Din Husain as a

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20. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri ed. Habibi, vol. 1, pp. 398, 405.

group of commanders that were a part of an expeditionary force sent to Ajmer, circa 591/1195 to relieve Qutub al-Din.[21] Excluding Nasir al-Din Husain, there is no further information on any one of these individuals, nor do they figure again in any Ghurid expedition into north India.

Nasir al-Din's career, however, is instructive. He also figures in Juzjani's list of "Maliks and those who were close, aqriba`" to Sultan Mu`izz al-Din. There he is referred to as the officer in charge of the hunt, the amir-i shikar, at the Ghurid court in Ghazni.[22] He might have also participated in some other campaigns into north India, and Juzjani mentions at least one example where Malik Nasir al-Din accompanied Qutub al-Din Ai-Beg in the Nahrwalah campaign of 590/1194.[23] Yet Juzjani does make it clear that he had considerable influence in Ghazni by Mu`izz al-Din's death (602/1206).

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21. Hasan Nizami, Taj al-Ma`athir, translated Elliot and Dowson The History of India as told by its own Historians (Allahabad: Kitab Mahal, 1963 reprint), vol. 2, p. 229.

22. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 405.

23. At the end of the expedition both returned to Ghazni. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, pp. 442. Raverty, trans., vol. 1, p. 602, and fn. 3, misreads the name as Nasir al-Din Husain-i Khar-Mil and suggests that this might have been `Izz al-Din Husain Kharmil or the name of a previously unidentified brother. Habibi does not display any similar uncertainty.

Together with Taj al-Din Ilduz and the wazir Muayyid al-Mulk Muhammad `Abd Allah Sistani, Nasir al-Din completed the triumvirate that wielded political power in Ghazni. The appanage of Ghazni managed to protect its autonomy from Ghur through the efforts of Nasir al-Din who defeated and killed Sultan `Ala al-Din Atsiz b. `Ala al-Din Jahansuz (610/1213-611/1214) of Ghur. Subsequently Nasir al-Din's influence and ambition reached far enough to challenge Taj al-Din Ilduz's authority and in the ensuing conflict Nasir al-Din together with the wazir Muayyid al-Mulk were murdered.[24]

In his brief military experience with north India, Nasir al-Din was much like `Izz al-Din Kharmil and Husam al-Din `Ali Karmakh. Using the examples of these Maliks it is perhaps possible to generalise even further and suggest that the participants in the early campaigns of Mu`izz al-Din into north India included some free individuals who were a part of an entrenched elite class within the Ghurid appanage. These individuals participated in the campaigns in north India, sometimes held revenue assignments, but eventually reverted back to Afghanistan, leaving the running of the South Asian conquests to others who had more to gain from military adventure on the frontier. Members of the Ghurid elite found little to interest them in north

24. Ibid, vol. 1, pp. 381, 413

India on a long term basis. Individuals of quite different backgrounds perpetuated their contact with the Ghurid South Asian marches.

One such group comprised free individuals who served Mu`izz al-Din in north India but who did not figure in the list of "Maliks and those who were close, aqriba`" to the monarch. Only incidental information is to be found concerning these individuals in the contemporary chronicles; sometimes they were referred to only because they were related or impinged in some way on the life of the chroniclers. It is also obvious that they belonged to a lesser stratum of the Ghurid elite who were present in north India for the opportunities that it presented to improve their material resources and social position. While there are several examples of such individuals from the Ghurid appanage indulging in cossack plunder activity in the north Indian marches, contemporary chroniclers only refer to a couple of notables who were directly affiliated to Mu`izz al-Din.

One is Malik Diya al-Din Qadi Tulak Muhammad `Abd al-Salam Nisawi Tulaki, the son of Qadi Madj al-Din Tulaki, Juzjani's maternal grandfather's brother, pisar-i `amm-i jadd-i madari.[25] In 587/1191, before Mu`izz al-Din's reversal at Tarain, Malik Diya al-Din was appointed by the

25. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 399.

Sultan to the fort of Tabarhind. At the Malik's request, ba iltimas-i u, twelve hundred Tulaki men were chosen from the forces of "Hindustan and Ghazni" and added to his cavalry, khayl. He was appointed by Mu`izz al-din to look after the fort for eight months but because of the reversal at Tarain was besieged for thirteen months before capitulating to Rai Pithora.[26] Malik Diya al-Din was like many other individuals who sought to augment their fortunes through plunder campaigns and conquest in north India. While being directly appointed and affiliated to Mu`izz al-Din his efforts to arrange a body of troopers from Tulak suggests that he sought to create a following tied to himself through a bond of belonging to a common ancestral home. Significantly, khayl, has the double meaning of horsemen or kinsfolk.

There are similarities between Malik Diya al-Din Qadi Tulak and Malik Baha al-Din Muhammad, the governor of Sangwan near Multan. The only reference to Malik Baha al-Din is by Hasan Nizami who does not indicate the year of his appointment as governor.[27] Like Malik Diya al-Din who was supported by a cavalry consisting of kindred from Tulak, Baha al-Din relied upon siblings for military support. Hasan Nizami reported that Baha al-Din received assistance in Sangwan from his brothers who held revenue assignments,

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26. Ibid, vol. 1, p. 400.

27. Hasan Nizami, Taj al-Ma`athir, pp. 233-4.

<u>iqta`</u>, in the region of Multan. While this does indicate a degree of interest by Baha al-Din and his kinsmen in the region of their command, the extent of their local ties is elaborated by the support which the Malik and his brothers received from other migrants when challenged by hostile forces. This alliance for local self-preservation took place when Sultan Mu`izz al-Din, involved in campaigns against the Khwarazm Shah and the Qara Khita in Khurasan (601/1204-5), was unable to come to their defence during the Khokar attack on Multan and its environs. This event can be situated sometime between Mu`izz al-Din's reversal at Andkhud, 601/1204-5, and his murder at Damyak in 602/1206. The Khokars were challenged by the Malik Baha al-Din, his brothers, "accompanied by many of the chief people, <u>ra'is</u>, of the city" but they, together, were not successful in overcoming the Khokar insurgency. Of this group Malik Baha al-Din was the only officer appointed by Mu`izz al-Din, but what is interesting is the fact that the Malik, together with his kinsman, had consolidated their position sufficiently in local society that, in the absence of royal aid from Ghazni, they together with the "chief people of the city" participated in domestic defence.

The example of Malik Diya al-Din Qadi Tulak and Baha al-Din suggests that while free individuals from the Ghurid appanage were patronised by Mu`izz al-Din in frontier campaigns, the actual defence of their position in South

Asia was organised on a local level through the banding together of individuals sharing a bond of common descent, or geographical proximity. One can also conclude that the creation of these local ties in South Asia indicates a recognition of a "career investment" in the region. Unlike `Izz al-Din Kharmil, Husam al-Din `Ali Karmakh or Nasir al-Din Husain, the efforts of Malik Diya al-Din Qadi Tulak and Baha al-Din were not diverted towards consolidating their positions in Afghanistan and an eventual return to their motherland. Instead their efforts seem to have been directed towards protecting their uncertain positions on the north Indian marches through association with others like themselves in status and interests.

It is also worthwhile to note that the Malik Diya al-Din Qadi Tulak Muhammad `Abd al-Salam Nisawi Tulaki, was the son of a qadi (judge), and continued to carry that title. Minhaj-i Siraj does not provide us with sufficient information to judge whether Diya al-Din was ever appointed as a qadi, but the tone of the text does indicate that the Malik deserved respect on account of his descent from a learned jurist. Hasan Nizami provides us with information on some other jurists.

The first is the Qadi al-Qudat Sharf al-Mulk who received Hasan Nizami "with great kindness" upon his migration to Delhi circa 1192. The enigmatic Sharf al-Mulk is not heard of again.

Not much more is known about Sadr Rukn al-Din Hamza who was

> among the chiefs of the country and the renowned of the state, and had obtained distinction by the customs of embassage and the proprieties of missions.[28]

Sadr Rukn al-Din Hamza was sent as an emissary to the court of Raja Pithora in Ajmer sometime in 588/1192 before the second battle at Tarain. According to Hasan Nizami, Rukn al-Din stayed on in Ajmer after the battle of Tarain and informed Qutub al-Din that the brother of the king of Ranthambhor, Hiraj/Bhiraj had revolted. There is no further mention of the Sadr Rukn al-Din Hamza in Nizami's eulogy of conquest.[29]

Neither of the two, the qadi or the sadr were included in Juzjani's list of qadis and `ulama in Mu`izz al-Din's reign nor is there any reference to their activities in Afghanistan.[30] In fact if one follows Hasan Nizami's account of Sadr Rukn al-Din Hamzah, the main reason why he should be entitled "Qiwam al-Mulk" or the "adornment of the state" by the author appears to be not so much because of

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28. Hasan Nizami, Taj al-Ma`athir, p. 212.

29. Ibid, p. 219.

30. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 405.

his pious qualities, but as a consequence of his successful ability to report on developments in Ajmer.

Although we do not possess details about the careers of individual qadis, sadrs, or sayyids in South Asia from this time period, the conventional understanding amongst historians concerning the office of qadi and sadr is that they were nearly synonymous, in that qadis "also acted as sadrs in their respective areas".[31] They were men who had mastered a/some religious text[s], were known for their piety, humility and altruism. They used their scholastic training and moral qualities for purposes of adjudication on the basis of the Shari`a and managed charitable estates, and services for the indigent, the orphans and the widowed.[32] Clearly Sadr Rukn al-Din's conduct (or Malik Diya al-Din Qadi Tulak's) does not match the classical description of piety or the conduct of a "man of the pen".[33] However, if one accounts for the frontier environment of Ghurid territories in north India then the quality of the

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31. See I.H. Qureshi, The administration of the Sultanate of Delhi (New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, 1971 edition), p. 176.

32. See I.H. Qureshi, The administration of the Sultanate of Delhi, pp. 157, 160-1, 175-177. For a more sceptical study see K.A. Nizami, Some aspects of Religion and Politics in India (Delhi: Idarah-i Adabiyat-i Delli, 1974 edition), pp. 150-173.

33. On the idealised description of a "man of the pen" see Sources of Indian Tradition, ed. Ainslie T. Embree, (Columbia University Press, 1988) 1:430-432.

pietistic endeavour to protect, and enlarge the habitat of the "chosen community" is unquestionable.

The demands of the frontier on the nature of service required of the pious is well brought out by the career of Minhaj-i Siraj's father, Maulana Siraj al-Din Minhaj. Maulana Siraj al-Din Minhaj was a jurist of middling rank. Although Minhaj-i Siraj extolled his father's achievements and honours in the Tabaqat-i Nasiri, yet Siraj al-Din Minhaj was never included in the son's list of the eminent qadis and learned of the realm. Similarly Fakhr-i Mudabbir also ignored Maulana Siraj al-Din Minhaj in his list of eminent qadis and wazirs.[34] Maulana Siraj al-Din Minhaj, however, had enviable imperial connections. Other than his relationship with Sultan Baha al-Din of Bamian, he was associated through his wife with the princess Mah Malik, daughter of Sultan Ghiyath al-Din of Ghur.[35]

Siraj al-Din Minhaj progressed rapidly in office. After an initial period of wandering during which he delivered some sermons in Bamian, Siraj al-Din was recruited by Mu`izz al-Din in 582/1186 to serve in Lahore together with Malik Husam al-Din `Ali Karmakh. While on the frontier in Lahore Siraj al-Din Minhaj performed the functions of the

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34. Fakhr-i Mudabbir, Tarikh-i Fakhr al-Din Mubarakshah, ed. E. Denisson Ross, (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1927), pp. 69-70.

35. Minhaj-i Siraj, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, vol. 1, p. 369. The author spent his childhood in the Princess's harem.

itinerant "judge of the army of Hindustan", the qadi lashkar-i Hindustan, and had twelve camels assigned to aid him in fulfilling his responsibilities.[36]

The office of the qadi lashkar was much like the early Ayyubid and Ottoman office of qadi `asker in that he had judicial responsibility and supervisory functions over a specific unit of the army. In the early Ottoman state the qadi `asker was also responsible for appointing subordinate qadis in areas under his jurisdiction.[37] Although the fortunes of the "army of Hindustan" over which Maulana Siraj al-Din Minhaj adjudicated between 582/1186 and circa 591/1195 were rapidly improving, it is likely that as the Ghurid area of control in Hindustan increased the responsibilities of the qadi lashkar diminished. Hasan Nizami does after all mention the presence of the Qadi al-Qudat Sharf al-Mulk in Delhi in 588/1192, and the presence of this officer (and also the sadr sent on a diplomatic mission) does suggest that the responsibilities of the judiciary might well have been differentiated some time around 588/1192 between qadis in the field and the more prestigious qadiships of the settlements and garrison

36. ibid, vol. 1, p. 398.

37. See Uriel Heyd, Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), Halil Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975) and The Encyclopaedia of Islam ed. C.E. Bosworth (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1960-) s.v. "Kadi `Askar".

towns.

At any rate, sometime around 591/1195 when Minhaj-i Siraj was three (lunar) years old Maulana Siraj al-Din was enticed from Lahore and Mu`izzid service to the court of Sultan Baha al-Din Sam of Bamian (588/1192-602/1206). In contrast to his office of the qadi lashkar in Lahore, in Bamian the Maulana received the dignity of the "chief judge of the realm", the quda-i mamalik, and, in addition, responsibilities akin to the qadi lashkar, the executive post of "censor of public morals", ihtisab ba-kull umur-i shari`a, and two madrasahs together with their immunities (in`am) and revenue assignments (iqta`).[38]

The case of Maulana Siraj al-Din Minhaj highlights two characteristics of the Ghurid intrusion into South Asia that have been discussed thus far. The first concerns the nature of service on the frontier. It is hardly original to note the frequency of combat between the Ghurid invaders and the autochthenes during 1180-1210, nor the fact that it was military service that was the favoured profession amongst the Mu`izzids in north India. It is perhaps worthwhile to emphasise this point however, because of its impact on Muslim ritual specialists (qadis etc.) who were otherwise seldom involved with military activities. Their

38. Minhaj-i Siraj, Tabaqat-i Nasiri ed. Habibi, vol. 1, pp. 388-389, and Raverty's translation, vol. 1, pp. xxi-xxii.

role in field activity diminished only slightly during this time period, but by circa 588/1192 and the onslaught and occupation of urban centres in north India the differentiation between the pious in the field from those in the urban centres was noticeable yet not worthy of comment by the chroniclers.

The second characteristic that the career of the Maulana draws attention to is the motivation to serve in the marches of north India. As we have already noticed there were very few Shansabanid kinsmen that served in north India. Together with some of the upper elite from Ghur, their major interests continued to reside in Afghanistan where, after a brief service on the frontier, they all returned. While service in north India with its temptation of plunder was extremely seductive the people that were attracted were from a middle, or lower, social and political reckoning. In an effort to bolster their position some of these individuals like Malik Diya al-Din Qadi Tulak and Baha al-Din sought to consolidate their post by situating kinsmen as a body of support, with vested interests in the protection of the region. For them, in the absence of equally lucrative opportunities in Afghanistan, the perils of the frontier with its opportunities of plunder was an acceptable risk.

That the opportunities to plunder north Indian hoards was a major incentive has been lately detailed by John

Deyell's study of the movement of precious metals and bullion through dethesaurization from the Gangetic plain towards the Punjab and Afghanistan.[39] However, this was not a simple "drain of wealth" out of north India into Afghanistan exemplified by the usage of the celebrated "melon/drum of gold", kharbuzah-yi zarin, to fund the construction of the Jama\` Masjid in Herat.[40] Instead as Deyell rightly argues the undiminished circulation of Ghurid and sometimes recirculated indigenous gold and bullion coinage with sigilla in Devanagiri, Persian and Arabic indicates a more permanent presence of the conquerors within the ambitus of the north Indian economy. Indeed some individuals conquered, plundered and stayed, but they stayed because of the social and economic gains available in the north Indian marches.

In fact Maulana Siraj al-Din presents an excellent example here. His appointment as qadi lashkar in Lahore was the first major appointment in his professional life. He had honour, status and a share in the proceeds of the spoil from plunder campaigns: an enviable lot for many people.

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39. John Deyell, Living without Silver, pp. 195-211 and maps 1, 2, 8 and 9.

40. Of the four drums seized from Ranthambhor and remitted by Qutb al-Din Ai-beg to Muizz al-Din, one was sent to Sultan Ghiyath al-Din Ghur. See Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, vol.1, p. 375 and Fakhr-i Mudabbir, Tarikh-i Fakhr al-Din Mubarakshah ed. E. Denison Ross, pp. 22-23, for the details on the conquest of Ranthambhor.

Yet, as in the case of the Maulana, if comparable or better opportunities were to open up within the central Islamic lands it could imply a quick return. Siraj al-Din migrated to what were clearly better opportunities in Bamian without so much as informing and getting the permission of the Ghurid Sultan, be-ijazat-i Sultan Ghiyath al-Din ba-hazrat-i Bamian raft.[41] It would be some years before the push and pull factors in favour of service in north India would be altered against the Central Islamic lands.

The one undeveloped assumption here is that notables in the service of the Mu`izzid regime had an option to choose the nature and area of their service; that they were, as the sub-title of the section notes, "free-men" in exercising their preferences. The majority of the people who led the assault and manned the garrison towns in north India under Mu`izzid auspices, however, were never presented with these opportunities to choose; as slaves, bandagan (singular, banda), of the Sultan Mu`izz al-Din they had constantly to function within his directives. In the uncertain, yet lucrative environment of the north Indian marches these bandagan constituted a vital element in the bulk of the Mu`izzid forces.

41. ibid, vol.1, p. 389.

III Mu`izz al-Din's slaves and their dependents:

While it is quite clear that the bulk of the conquests and the military administration of the urban centres were carried out and administered by Mu`izz al-Din's slaves it is important to differentiate the slave corps and recognize that the bandagan were led by an elite personnel largely of Turkish ethnic background. Most of Mu`izz al-Din's slaves remain anonymous to us, but the elite corps of Turkish slaves are extensively described in the Tabaqat-i Nasiri and the Tarikh-i Fakhr al-Din Mubarakshah. In the Tabaqat-i Nasiri, Juzjani described the elite corps of slaves as the bandagan-i khass (the senior, literally, the special slaves). Although it is difficult to be precise, it is likely that around 601/1205 the bandagan-i khass, the elite military troopers of the monarch, numbered anywhere between fifty and seventy-five. These bandagan-i khass were appointed as governors to strategic revenue assignments by Mu`izz al-Din, participated in the Sultan's campaigns as cavalrymen, where they were deployed with the central contingent, qalb, around the monarch. By reputation, at least, during moments of crisis in a campaign they stood by their master and were the last group to retreat.[42]

42. On the bandagan-i khass, their Turkish origin, their deployment with the qalb, and loyalty to their master during a time of crisis see Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 403, and the description of the Andkhud campaign. During the Andkhud campaign Juzjani noted that the bandagan-i khass, and the commanders who were the

Mu`izz al-Din's slaves belonged to a variety of ethnic backgrounds, but the logic in the deployment of Turks as bandagan-i khass was to some extent a result of their formidable reputation as warriors. Slaves of Turkish origin in particular were favoured because they were excellent archers with marvelous equestrian capabilities. This had already won them considerable acclaim within the Islamic world and Jahiz put their case to the `Abbasid wazir in the eighth century in the following manner :

> If a thousand of their (Turks) horse join battle and let off a single shower of arrows, they can mow down a thousand [Arab] horse. No army can withstand this kind of assault. The Kharijites and the Beduin have no skill worth mentioning in shooting from horseback, but the Turk can shoot at beasts, birds, hoops, men, sitting quarry, dummies and birds on the wing, and do so at full gallop to fore or to rear, to left or to right, upwards or downwards, loosing ten arrows before the Kharijite can nock one....and if they do turn their back, they are to be feared as much as deadly poison and sudden death; for their arrows hit the mark as much when they are retreating as when they are advancing.[43]

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notables of Ghur, sar-i khaylan Ghuri keh khwass-i Sultan budand, numbered about a hundred horses. If one were to exclude the "notables of Ghur" and include the senior slaves of the monarch located in Ghazni and in the domains of Hindustan (not present at Andkhud), the number of the bandagan-i khass would probably be less than seventy five.

43. Translated by C.T. Harvey Walker, "Jahiz of Basra to al-Fath ibn Khaqan on the `Exploits of the Turks and the Army of the Khalifate in general'" Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 23 (1915) p. 666, and J.D. Latham, "The Archers of the Middle East: the Turco-Iranian background" Iran 8 (1970) 97. See also E. McEwen, "Persian Archery texts: Chapter eleven of Fakhr-i Mudabbir's Adab al-Harb" The Islamic Quarterly 18 (1974): 76-99.

While the majority of Mu`izz al-Din's military slaves were seized during the monarch's plunder raids in Afghanistan, Khurasan and north India the process of acquisition of the Turkish slaves differed and was made more difficult by the absence of a Ghurid frontier with Central Asia. As a result Mu`izz al-Din was forced to purchase his Turkish slaves through merchants. Qutub al-Din Ai-Beg, and Iltutmish were both sold to merchants in the Central Asian steppes. The former was subsequently brought from Kufa to Ghazni to be sold. Iltutmish's case was similar: he was sold first to the merchant, Bukhara Haji, and then to Jamal al-Din Chust Qaba who tried to sell him in Ghazni and Bukhara before finally meeting with success in Delhi.[44]

The financial outlay required to buy these elite Turkish slaves must have been considerable; each slave implied a substantial investment of money. Juzjani recounts the haggling that took place between the Sultan and the merchant Jamal al-Din Chust Qaba over the pair of slaves Iltutmish and Ai-Beg (a namesake of Qutub al-Din). Mu`izz al-Din's offer of two thousand gold Rukni dinars for the pair was rejected by the merchant. The Sultan's ability to

44. Juzjani, <u>Tabaqat-i Nasiri</u>, ed. Habibi, vol 1, p. 442.

build a vast slave retinue was a result of the wealth that he had accrued from his plunder campaigns, and the remittances that he continued to receive from his subordinates located in north India. In 602/1206 the lesser half of the hoard in Mu`izz al-Din's treasury removed to Bamian amounted to two hundred and fifty camel loads of gold, jewel studded articles and vessels of gold and silver. Obviously the Sultan could well afford the expense entailed in the purchase of slaves especially when they later remitted more than an even return on their investment in north Indian plunder.[45]

It would be some years, however, before the slaves could make remittances to Ghazni from their independent commands on the frontier. Some of the bandagan-i khass, like the Turk Taj al-Din Ilduz, were purchased when they were extremely young, khurd sal bud. Others, like Qutub al-Din Ai-Beg, and Iltutmish were youths.[46] Slaves were seldom purchased individually; they were normally sold in a group, guroh, or as in the case of Iltutmish, a chain, dar yek silk bud. This group was trained together and in time one

45. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, pp. 408-9. See also J.F. Richards, "Outflows of Precious Metals from early Islamic India" in Precious Metals in the later Medieval and Early Modern Worlds ed. J.F. Richards (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1983), pp. 183-205, specially p. 193.

46. On Ilduz and Ai-Beg see respectively Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, vol. 1, p. 411, and 416.

of them was recognised as the group leader. The group leader was gradually promoted and was given responsibility over increasing number of bandagan until he was adjudged to be ready to hold independent command.[47]

The history of Taj al-Din Ilduz and Qutub al-Din Ai-Beg were similar in that both received gradual promotions within the slave ranks and it was only once they had matured in service and could be trusted that they were given posts of command in the state. Ilduz, for example, was raised up the ranks, buzurg gardanid, step by step, pas martabeh, until he was older, chun buzurg shud, when he received a command and governorship, amarat wa wilayat rasid. By 602/1206 he was the chief, mihtar, of the Turkish Maliks and the most distinguished of the slaves, buzurgtar-i bandagan, of the Sultan Mu`izz al-Din.[48] Similarly the slave Baha al-Din Tughril was raised in status, buzurg gardanidah bud, after [appropriate] training, ba-tarbiyat.[49] There is greater detail about Ai-Beg. After he had been

47. This is the normative method described by Nizam al-Mulk, Siyasat Namah, trans. Hubert Darke (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 102-105. The broader outline of the method of training recommended by Nizam al-Mulk was confirmed in the testament of the Ghaznavid monarch Sebuktigin (366/977-387/997). See M. Nazim, "The Pand-Namah of Subuktigin" Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1933) pp. 605-628, especially p. 623.

48. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 411.

49. Ibid, vol. 1, p. 421.

distinguished from the commonality of the slaves and made to serve in the royal court, his was a faster rise in the ranks: from a leader of troops, <u>sar-i khayl</u>; to Amir of the stables, <u>Amir Akhur</u>; to in-charge of the foragers on campaign, <u>bar sar-i....`ulafqi</u>; until finally he was given the assignment, <u>iqta`</u>, of Kuhram in the Punjab.[50]

The example of Ilduz and Qutub al-Din indicates that the process of appointment and promotion within the Ghurid slave corps had similarities with the normative process described by the Seljuq <u>wazir</u> Nizam al-Mulk in his <u>Siyasat Namah</u>. The <u>wazir</u> noted :

> This is the system which was still in force in the time of the Samanids (204/819-395/1005). Slaves were given gradual advancement in rank according to their length of service and general merit. Thus after a slave was bought, for one year he was commanded to serve on foot at a rider's stirrup....when he had done one year's service with boots, the tent leader spoke to the chamberlain and he informed the king; then they gave him a small Turkish horse....in his third year he was given a belt to gird on his waist. In the fourth year they gave him a quiver and bow case...In his fifth year he got a better saddle and a bridle with stars on it....In the sixth year he was made a cup-bearer or water-bearer....In the seventh year he was a robe bearer. In the eighth year they gave him a single apex, sixteen-peg tent and put three newly bought slaves in his troop....Every year they improved his uniform and embellishments and increased his rank and

50. Ibid, vol. 1, p. 416-7.

> responsibility until he became a troop-leader and so on until he became a chamberlain.[51]

The Ghurid practise was not nearly as structured as Nizam al-Mulk might have wanted it to be; Mu`izzi slaves were frequently promoted much faster than the Seljuqid _wazir's_ recommendations. Qutub al-Din Ai-Beg, for one, jumped ranks in a year that the Seljuq _wazir_ would have stretched out at least over a decade.[52] A rapid rise up the slave ranks might have been necessitated by the fact that some of Mu`izz al-Din's slaves were not purchased as children. Ai-Beg was a youth who had already undergone some training with a previous master. More crucially, however, it was the personal qualities and aptitude of some of the slaves that warranted their quicker promotion to the eventual status of _bandagan-i khass_.

To begin with the course of training and eventual promotion was one that all military slaves, irrespective of their age and ethnic background, went through. The intention was to create a new identity for the slave where his dependence upon his master was absolute. To achieve this the alienation of the slave from his natal surroundings and

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51. Nizam al-Mulk, _Siyasat Namah_ trans. Hubert Darke (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 103-4.

52. In 587/1191, when he was the Commander of the Stables, _amir akhur_, Qutub al-Din received the additional charge of leader of the foragers on the campaign into Khwarazm, and then the revenue assignment, _iqta`_, of Kuhram.

the related absence of social moorings in his new environment were crucial. In their stead, newly fostered ties and opportunities in the service of the monarch enticed the slave into an exotic world.

The Sultan sought to ensure that his dependents from foreign cultural environments "fit" into their new social and religious surroundings. As a result, together with training in arms and deployment with the army, it was important that the slave be instructed in the religion and etiquette of his new world. This religious instruction was introduced after the slave had been captured or purchased by the Sultan and this was certainly true for those bandagan acquired as children. Otherwise, at least in the case of those slaves that were purchased, this aspect of the training of the slave would have been carried out by the slave-merchant or a previous master. A slave, who possessed a preliminary military and religious training, commanded an excellent price in the slave market. Qutub al-Din's value, for example, accrued from the religious training that he had received earlier from the noted Hanafi jurist the Qadi al-Qudat Fakhr al-Din `Abd al-`Aziz Kufi.[53] This preliminary introduction to the Islamic world was of enormous value for it implied that the slave possessed the

53. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed, Habibi, vol. 1, p. 416 and Fakhr-i Mudabbir, Tarikh-i Fakhr al-Din Mubarakshah, ed. E.D. Ross, pp. 21-22.

rudimentary etiquette to be allowed into the imperial court where the Sultan could interact with his slave without any social discord.[54]

A secondary effort was also directed to seduce the loyalty of the slaves by holding out promises of wealth and high office possible in the service of the monarch. It helped to draw the contrast between the lives of the slaves in their former environment while they were free and as slaves in the service of the Sultan. Fakhr-i Mudabbir presented the imperial case faithfully. Referring solely to the Turkish slaves the author noted that in the steppes the Turks were nondescript, indistinguishable from each other in power and wealth, but when they came within the Muslim world

> the further [the Turk slaves] are taken from their hearth, their kin and their dwellings, <u>har chand az khaneh wa aqriba` wa wilayet-i khud durtar uftad</u>, the more valued, precious and expensive they become, <u>qadr wa qimat wa baha-i u ziyadat gardad</u>, and they become com-

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54. In addition to their training what further endeared the youth of the Central Asian steppe to the Sultan, as in the case of Ilduz and Iltutmish, was their comeliness, their fairness, <u>jamal</u>, and agreeable manners. Juzjani, <u>Tabaqat-i Nasiri</u>, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, pp. 411, 442. Such youth were prized possessions and were kept in close proximity to the monarch. Nevertheless, while pedarasty might endear a young slave to his master this did not necessarily improve the slave's political status. Qutub al-Din Ai-Beg, for one, possessed no apparent beauty, <u>ba-zahiri jamali na-dasht</u>. This, of course, did not prevent his subsequent rise to political prominence.

manders and generals, amiran wa sipahsalaran shawand.[55]

The ideal distance between the steppe and the Islamic world that Fakhr-i Mudabbir was hinting towards was not merely spatial but also cultural. At least according to that author the ability to renounce heathen practice and natal roots were ethnic qualities peculiar to the Turks. He noted that "when their hearts turn to Islam, chunan dil Muslimani ba-nihand, they do not remember their homes, their place of origins or their kinsmen, khaneh wa jai wa aqriba` besh yad nakunand."[56] I am sure, however, that not all Turks were quite able to see the experience of enslavement as a chance to make good in new surroundings. Fakhr-i Mudabbir, writing for Qutub al-Din Ai-Beg, a patron of Turkish, slave antecedents, definitely overstated his case; there were examples of discord in the imperial court from the Ghaznavid period caused by Turk slaves who lacked sufficient decorum.[57] Yet, Fakhr-i Mudabbir was correct within a more limited context. The process of training was certainly aimed at creating a banda who was at home within

55. ibid, p. 36.

56. Fakhr-i Mudabbir, Tarikh-i Fakhr al-Din Mubarakshah, ed. E.D. Ross, p. 36.

57. Note the examples of Asihtigin Ghazi and Eryaruq for the Ghaznavids. See C.E. Bosworth, The Ghaznavids: their Empire in Afghanistan and Eastern Iran 994-1040 (Beirut: Libraire du Liban, 1973), p. 57.

an Islamic context, was loyal to his master, and grateful for the avenues of promotion that opened up for him in imperial service and there were notable successes. Of all the imperial slaves some did learn the etiquette of their master quickly enough so that the Muslim Sultan felt comfortable in their company. Slaves of Turkish origin had a head start here. Since they were a financial investment (in contrast to war booty) the merchants and their masters made deliberate attempts to train this group. It was from this smaller group of slaves that the more privileged bandagan-i khass originated.

The starting point to a position of trust and command for the bandagan-i khass was an opportunity to personally serve the monarch. During this period the slave would display his personal worth and ability to follow the instructions of his master. The master in turn would establish close personal ties with his subordinate and win his trust and affection through kindness and choice rewards. This was a period of nourishing or fostering a slave and the Persian chronicles have used the verb parwardan, fostering, and tarbiyat, educating or nourishing, to indicate the process through which slaves came to be regarded, in time, as foster sons. Fakhr-i Mudabbir noted that after a period of close association, Mu`izz al-Din "adored [Qutub al-Din] as a beloved son, farzand-i `aziz girami, (and) went to

extremes in his rearing and education, ba-parward wa dar tarbiyat-i u mubalighat namud."[58]

The ties of relationship established on affection and trust between the bandagan-i khass and the Sultan were complemented by similar ties between the slaves themselves. Nizam al-Mulk had explained that a slave should be promoted to the status of Amir and appointed to a province only after his "suitability, skill and bravery" were recognised and he had been "found to be considerate to his fellows and loyal to his master." That the advice was translated into practice is evident from the event which brought Qutub al-Din to the attention of Sultan Mu`izz al-Din. Juzjani reported that Mu`izz al-Din sometimes, gah-gah, held convivial gatherings and parties, ba-tarab wa `aish, and during one such engagement he ordered the distribution of gold and wrought and unwrought silver amongst his (attendant) slaves. Qutub al-Din received his share of the Sultan's largess, but he came out of that party and proceeded to share his portion with the slaves outside: the Turks, the chamberlains in charge of the curtain, those responsible for pitching the imperial tents and laying the carpets and sundry other workers, az majlis birun amad, tamam an mal ba-turkan wa pardehdaran wa farrash wa digar kardaran bakhshid. When this was reported to the Sultan he rewarded

58. Fakhr-i Mudabbir, Tarikh-i Fakhr al-Din Mubarak-shah, ed. E.D. Ross, p. 22.

Qutub al-Din, employed him in the court and kept him close at hand. This marked the slave's rise to favour.[59]

Qutub al-Din Ai-Beg was rewarded by his master because he had inadvertently shown a degree of corporate solidarity with his slave "brethren", less fortunate (entirely by chance) than him. That the slave corps felt bound by a sentiment of common interest and sympathy worked to the interest of the monarch. It implied, on one hand, a recognition that the privileged bandagan-i khass could function more effectively as leaders of the larger slave corps when ties other than a formal chain of command united them. The intention was to mute and make hierarchical distinctions more palatable. It also implied a degree of check on the activities of the larger body of slaves through the bandagan-i khass. In effect, those slaves who were indifferently assimilated to the imperial court remained loyal to the Sultan through their attachment towards their corps commanders, who were "like sons" to the Sultan.

In fact, Mu`izz al-Din went even further and established a corporate solidarity amongst his bandagan-i khass as well. In a manner that paralleled the cousin marriages of the Shansabanid imperial lineage, Mu`izz al-Din ordered affinal relations between some of his bandagan-i khass. By the command of the Sultan, daughters of Ilduz were married


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59. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 316.

respectively to Qutub al-Din Ai-Beg and Qubacha; two daughters of Qutub al-Din were married, one after the death of the other, to Qubacha. Mu`izz al-Din sought to tie his slaves not merely to himself through his affection, close association, generosity and political and economic opportunities within his realm, but also to each other through a unity of interests, and social interdependence. There was a greater amount of egalitarianism within the corporate group of the bandagan-i khass. The Sultan sought to be the crucial linchpin of all of these associations; all favours and social relationships were engendered through his decrees.

It is possible that Mu`izz al-Din sought to ascertain the loyalty of his bandagan-i khass before he appointed them to independent commands in north India. The earliest mention that Juzjani has of the deployment of a slave on an independent assignment, iqta`, in north India was only in the monarch's 19th lunar regnal year, in 588/1192, when Qutub al-Din Ai-Beg was appointed to Kuhram.[60] It is also interesting to note that from the 1190's onwards the references to free individuals directly subordinate to Mu`izz al-Din in north India start to decline, instead the

60. Both, Fakhr-i Mudabbir's Tarikh-i Fakhr al-Din Mubarak Shah, ed. E.D. Ross, and Hasan Nizami's Taj al-Ma`athir, commence from 587/1191 and have details following Qutub al-Din's appointment to Kuhram. The Tabaqat-i Nasiri does not suffer from the same lacunae, although it too is not necessarily comprehensive.


THE MU`IZZI BANDAGAN
IN HINDUSTAN
Andkhud
BAMIAN
FIRUZ KOH
GHAZNI
KARMAN
LAHORE
MULTAN
UCHCH
Tabarhind
Kuhram
Hansi
DELHI
Baran
BUDAUN
Kol
BAYANA
AWADH
Gwalior
BENARAS
KALINJAR
LAKHNAUTI
Dewal

chroniclers mention the Sultan's bandagan and their subordinates. In the far flung, hostile, yet lucrative frontier zone in north India it seems that the unquestioned loyalty of the Mu`izzi bandagan to their master made them the ideal, closely drilled, military personnel who could be trusted to successfully carry out Mu`izz al-Din's programme of conquest and plunder.

It was for this reason that the bandagan-i khass were appointed to guard the centre of his dominions in north India. In the north, the governorships of Karman and Sanquran, staging posts for invasions into north India were assigned to Taj al-Din Ilduz.[61] Uchch and Multan were assigned to Nasir al-Din Ai-Tamur, and upon his death in 601/1205, to Malik Nasir al-Din Qubacha.[62] In the centre of north India, Kuhram, and later Delhi and Tabarhind were the charge of Qutub al-Din Ai-Beg. Hansi was assigned to Malik Nusrat al-Din Tayisi.[63] In the South and South-Eastern extension of Mu`izz al-Din's territory Sipahsalar Hizabr

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61. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 497.

62. Ibid, vol.1, p. 418.

63. Hasan Nizami, Taj al-Ma`athir, p. 217 refers to the Malik Nusrat al-Din in connection with the iqta` of Hansi. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 2, p. 10, mentions a Malik Nusrat al-Din Tayisi al-Mu`izzi, a slave of Mu`izz al-Din, who as late as circa 1228 still held the assignment of Hansi, together with Jhind and Barwalah. The two authors are probably referring to the same Malik.

al-Din Hasan Aznab was given the assignment, iqta`, of Budaun in 594/1197-8; subsequently he was moved to Kalinjar in 599/1202.[64] Malik Baha al-Din Tughril was given the charge of Thangir, in the district of Bayana in 592/1196.[65] In the Eastern Gangetic plain in 590/1194 Malik Husam al-Din Ughul-Beg was appointed to the assignment of Awadh which included Benaras and Kol.[66]

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64. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 422, Hasan Nizami, Taj al-Ma`athir, vol. 2, p. 232.

65. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 421, Hasan Nizami, Taj al-Ma`athir, vol. 2, p. 227.

66. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, pp. 423, 451, Hasan Nizami, Taj al-Ma`athir, p. 224, and Fakhr-i Mudabbir, Tarikh-i Fakhr al-Din Mubarakshah, ed. E.D. Ross, p. 25. Fakhr-i Mudabbir refers to the officer as a slave of Mu`izz al-Din and his version of the name differs slightly: Sipahsalar Husam al-Din Ahmad `Ali. There is little consistency in the way our sources have preserved the officers's title. According to Habibi, the various manuscripts of the Tabaqat-i Nasiri have variants of the Turkish title Ughul-Beg (see, vol. 1, p. 423, fn. 1.). Al-Awfi, Jawami` al-Hikayat wa Lawami`ur-Riwayat also mentions the name as Husam al-Din Ughul-Beg; M. Nizamuddin transliterates this as Aghlabek. See M. Nizamuddin, Introduction to the Jawami`u'l-Hikayat wa Lawami`u'r-Riwayat of Sadiu'd-din Muhammad al-Awfi (Leiden: Gibb Memorial Series, 1929) p.228. Raverty transliterated the title Aghul-Bak (Raverty, trans., vol. 1, pp. 549, 627). See also the commentary of S.H. Hodivala, Studies in Indo-Muslim History: a critical commentary on Elliot and Dowson's History of India (Bombay: Popular Book Depot, 1939), vol. 1, pp. 180-181. From the context in which the Sipahsalar is mentioned in Fakhr-i Mudabbir (he was one of the more powerful of the Mu`izzid commanders in North India, see below) it can be ascertained that the same commander is being referred to. The only distinction is that Fakhr-i Mudabbir uses an Islamic name, Ahmad `Ali, rather than the Turkish one, Ughul-Beg. It was probably not an unusual practice amongst recent Turkic converts who held offices of authority to also take on a Muslim name. On this question see also my forthcoming The Creation and Representation of Order: Ghiyath al-Din's Tughluqabad.

There were further extensions of Mu`izzid control from this core area and these were carried out by individuals and groups recruited by the Sultan's slaves. The retinue of the bandagan-i khass supplemented the forces left by the Sultan and were an important element within the military force that garrisoned the urban centres of north India. Although the nature of the relationship between the Sultan's and the Malik's retinue is not quite clear it is interesting to note that the former were not reported to have ever led any military contingent on campaign or been appointed by the bandagan-i khass to man a conquest.

The subordinates that the bandagan-i khass tended to entrust with local authority and strategic commands were by and large their own slaves. Qutub al-Din's slave, Tamghaj (died, circa 602/1206), for example, was appointed Amir of Tabarhind. Another slave, Shams al-Din Iltutmish, was appointed successively to Gwalior, Baran and then Budaun.[67] A slave corps was established by each of the senior Mu`izzid slaves with the full cognisance of the Ghurid monarch.[68] As in the case of their close, trusted and dependent relationship with their master in Ghazni the

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67. According to Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 443.

68. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 451, vol. 2, pp. 2-3, preserves the names of two of Baha al-Din Tughril's slaves: Nasir al-Din Ai-Tamar and `Izz al-Din Tughril Baha'i.

senior slaves attempted to establish identical relationships with their own slaves. This did not pose a challenge to Mu`izz al-Din's authority in India for despite the ties of association which united the bandagan-i khass and their slaves, it was clear that Mu`izz al-Din was recognised as the ultimate overlord. The slaves of the bandagan-i khass participated in the campaigns of the Sultan together with their masters where they were sometimes rewarded by the monarch for their valour.[69]

Once the slaves of the bandagan-i khass were appointed to command some of the new conquests we find that for the purpose of governance and military security they recruited their own retinue as well. Here the cultural expectations of the day influenced their decision to rely in turn upon a core of trusted slaves. Iltutmish, Qutub al-Din's slave, for example, appointed his slave Hindu Khan Muayyid al-Din Mubarak al-Khazin as his Yuzban, keeper of the hunting leopards, and then mash`alah dar, torch bearer, while he was the governor of Baran.[70] That Iltutmish seriously

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69. According to Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 444, during Mu`izz al-Din's campaign against the Khokars (after the defeat at Andkhud 601/1204-5) the forces of Qutub al-Din, and that of his slave Iltutmish were also present. Mu`izz al-Din was sufficiently impressed by Iltutmish that he commended the slave to Qutub al-Din and "commanded that they should write and prepare [Iltutmish's] deed of manumission, ba-farmud ta khatt-i `atiq-i u dar tahrir awardand."

70. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 2, p. 18.

pursued the goal of building up a dependent service clientele was evident in his efforts to "train" his slaves for later high offices within his establishment; Juzjani mentions the biographies of two such early Shamsi bandagan, Malik Ikhtiyar al-Din Ai-Tegin and Taj al-Din Sanjar Qutluq.[71] Clearly the bandagan-i khass possessed a substantial reservoir of military personnel that they could depend upon.

Other than the slave retinue that the bandagan-i khass bought, nourished and appointed to offices, a great number of free men were also engaged primarily for plunder campaigns on the frontiers. War against the infidels, ghazw, generated enough lucre that contingents of Hindu autochthenes, ratgan wa takran, chose to serve Muslim masters.[72] The ubiquitous Khalajis, however, were the one group of free individuals recruited by the bandagan-i khass that made the greatest impact on north Indian politics. Lineage groups of the Khalaj tribe had migrated as military adventurers into north India from the very beginning as a

71. ibid, vol. 2, pp. 22, 25.

72. See Fakhr-i Mudabbir, Tarikh-i Fakhr al-Din Mubarakshah, ed. E.D. Ross, p. 33. E.D. Ross had been unable to recognize this group of people, but Peter Hardy, "The growth of authority over a conquered political elite: the early Delhi Sultanate as a possible case study" in Kingship and Authority in South Asia, ed. J.F. Richards (Wisconsin-Madison: University of Wisconsin South Asian Publication Series #3, 1978), p. 208, correctly identified the ratgan wa takran as the rautagan and thakuran or autochthonous elites.

part of Mu`izz al-Din's forces,[73] and they had dispersed looking for patrons and monetary and military resources amongst the bandagan-i khass to pursue frontier campaigns.[74] Fakhr-i Mudabbir noted, for instance, that the Khalaj were also an element in Qutub al-Din Ai-Beg's army.[75] Muhammad Bakhtiyar Khalaji, however, was the best known Khalaj tribesman who made good on the Eastern front. The fact that the tie of association which linked free subordinates to their patrons was a great deal more uncertain than the bandagan was evident in their lack of hesitation in transferring loyalties from one commander to another. Muhammad Bakhtiyar was patronised first by Sipahsalar Hizabr al-Din Hasan Aznab of Budaun, then by Malik Husam al-Din Ughul-Beg and finally by Qutub al-Din Ai-Beg. Their uncertain allegiance to one master for a length of time did not detract from their value as subordinates who remitted plunder. Once Bakhtiyar Khalaji had transferred his

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73. At the reversal of the first battle of Tarain 587/1191 the wounded Mu`izz al-Din was saved by a Khalaji youth, Khalaj baccha. See Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 399.

74. The Khalaji migrations seems to have followed the penetration of their homeland in Afghanistan by Mahmud of Ghazni. Subsequently they sought service under assorted patrons. Other than Mu`izz al-Din, they are reported to have also been instrumental in supporting his nephew, Ghiyath al-Din Mahmud's accession to the throne of Ghazni. Ibid, vol. 1, p. 373.

75. See Fakhr-i Mudabbir, Tarikh-i Fakhr al-Din Mubarakshah, ed. E.D. Ross, p. 33.

allegiance from Husam al-Din Ughul-Beg to Qutub al-Din, the latter then received the remitted portions of the bullion spoils from West Bengal, ghanaim wa amwal bisyar ba-khidmat-i Sultan Qutub al-Din Ai-Beg firistad.[76] Muhammad Bakhtiyar's successes on the frontier in turn attracted a host of Khalaji tribesmen and others to his service.[77]

In sum, each of the Mu`izzi bandagan-i khass had a substantial military following that they could draw upon. This was an important consequence of the political responsibility delegated to the bandagan-i khass by Mu`izz

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76. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi,vol. 1, p. 327. See also, vol. 1, pp. 323-4. The details of the transfer of allegiance from Husam al-Din Ughul-Beg, governor of Awadh, to Qutub al-Din, governor of Delhi and Lahore, are unclear. Juzjani suggests that Bakhtiyar Khalaji took the initiative to offer allegiance and plunder to Qutub al-Din. Yet the chronicler's effusive account of the reception and the honour given to the Khalaji commander leads one to suspect that it may well have been Qutub al-Din Ai-Beg that sought to recruit Bakhtiyar Khalji. See, Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 423. This transfer of allegiance would have worked out to Qutub al-Din's satisfaction for he, rather than Husam al-Din Ughul-Beg, would receive the remitted portions of the bullion spoils from western Bengal. It worked out in Bakhtiyar Khalaji's interests as well because in trading patrons he gained more latitude for independent action, as well as an ally on a flank which could neutralize the more immediate influence of Awadh. In effect, he exchanged one patron who was closer to him in Awadh for one more distant in Delhi. Delhi also served as an effective check on Awadh but not on Bengal.

77. Amir `Ali Mardan Khalaji, the brothers Malik `Izz al-Din Muhammad, Ahmad Sheran Khalaji, and Husam al-Din `Iwaz Khalaji are some prominent examples of Khalaji followers of Muhammad Bakhtiyar Khalaji. M`utamad al-Daulah was a non-Khalaji client; he was also Juzjani's main informant on Muhammad Bakhtiyar Khalaji's aborted campaign into Tibet. See Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, op.cit., pp. 422-423, 432-435, 428.

al-Din and it gave the slaves the local initiative to enforce their writ in their several governorships in north India.

The efforts made by the bandagan-i khass to consolidate their power within their appanages was reflected in their efforts to construct fairly elaborate establishments of their own. Other than their armed retinue, the senior Mu`izzid slaves had administrators who functioned as their accountants and deputies on diplomatic missions. Qutub al-Din Ai-Beg relied upon Malik Nizam al-Din Muhammad's diplomacy to request Ghiyath al-Din Mahmud for the right to rule from Ghazni in 605/1208.[78] He was also Qutub al-Din's deputy in the agreement worked out with Mu`izz al-Din and the slave merchant for the purchase of Iltutmish. Nizam al-Din was ordered to conclude Qutub al-Din's affairs, masalah, in Ghazni and bring the slave merchant Jamal al-Din Chust Qaba and the slaves to Delhi to finalise the

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78. This event has generated some confusion. Qutub al-Din had received manumission and the right to the domains of Lahore and Delhi in 602/1206; Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, pp. 373, 417. Subsequently, in 605/1208, Qutub al-Din seized Ghazni, expelled Taj al-Diz Ilduz, and sought an investiture from the Ghurid monarch Ghiyath al-Din Mahmud to legitimize his conquest; ibid, vol. 1, pp. 373, 412, 413-414. Raverty believed that Juz-jani contradicted himself by first mentioning 602/1206 as the date of manumission and investiture to rule, and then 605/1208. See Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, trans. H.G. Raverty, vol. 1, p. 398, fn 9, p. 516, fn 2.

transaction.[79] That Malik Nizam al-Din Muhammad was not a unique example of a wakil, a deputy, a helper, in the service of a Mu`izzi slave is borne out by Juzjani who noted that all the bandagan-i khass possessed men of repute, m`arufi, who looked after their interests and performed diplomatic missions.[80]

IV The Mu`izzi bandagan and their appanages:

The bandagan-i khass exerted themselves to transform their charges into flourishing appanages. There was a constant infusion of plunder from conquests. While a portion of it was remitted to the Ghurid Sultan in Ghazni the remnant was distributed amongst the Amir and his dependents located in north India. Some of the wealth of the Amirs and his dependents must have been invested locally on the maintenance of troopers and the embellishment of the court of the noble.[81] That the Mu`izzid slaves were interested in

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79. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol 1, p. 442.

80. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 373.

81. The ratio according to which the plunder was divided is unclear for this time period. In the case of the four melons/drums of gold seized from Ranthambhor, Qutub al-Din sent all four to Ghazni. Of the four, Mu`izz al-Din remitted one to his (senior) brother Ghiyath al-Din at Ghur. Elsewhere Fakhr-i Mudabbir, Tarikh-i Fakhr al-Din Mubarakshah, ed. E.D. Ross, p. 23, elaborates on how this apportioning was carried out after the Nahrawala campaign. He noted that after the conquest "the army of Islam carried away a lot of booty mostly in red gold and valuable cash.

the economic prosperity of their charges in north India, and not simply in a drain of wealth to Afghanistan, is borne out by the activities of Baha al-Din Tughril. Tughril invited merchants, tujjar, and men of repute, ma`araf-i rawi, from different parts of Hindustan and Khurasan to Bayana in an effort to develop the commercial opportunities of the region. To further encourage trade within the region all merchants were granted accommodation and material support, jumleh-ra khaneh wa asbab bakhshid. As a result he made the province prosperous, an indication of which was the construction of Sultankot; a new capital to go with changed circumstances.[82] Bayana was not the exception in north India; Lahore captured by Mu`izzid forces in 1186 flourished under the new dispensation. The city bustled with people of diverse occupations; in 602/1206 Qutub al-Din was welcomed into the city by "qadis, imams, sayyids, sufis, high officials, tax gatherers, soldiers, and mer-

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All of this [Qutub al-Din] distributed amongst the soldiers. Thirty-two incomparable elephants were [also] brought away [from Nahrawala] and sent to the Sultan [Mu`izz al-Din]." The rule of the thumb seems to have been that extremely valuable or unique pieces of plunder (and this certainly included strategic war material) were normally reserved for the Sultan, the rest was shared between the commanders and the troopers descending in rank and influence. The ratio seems to have been clarified in the reign of Sultan Shams al-Din. See chapter 2 for details and Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 2, p. 10.

82. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 321.

chants....".[83]

In this devolution of power and prosperity to the bandagan-i khass in north India, there is little doubt that Qutub al-Din Ai-Beg, with his head quarters in Delhi and Lahore, was the most senior slave. But at the same time the point does need to be reinforced that while Delhi and Lahore were described as centre[s] of Hindustan, markaz-i Hind, by Hasan Nizami there were other flourishing appanages as well in north India, a few nearly as magnificent as Delhi. Bayana, for example, had profited from the many beneficial monuments, athar-i khair bisyar, constructed by the Mu`izzi slave Baha al-Din Tughril.[84] The recent research of Mehrdad and Natalie H. Shokoohy on Baha al-Din's constructions has helped in identifying several of these monuments.[85] It is interesting to note that the Chaurasi Khamba Masjid at Kaman, the mosque of Ukha Mandir and the `Idgah in Bayana share with the Qutub mosque in Delhi the technological expertise of the trabeate arch, the reliance upon plundered temple material for construction, and the architectural semblance of a rectangular courtyard

83. Fakhr-i Mudabbir, Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi, ed. E.D. Ross, p. 31.

84. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 421.

85. Mehrdad and Natalie H. Shokoohy, "The Architecture of Baha al-Din Tughrul (sic) in the region of Bayana, Rajasthan" Muqarnas 4 (1987): 114-132.

flanked with colonnade bays and aisles.[86] In terms of size and grandeur the Bayana monuments compare favourably with the constructions of Qutub al-Din in Delhi especially when we remember that both the Qutub Masjid and the minar have profited by frequent conservation efforts, which includes restoration (and renovation!) carried out by the Tughluqid Sultan Firuz Shah (752/1351-790/1388), Sikandar Lodi (894/1489-923/1517) and more recently the Archaeological Survey of India. On the other hand the constructions in Bayana have received little attention; the Jama` Masjid in Bayana today houses a temple.

Other than the architectural resemblance between the constructions in Delhi and Bayana, through the usage of plundered temple material which were defaced, plastered over or inverted, the two constructions shared the symbolic statements of conquest and hegemony over an infidel population and the ritual cleansing of profane territory. Both Delhi, and Sultankot (Baha al-Din's capital) presented themselves as centres of civilization (merchants and men of renown were welcome here) within which security was ensured by the respective Mu`izzi Maliks who appointed ritual specialists to safeguard the religion of the faithful. The message to the local Muslim population and immigrants was unequivocal: as with political authority, there were many

86. The authors have identified the mosque of Ukha Mandir in Bayana as Tughril's Jama` Masjid at Sultankot.

centres of Muslim civilization in north India each protected and patronised by an Amir aware of his responsibilities to the faithful.[87]

87. The sigilla on the coins struck by the conquerors legitimising their conquests also provides the historian with a vital insight into their ideological claims to paramountcy. The Muizzid conquerors continued to operate the Rajput mints within their several governorships in North India. Many of these coins carried sigilums which were clearly imperialistic in their proclamation of the identity of the new conquerors, the Muslim commanders as conquerors, amir, were introduced as Shri hammirah; the same title but in the local language. In fairly clear terms the local community was informed of the political change but there were also some others symbols on these coins directed to the local communities which sought to ease the insecurities caused by the political change. With very few exceptions the Muizzi coins harmonized with the earlier Rajput currency in weight, and metallic purity. In an intriguing effort at what must have been reassurance the Nandi bull and Chauhan horseman emblems remained sometimes only slightly altered. An even better example of continuity in sigilums was evident to the local audience in the gold coin minted at Benaras after its conquest by Muizz al-Din. On the obverse it had the outline of the Goddess [of wealth] Lakshmi, and on the reverse a devanagiri inscription recognising Muizz al-Din's conquest, mahamada bini sama. That Muizz al-Din's currency was fully assimilated within an economic world that crossed political frontiers is evident from the fact that the Sultan's Lakshmi-type coins were found in a hoard that contained 27 coins of Govinda Chandra, 4 of Kumara Pala and 8 of Muizz al-Din. See, John S. Deyell, Living without Silver, pp. 193-206. The gold Lakshmi-type coin of the Gahadavala Rajput Govinda Chandra (coin # 145) can be compared with Muizz al-Din's coin (# 252) in the plates at the end of the book. Obviously, while Muizz al-Din and his governors, the bandagan-i khass, were well aware of the agenda of conquest, plunder and transfusion of wealth to Afghanistan, consistent efforts were also made to consolidate the urban outposts in North India within a local context. These efforts did not dilute the reality of the political paramountcy of the Muizzid commanders, instead it emphasised their intention to stay on as overlords.

Fakhr-i Mudabbir and Juzjani would have been hard put to accept this interpretation. If we followed their chronicle of Ghurid conquests in north India the inescapable conclusion would be that Qutub al-Din Ai-Beg the favourite, competent military slave of Mu`izz al-Din, was single-handedly responsible for the conquests and defence of his master's dominion in north India. Yet, even Fakhr-i Mudabbir's eulogy wore thin on occasion and he confessed

> And although all the victories which God caused him (Qutub al-Din Ai-Beg) to win are clearer than the sun, and well know to all the world: nevertheless it must not be forgotten how much was due to the care and assistance of the General (Sipahsalar) Husam al-Din Ahmad `Ali Shah, who was the slave and officer of the King of Islam (Mu`izz al-Din), and was never absent from his stirrup, and was present at these victories and battles. Indeed all the generals of this court were gifted, brave and noble, and each was distinguished for his courage, and received an ample share of the fortune and prosperity of the King of Islam, who by his patronage and favour made each and all famous. To some he gave high commands, body guards, pavilions, drums, standards and districts, and each performed fine acts of service, and was duly praised.....[88]

In a chronicle where Qutub al-Din was portrayed as the heroic Muslim conqueror who busily dashed around offering

88. Translated by E.D. Ross, "The genealogies of Fakhr al-Din Mubarak Shah" in `Ajab Namah: A Volume of Oriental Studies presented to E.G. Browne on his 60th birthday, ed. T.W. Arnold and R.A. Nicholson (Cambridge: University Press, 1922), p. 399; Fakhr-i Mudabbir, Tarikh-i Fakhr al-Din Mubarak Shah, ed. E.D. Ross, pp. 25-6.

assistance to beleaguered garrisons the recognition of Sipahsalar Husam al-Din's military contributions strikes a discordant note.

Yet, Juzjani also provides evidence to support the fact that Mu`izz al-Din, himself, organised his conquests in north India in semi-autonomous appanages under his bandagan-i khass. This information is presented in a well known conversation between a favourite at Mu`izz al-Din's court, muqarraban-i hazrat-i Sultanat, and the monarch. The favourite expressed his regret and observed that the monarch deserved sons so that each one of them could inherit a kingdom from the kingdoms of the world, ta har yek az ishan warith-i mamlikati budandi az mamalik-i giti. Although Juzjani could not have been privy to the private conversation between the monarch and his nobles, Juzjani's account of the confidant's expression of regret is a unique description of Ghurid political practice of appanaging territory, "a kingdom from the kingdoms of the world", amongst the members of the Shansabanid imperial family. As I have analysed earlier, while the Ghurid imperial family recognised a head located in Ghur there was a simultaneous recognition of a corporate egalitarianism within the kin group which necessitated the distribution of territory to them as autonomous appanages. In effect, Juzjani's regret (i.e., the regret of the confidant of Mu`izz al-Din) was that the Sultan would be unable to perpetuate this familial

political tradition within his own appanage in the absence of any sons.

The political formulation that struck Juzjani and which was reported as the Sultan's reply reconciled Ghurid political practice with the Sultan's dilemma. Juzjani reported Mu`izz al-Din's reply:

> (while) other rulers have one or two sons I have many thousand sons, i.e, my Turkish slaves and they will be the heirs to my dominions, and after my death they will preserve my name in the Friday sermons read in my dominions digar Salatin-ra yek farzand ya du farzand bashad, mara chandin hazar farzand ast, y`ani bandagan-i Turk keh mamalik-i man mirath-i ishan khwahad bud, b`ad az man khutbah-i mamalik ba-ism man nigah khwahad dasht.[89]

According to Mu`izz al-Din the practise of the Shansabanid family was indeed followed in the way the dominions comprising the Ghaznavid appanage were organised.

While Mu`izz al-Din was careful to exclude all kinsmen competitors from his own patrimony, in the absence of a son, the domains of the appanage of Ghazni were distributed amongst the Turk bandagan-i khass in north India. These senior slaves were, after all, "like" the Sultan's sons. This is where the nourishing, the fostering, the training, and the development of a corporate solidarity amongst the elite slaves came in handy. In the opinion of the day,

89. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, pp. 410-11.

since the _bandagan-i khass_ were uprooted from their natal environment, denied any alternative social roots, and had excelled in a training which tested their military competence and loyalty they could be trusted more than sons.[90] The organisation and deployment of the Mu`izzi slaves was conflated with the political practice of the Shansabanid family where together with the tradition of corporate egalitarianism there was the recognition of a nominal senior. While Mu`izz al-Din was alive the nominal senior amongst the _bandagan-i khass_ was Ilduz in Afghanistan, and in north India, Qutub al-Din Ai-Beg. The inculcation of a sentiment of a corporate egalitarianism amongst the slaves was an essential part of the training of the slave. That this also operated in practice is borne out by the fact that, after Mu`izz al-Din's death, all the _bandagan-i khass_ were manumitted and invested with authority over their respective appanages. Juzjani noted that after the death of Mu`izz al-Din in 602/1206:

> the other (other than Ilduz and Qutub al-Din) Turkish Maliks and Amirs, _digar-i muluk u Umara-i Turk_, who were Mu`izzi slaves, _bandagan-i Mu`izzi budand_, each one, _har yek_, of them sent a reliable emissary, _m`arufi_, to attend his (the Sultan Ghiyath al-Din Mahmud's) court and they petitioned, _iltimas namudand_,

90. Nizam al-Mulk quoted an anonymous poet: "One obedient slave is better/than three hundred sons;/for the latter desire their father's death,/the former his master's glory. See Nizam al-Mulk, _Siyasat Namah_, trans. Hubert Darke, p. 117.

> for letters of manumission, khatut-i `itaq, and command of the kingdoms of Ghazni and Hindustan.[91]

Sultan Ghiyath al-Din Mahmud's response to these petitions is not mentioned by Juzjani. It is clear, however, that aside from Taj al-Din Ilduz and Qutub al-Din Ai-Beg (about whom we have information in Juzjani), other Mu`izzi slaves must have also been manumitted and gained the honour of a right to rule their appanage. The example of the slave Baha al-Din Tughril substantiates this inference. Although Juzjani is entirely silent on the matter, it is not hard to deduce that Baha al-Din was manumitted sometime soon after Mu`izz al-Din's death in 602/1206 and his rights to the province of Bayana were recognised (by Ghiyath al-Din Mahmud?). Baha al-Din's free status after Mu`izz al-Din is indicated by the fact that his descendants possessed the social rights to dispose of their father's property; these were rights that only free individuals could bequeath.[92]

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91. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 373.

92. With the increasing political competition between elites in the early years of Sultan Iltutmish's reign, the fortunes of Baha al-Din's descendents declined. Baha al-Din's sons felt the need to sell his slave, Nasir al-Din Ai-Tamar (and possibly Malik `Izz al-Din Tughril Baha'i), to Sultan Iltutmish. It is important to point out here that unless legally manumitted, a slave's sons inherited their father's unfree status. Moreover, a banda could "possess" slaves only through a special dispensation of his master, and the claims to his inheritance belonged to his owner. The slave's descendants, slaves themselves, could hardly sell bandagan that their father never legally "possessed". See Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 451, vol. 2, pp. 2-3, and The Encyclopaedia of Islam s.v.

Baha al-Din must have succeeded in carving a substantial niche for himself in the social and political world of the early Delhi Sultanate, which his successors, despite a decline in stature, continued to capitalise on. Baha al-Din family's political control over Bayana diminished by the 1230's when Malik Nusrat al-Din Tayisi, a slave of Mu`izz al-Din, was appointed the military commander, shahna, of Sultankot by Sultan Iltutmish. Nevertheless, Tughril's lineage was still socially very important in the region. Affinal relations with Baha al-Din's family in the second generation still served to improve an individual's status and Sultan Iltutmish married one of his trusted manumitted slaves, Taj al-Din Arsalan Khan to Baha al-Din's daughter. Clearly, until the 1250's (the reign of Sultan Nasir al-Din Mahmud, 644/1246-664/1266), Baha al-Din's successors still possessed some kind of a familial claim upon portions of the Bayana region. Juzjani claims that it was because of his affinal relations (bridal wealth?) that Bayana was made Taj al-Din Arsalan Khan's.[93] Effectively then, despite challenges, Baha al-Din and his successors continued to be important in the history of Bayana for the first fifty years of the Delhi Sultanate.

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93. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 2, p. 34.

Baha al-Din's privileged social status in north India in and around 602/1206 should not surprise us unduly. He had invested considerable effort to make his province prosperous. In fact an inscription, circa 603/1206 or after, from the Chaurasi mosque in Kaman, Bayana, records that Baha al-din was already using the title of Sultan, Padishah wa al-Sultan Jahan Pahalwan Tughril al-Sultani.[94] There could have been no stronger claims to autonomy from Lahore-Delhi.

The organisation of political authority in north India paralleled Ghurid political practice in Afghanistan, but the fact that the two systems were so analogous also implied that the tensions present in one were shared by the other. As we have seen, the major source of tension within the Ghurid system centred around the implicit contradiction between the sense of corporate egalitarianism and the presence of a principle of seniority within the kin group. According to Ghurid practice while all Shansabanid kinsmen held semi-autonomous appanages, the head of the family was accepted as Sultan and was expected to rule from the appanage of Firuz Koh. There was a temporary consensus at best about who was the head of the family and therefore the descendants of Baha al-Din Sam had to constantly neutralise

94. See Mehrdad and Natalie H. Shokoohy, "The Architecture of Baha al-Din Tughrul (sic) in the region of Bayana, Rajasthan", p. 115.

the hostile attempts of other lineages to usurp leadership of the family. In the time of the brothers Ghiyath al-Din Muhammad and Mu`izz al- `n, the major challenge was presented by the lineage of Fakhr al-Din Mas`ud located in Bamian. Since the entire Shansabanid kin group were provided with appanages and military and financial resources the lineage that controlled Firuz Koh was constantly preoccupied with schemes to thwart dissension, or win supporters to improve their preeminent status.

In the appanages held by the *bandagan-i khass* in north India, the strategic importance of Lahore-Delhi to Afghanistan together with its available resources from the Punjab and the Jumna-Ganges *do-ab* increased the power and prominence of the appanage over all the others. Yet, it was not as if the other *bandagan-i khass* did not attempt to increase their own resources or power. In the context of the sentiment of corporate egalitarianism within the corps of the *bandagan-i khass* such attempts while useful to the overall Mu´izzid imperialistic agenda were viewed with apparent suspicion and anxiety by Qutub al-Din in Lahore-Delhi. In order to consolidate his own position he had to curb the efforts of his peers to concentrate power in their own appanages. This is apparent from Qutub al-Din's reactions to Baha al-Din's success in improving the economic opportunities in the province of Bayana which culminated in the establishment of the new capital at Sultankot. From

Sultankot, Baha al-Din had commenced periodic raids towards Gwalior and was promised its territory by Mu`izz al-Din upon its capitulation. The seizure of Gwalior would have opened up the frontier into northern Rajastan and Bundelkhand and brought considerable plunder and war material into the Amir's reach. Baha al-Din's efforts to enlarge and consolidate his appanage were resisted by Qutub al-Din Ai-Beg, who diminished Baha al-Din's increasing influence in the region by seizing Gwalior himself in 597/1200. Juzjani, who narrated this incident, concluded rather diplomatically that as a result of the Gwalior episode there was (not?) a little dislike between the Malik and Qutub al-Din, miyan malik....wa Sultan andak ghabari bud.[95]

To consolidate his own authority in relation to his peers, Qutub al-Din had to rely upon a variety of stratagems to garner resources and frontier outposts from the other bandagan-i khass. This was apparent in the efforts made to gain access to new frontiers and avenues of plunder by recruiting the likes of Bakhtiyar Khalaji especially once he had gained access to new bases in west Bengal. This was doubly worthwhile if it was at the expense of a possible competitor like Husam al-Din Ughul-Beg, commander of Awadh. Alternatively, if the charge of a senior Mu`izzid slave fell vacant Qutub al-Din did not hesitate to

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95. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 421.

appoint his own man before the assignment could devolve upon anybody else. This must have been the case with the Sipahsalar Hizabr al-Din Hasan Aznab whose charge of Budaun was given to Iltutmish, the slave of Qutub al-Din.[96]

In effect, there was a level of constant tension and hostility over precedence within the Shansabanid lineage and the senior Mu`izzi slaves. This contradiction made itself most evident within the imperial lineage and the slave corps at times of succession when, in the absence of a recognition of vertical succession within the lineage, seniority was once again an unresolved question. The conflict between the nominal heads of the <u>bandagan-i khass</u> in Afghanistan and Hindustan, Taj al-Din Ilduz and Qutub al-Din Ai-Beg, was presented with enough clarity by Juzjani to enable us to see how the contradictions between corporate egalitarianism and seniority drove the two slaves to war. Mu`izz al-Din in fact had made specific attempts to diminish friction between the two slaves by bonding them to each other by matrimonial ties and by clearly differentiat-

96. Juzjani, <u>Tabaqat-i Nasiri</u>, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 443. The date of Iltutmish's appointment to Budaun is not mentioned in Juzjani. Hasan Nizami, <u>Taj al-Ma`athir</u>, p. 232, however, mentions that Sipahsalar Hizabr al-Din Hasan Aznab was appointed to Kalinjar in 599/1202, so it must have been sometime after this. There is the further possibility that Qutub al-Din dispossessed Hizabr al-Din from Budaun, and gave him Kalinjar instead in 599/1202. It is doubtful, however, if Qutub al-Din possessed sufficient initiative to set aside and alter Mu`izz al-Din's appointments in North India.

ing their ambitus of influence in Afghanistan and India. Logically one would not have expected any difference of interests between the two to generate hostility. This was specially true when after the death of their master Mu`izz al-Din in 602/1206, the two bandagan-i khass were manumitted and their rights to their appanages of Ghazni and Lahore-Delhi (Juzjani uses the more general term of Hindustan for Qutub al-Din's appanage) were separately recognised.

Yet, sometime around 604/1208 Qutub al-Din attacked and conquered Ghazni and applied to Ghiyath al-Din Mahmud for a recognition of his right to rule that area. Aside from a desire to extend his dominion Qutub al-Din was also interested in seizing his master's capital because it would have catapulted him as the senior-most member within the Ghaznavid appanage of which Lahore-Delhi were merely a part.[97] Instead faced with hostility from the local population and

97. The tradition of seniority of the appanage of Ghazni within Mu`izzid dominions seems to have been deliberately furthered by Taj al-Din Ilduz. The estampage on the manumitted slave's coinage claimed the status of Sultan al-`Azam, the supreme Sultan, for Mu`izz al-Din and the title of Sultan al-Mu`azzam, the great Sultan, for Ilduz. See E. Thomas, The Chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Delhi (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1967), pp. 29-31, Nelson Wright, The Coinage and Metrology of the Sultans of Delhi (New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, 1974), pp. 12-13, and J. Deyell, Living without Silver, p. 361. Despite Ilduz's support and protestations of loyalty to Muizz al-Din's nephew Ghiyath al-Din Mahmud in Firuz Koh -- see Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 412 -- this was never publicly acknowledged on any coin discovered to date.

a renewed attack from Ilduz, Qutub al-Din was forced to retire to Lahore. He had to thereafter content himself with the role of the senior slave amongst the bandagan-i khass in north India.

If the death of Mu`izz al-Din created insecurities concerning inheritance, precedence and loyalties, the death of his slave Qutub al-Din in Lahore in 1210 opened up a veritable Pandora's box. Other than the remnant bandagan-i khass of Mu`izz al-Din in Afghanistan and north India, there were also the Qutbi slaves that contested for the right to inherit the appanage of Lahore-Delhi. Meanwhile several appanages struck out for independence from the Mu`izzids. Other than the already considered example of Bayana, Uchch and Multan under Nasir al-Din Qubacha, Lakhnauti in the east under the Khalajis remained outside the ambit of Ghazni and Lahore-Delhi.

V CONCLUSION:

The Mu`izzid political structure in north India was influenced by two overlapping factors. The first was the Shansabanid system of governance through the lineage and the slave systems and the second was the frontier environment in which it was located.

Under the Sultan Ghiyath al-Din and his brother Mu`izz al-Din the Ghurid system of governance met its greatest

political success. During its apogee the two brothers Ghiyath al-Din and Mu`izz al-Din governed their separate domains in rare harmony. This unanimity of interests should not obscure the fact that Ghurid authority and domains were extremely fractionalised and that conflict to protect presumed familial rights were not uncommon. That the Ghurid Sultanate managed to preserve a stable exterior was dependent, in part, upon a balance of power that definitely favoured the two brothers in Firuz Koh and Ghazni. Mu`izz al-Din was also extremely energetic in consolidating his position within his own appanage. His rights within the Ghaznavid territory in Afghanistan and north India were maintained by a large deployment of bandagan led by a judiciously selected elite slave cadre.

The death in rapid succession of the two brothers destabilized the balance within the Shansabanid patrimony. The descendants of Fakhr al-din Mas`ud and `Ala al-Din Husain grappled with the Mu`izzi slaves and the heirs of Ghiyath al-Din over Firuz Koh. Within the Ghaznavid appanage the domain fractionalised into its basic units. While some of them maintained the fiction of Mu`izzid dependence, others unambiguously stated their independence.[98] These developments marked a diminishing in the

98. Other than Baha al-Din's inscription previously cited see also the coinage of `Ali Mardan Khalaji of Bengal which is estamped on the reverse: the Sultan of the world, Rukn al-Dunya wa al-Din, the victorious `Ali Mardan, al-Sultan al-`Alam Rukn al-Duniya wa al-Din Abu al-Muzaffar `Ali Mardan. See John Deyell, Living without Silver, p.

power and influence of the "unitary" Ghurid state, but with the devolution of power to the participants of the patrimony it meant greater power to its erstwhile agents.

The fractionalisation of the Ghaznavid appanage after 602/1206 implied that in India power was transferred to either the bandagan-i khass in their domains or free individuals, specifically the Khalaj on the west Bengal frontier. Some historians have argued that without the backing of vaster resources several of these Mu`izzid territories in north India were recaptured by the autochthenes, and some diminished in size as Ghurid forces were driven closer to their garrison towns.[99] The evidence, however, does not support this conclusion. After Qutub al-Din Ai-Beg's death and in the unstable first years of Iltutmish's reign the areas that devolved to autochthenes, with the exception of Gwalior, were those that were only nominally under Mu`izzid suzerainty. Areas such as Ranthambhor, Malwa, and Naharwala had been plundered, not settled as a part of Mu`izzid territory. In some of these places local chieftains were reinstalled in exchange for tribute. The majority of Iltutmish's campaigns were significantly launched not against autochthenes but the senior Mu`izzid slaves or his peers,

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99. See the forceful argument of A.B.M. Habibullah, The Foundation of Muslim Rule in India, pp. 83-87.

the Qutbi amirs. All of these had declared independence from Lahore-Delhi and had used the opportunities available after 1206 to further consolidate their appanages. It is for this reason that a place like Uchch, headquarters of Nasir al-Din Qubacha, figured in Iltutmish's list of conquests.[100] Similarly, Lahore was conquered not from the Rajputs or the Khokars, but from those Amirs who opposed, Umara-yi mukhalif, Iltutmish's succession to the throne of Delhi.[101]

The bandagan-i khass and the Khalaj amirs managed to hold their own very well in the absence of Mu`izzid and Qutbi supervision. The bandagan might have had much to thank Mu`izz al-Din for the rigourous military training that he imparted to his slaves. As we have noticed, the Mu`izzid bandagan-i khass organised their own armed retinues around similarly trained military slaves. Schooled in the martial arts and drilled together, the military slaves possessed an esprit de corps that could not be matched by the more decentralised clan and lineage levees of the Rajput chieftains. They were a formidable fighting machine and proved to be a bulwark against Rajput aspirations of a reconquest of lost homelands.

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100. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 452.

101. ibid.

The military resilience of these Mu`izzid appanages complemented their economic viability. This was maintained through the infusion of plunder, but as important were the efforts made by the slaves to develop the replenishable resources of their region through trade and commerce. As a result merchants were given a preferential treatment for they were the avenues through which exotic goods as well as the necessities of their profession, war horses, were supplied. Although the evidence is uncertain numismatic material does suggest that the efforts to build up a viable resource base for the Mu`izzid appanages implied reassuring the local indigenous communities and inviting continuous participation in local economic life.

Finally, the degree of consolidation within the appanages was evident by increasing immigration into north India. Although the push and pull factors were still not in favour of service in India in 607/1210 a larger number of noncombatants made their way into the region. While Lahore had already profited as the capital of the Ghaznavids and it was not quite the frontier any longer, further afield even Delhi and Bayana possessed their congregational mosques, Jama` Masjids. There were enough ritual specialists and jurists in Delhi that a chief, Qadi al-Qudat, had to be appointed. Suffice it to say that by 607/1210 the factors influencing a choice either to stay in eastern Iran and Afghanistan or to serve in one of the wealthier

appanages in north India was balanced very slightly in favour of the central Islamic lands. Any individual misfortune could tilt the balance in favour of India. Larger misfortunes like the Khwarazmid invasion of the Ghurid domains in Afghanistan or the Chengiz Khanid invasions of Khurasan and Afghanistan in the next decade started a flood of migrations. The Mongol destruction in Khurasan and Afghanistan was only partly responsible for this migration into north India. After all Muslims could still flee westwards like the monarch of Khwarazm, Sultan Jalal al-Din Mangabarni. That a large number of them chose to come to north India was only because the region had gained a reputation as a sanctuary for Muslims looking for patronage.

This reputation was possible only because by the first decade of the thirteenth century the umbilical cord connecting north India to Ghazni was in the process of being severed. The bandagan-i khass had consolidated their authority in what might be referred to as the "Sultanates of north India". The establishment of the paramount Sultanate of Delhi under Shams al-Din Iltutmish was still in the future and it would be established at the cost of these rival principalities.

Chapter 2

THE SHAMSID DISPENSATION AND THE POLITICAL PARAMOUNTCY OF DELHI

Introduction: North India ca. 607/1210:

With the death of Qutub al-Din Ai-Beg even Juzjani, the chronicler of the history of the Delhi Sultans, was forced to recognise the fractionalisation of the Mu`izzid dispensation into autonomous domains where Delhi, rather than being the paramount province, struggled to retain its autonomy from its neighbours. He explicitly noted the division of the Ghaznavid principality of north India into four dominions: Ghazni ruled by Taj al-Din Ilduz, Sindh under Nasir al-Din Qubacha, Delhi governed by Shams al-Din Iltutmish (607/1210-633/1236), and the domains of Lakhnauti controlled by the Khalaj Sultans and Maliks.[1] Both Juzjani and

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1. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 418. The presence of several states and individuals in authority in Bengal is evident from Juzjani's usage of the plural, mamalik-i Lakhnauti Muluk wa Salatin-i Khalaj dar zabt awardand.

Nizami described the conflict for paramountcy that occured between these states. While the details of the conflict between Ghazni, Sindh, Delhi, and Lakhnauti are presented later in the chapter, suffice it to note here that of the four principalities, Delhi was the weakest and had, in 607/1210, the least chance of political survival.[2]

The challenge to Delhi's authority, however, came not just from the larger north Indian Mu`izzi principalities. Both Juzjani and Nizami gloss over the fate of some of the other regions that were a part of Mu`izzi territories in North India. We know, for example, that the region of Bayana was independent under Baha al-Din Tughril, Malik Husam al-Din Ughul Beg had been appointed to Awadh by Mu`izz al-Din, Benaras was under the governance of Qaimaz Rumi, and the region of Kalinjar, if Nizami's information is accurate, was under Hizabbir Hasan Aznab. In 607/1210 each of these appanages was autonomous from the control of Delhi.

What is obscured in the narrative of the two chroniclers are the details of the wider ranging conflict that occured between these smaller dominions and Delhi, after the status quo of the Mu`izzid dispensation was dis-

2. For details on the conflict with Ilduz and Qubacha see below and Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, pp. 413, 445 and 419, 445-447 respectively and Nizami, Taj al-Ma`athir, pp. 239 and 241-2.

turbed with the death of Qutub al-Din. At least as far as Awadh is concerned, the inclusion of Husam al-Din Ughul Beg's name in the list of Shams al-Din's notables suggests that Juzjani noticed the subordination of this Mu`izzi notable to the authority of Delhi. In the narrative of the Sultan's reign this struggle was contracted into a passing reference to the conquest of Awadh. The conquest of Benaras and defeat of Qaimaz Rumi, futuh-i Banaras wa hazimat-i Qaimaz received as much attention as Awadh. In a similar fashion the conflicts with other areas previously under the Mu`izzid dispensation were merely enumerated in the list of the Sultan's victories, dairah-i futuh-i u. Baha al-Din Tughril's principality of Sultankot-Thangir, for example, was seized sometime in the early years of Iltutmish's reign, and like Lahore, captured from Amirs that opposed Iltutmish. Yet, the only reference to these campaigns were in the Sultan's list of victories.[3]

3. See Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 444-5 where Juzjani notes in passing that Awadh and Benaras were seized. This event is sandwiched between the events of 614/1217 and 612/1215 (in that order), and from the context it seems that the conquests took place before 612/1215. Together with Awadh and Benaras, Budaun is also mentioned. In the list of Iltutmish's victories, vol. 1, p. 450, Juzjani clarified that in Budaun it was the autochthene Rai Man who was defeated. See also fn. 6, pp. 450-1, where Habibi noticed that in one of the variant manuscripts (also apparently used by Raverty in his translation) Husam al-Din Ughul Beg's name was included in the list of Shams al-Din Iltutmish's notables. See also Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, tr. Raverty, vol. 1, p. 627. For the reference to the conquest of the fort, hisar, of Thangir, Benaras and Lahore see Juzjani, Tabaqat...., ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 452 and fn. 5, where Habibi noticed that the conquest of Thangir is mentioned in a variant manu-

This obfuscation of intra-appanage competition is particularly significant when we realise that in 607/1210 there was little ostensible reason to expect the survival of the Delhi principality. Yet, it is hardly surprising that Juzjani sought to underplay conflicts that resurrected memories of a period when Delhi was little more than one appanage amongst many in north India, and not even the most important or powerful.

The conflict between the Mu`izzi appanages, however, was only one facet of the political environment of north India in 607/1210. The other aspect was the one in which the autochthenes interacted with the Mu`izzid governors. Paradoxically it is about this larger political environment of the Sultanates in north India that we have the least information.[4]

There was, of course, no one established Rajput response to Mu`izzid incursion and settlements, instead their reactions varied according to specific spatial and temporal contexts. In a compelling argument Kashi N. Singh and John Richards have suggested that in the face of persistent Mu`izzid military pressure one reaction of the

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script of the Tabaqat-i Nasiri.

4. Notice for example Peter Hardy's attempts to grapple with this problem: Peter Hardy, "The growth of authority over a conquered political elite: the early Delhi Sultanate as a possible case study" in Kingship and Authority in South Asia ed. John F. Richards, pp. 192-214.

[Rajput?] lineages and clans in the Gangetic plain was an immigration away from original homelands into the Terai, Bundelkhand and Chotanagpur regions where they gradually colonised territories occupied by non-"Hindu" tribal inhabitants.[5] Singh's and Richards' arguments have thus far only been substantiated by evidence from the early British ethnographic or land survey literature. Material from the early thirteenth century, however, does support the process of flight and immigration of the indigenes in the face of Mu`izzi invasion. In describing the conquest of Bengal by Bakhtiyar Khalaji (599/1202-3), for example, Juzjani noted that its Pala king Rai Lakshmanasena (written as Lakhmania by Juzjani) was "advised by the astrologers, brahmans and counselors of the kingdom, munajjiman, brahmanan, wa hakima-yi mamlikat...[that]....since the prophecy of Turkish conquest was at hand the Rai should agree to transfer himself and all of his people from this territory so that we may remain safe from the havoc of the Turks, az fitnah-i turkan ba-salamat manand".[6]

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5. See R.L. Singh and K.N. Singh, "Evolution of the Medieval Towns in the Saryu-Par plain of the middle Ganga valley: a case study" The National Geographical Journal of India 9 (1963): 1-11, Kashi N. Singh, "The territorial basis of Medieval Town and Village settlement in Eastern Uttar Pradesh, India" Annals of the Association of American Geographers 58 (1968): 203-220, and John F. Richards, "The Islamic Frontier in the East", pp. 107-108.

6. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, op.cit., vol. 1, p. 425.

While Juzjani's recounting of the tale of the Muslim conquest of Lakhnauti was undoubtedly exaggerated, it was accurate in so far that the Pala king did retreat into eastern Bengal without offering military resistance to the Khalaji invaders. Indigenous records also indicate that this was indeed one response of the autochthenes to Mu`izzid incursions. An undated Gahadavala inscription from Etawah, in eastern Uttar Pradesh, recounted the events of the last decade of the twelfth century (circa 1195[7]) in a manner that paralleled Juzjani's account:

> Salute to the Goddess! In the honour of the images of Candika, Durga and Siva (in the city) installed by the wise Maharaja Ajaysimha who performed the sacrifice after (?) his father's brother Jayachandra of Qanauj. Today, I, his acharya as well as priest, performed the Mahayoga of Candika. The statue of Durga was previously installed on the boundary, or outer wall of the fort. My rationality has been destroyed because of my fear of the mleccha (literally, the unclean, i.e., the Muslims). With great sorrow, touching her with my head (to honour her), I place this Durga, the dweller of the fort and destroyer of bad luck, into this pit, till the god Skanda turns their (mleccha) glory (Sun) to dust. When ill fate meets the Yavana (Turks), she might re-appear, or manifest herself again amidst uproar. Until that time I am a fool like a drunkard.

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7. The inscription records the death of Raja Jaichanda the paramount Gahadavala overlord (died, 590/1194) and the sacrifice performed by his nephew (brother's son) "Maharaja" Ajaysimha. See "II: 18 Etawah Fort Inscription" trans. Pushpa Prasad, in Pushpa Prasad, Sanskrit Inscriptions of Delhi Sultanate 1191-1526 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 93-4.

> (However) let not fear enter you; the gods will quickly return (with victory) along with you.[8]

Lest it be assumed that there was a wide-scale flight and migration away from the urban centres seized by the Mu`izzid commanders, it needs to be remembered that at least some withdrawals were conceived as no more than tactical retreats. Occasionally the autochthenes were able to reconquer their lost homelands as the following inscription from the fort of Chunar, in eastern Uttar Pradesh, dated Vikram Samvat 1390/1333 makes clear:

> ....And since pacification was not expedient, he (Svamiraja) abandoned the fort (of Chunar) for some days; only (presents) having been given (to the enemy according to usage). (But once more) to protect his own people, did the noble king Svamiraja, the crusher of the pride of alien heroes in fight (ascend his chariot), surrounded by applauding heralds: but (having perceived) the great Turushka (Turk) warrior, named (Sata) Dos, at the approach of the hateful one in battle, he (Svamiraja) again left the fort of his own accord. Thence having approached [the goddess] Bhagavati, having stayed there and meditated on her benevolence, thence returning with care, he (again) established his kingdom here (in Chunar) free from all thorns of trouble. Samvat 1390....was the kingdom set free from Malik Sahabdin acting under the protecting favour of the aforesaid Sairajadeva.[9]

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8. Ibid.

9. "II: 59 Chunar Fort Inscription" trans. W.H. Mill, in Pushpa Prasad, Sanskrit Inscriptions of Delhi Sultanate, p. 163.

Although the Chunar inscription refers to events much later than the period of our present concern it serves to elaborate the nature of the conflict that occured in regions such as Gwalior at the turn of the twelfth century. In the case of the Paramara ruler of Gwalior for example, Rai Sallakshanapala was first defeated by the forces of Mu`izz al-Din and Qutub al-Din in 592/1196. At that time the Paramara ruler was reinstated after agreeing to pay tribute.[10] Subsequently, in 597/1200 Gwalior was besieged by the forces of Baha al-Din Tughril. After continued resistance had been made impossible Rai Sallakshanapala ultimately resigned the fort to Qutub al-Din Ai-Beg. We have no further information on the Paramaras in the region of Gwalior, but it is obvious that that they perceived the loss of their homeland as only a temporary set back. It is not clear when the Paramaras regained Gwalior, but Juzjani informs us that the fort had to be reinvested by Iltutmish, and reconquered from Rai MILK (?) Deo only after a protracted seige, 629/1232-630/1233.[11] The status quo in

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10. Fakhr-i Mudabbir, Tarikh-i Fakhr al-Din Mubarak-shah, ed. E.D. Ross, p. 23, and Hasan Nizami, Taj al-Ma`athir, pp. 227-8, provided the details for this expedition. Nizami noted the name of the ruler as Rai Solankh Pal. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, pp. 400, 417 referred to this expedition, but provided no details or dates.

11. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 421 on the events leading to the second invasion of Gwalior to which Fakhr-i Mudabbir, Tarikh-i Fakhr al-Din Mubarak-shah, ed. E.D. Ross, p. 24, provides the date. For Iltutmish's campaign and seige, the details are provided by Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 448. The

Gwalior in circa 607/1210 parallelled that of Chunar; despite two reversals at the hands of the Mu`izzid conquerors the Paramara lord had persisted in his resistance until he eventually regained his homeland.

The defeat of the Gahadavalas of Qanauj, successfully accomplished after two campaigns, on the other hand, does not seem to have created any immediate crisis amongst the subordinates of the ruler. The first campaign of 590/1194 led to the defeat and death of Jaichand, the ruler of Qanauj, and the seizure of Benaras. No onslaught upon the capital Qanauj is mentioned at this time, although Benaras was garrisoned and passed into definitive Mu`izzi control. Information on the date of the subsequent conquest of Qanauj, 595/1198-99, is provided by Fakhr-i Mudabbir although he has no details on the nature of control of the area or its subsequent garrisoning.

Three inscriptions ranging from 1197 to 1217 from the neighbourhood of Benaras and Jaunpur, the eastern portion of the Gahadavala realm, present us with some information to understand how the local elites reacted to Mu`izzid and later Sultanate intrusion. From the two inscriptions dated 1197 it is evident that at least at the initial stage the

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name of the ruler MILK is unclear; Habibullah, The Foundation of Muslim rule in India, pp. 85, 94, fn. 93 cited Hiraman Munshi's, Gwalior Nama, B.M. Add. 16842, f. 11, and suggests that the ruler's name might be Malayavarmadeva.

institutional process of royal grants and ritual recognition of royal authority suffered no dislocation with Jaichand's death; the usage of royal prerogatives continued unchanged under his son and successor Harishchandra.[12] In the grant dated 1217, however, the reference to the ruler is absent, yet the principal military subordinates, the ranaka and the rawat, continued to occupy rights to their property which they latter mortgaged for loans.[13] The participants in the mortgage agreements seem to be unaware of any change in customary traditions governing fiscal obligations and are quite oblivious to the possible threat of military expulsion by the commanders of the Delhi Sultan who controlled garrisons in the neighbouring cantonments of Benaras and Kara. Nor was their confidence misplaced; an inscription dated 1227 from Kasrak in the region of Katehr (near the old Gahadavala capital of Qanauj) recognised Sultan Iltutmish as the paramount ruler in a mortgage agreement between a rauta and three Brahmins.[14] It was only as late as circa 634/1236 that we have the first recogni-

12. See inscriptions #II: 6 "Machchlishahr Copper-plate Inscription", trans., Pushpa Prasad and #II: 5 "Belkhara Pillar Inscription" trans., R.D. Banerji (?) in Pushpa Prasad, Sanskrit Inscriptions..., pp. 58-70, 56-57.

13. See inscription #II: 9 "Jaunpur Brick Inscription", trans., V.S. Agarawal in Pushpa Prasad, Sanskrit Inscriptions..., pp. 78-79.

14. See inscriptions #II:11 "Mahoba Fort Copper-Plate Inscription", translated Pushpa Prasad, in Sanskrit Inscriptions..., pp. 80-89.

tion of direct Sultanate administrative control over the city of Qanauj. Malik Tamar Khan was given Qanauj as his iqta`, military assignment, but by this time the Gahadavala capital had sunk in status; the muqta`, assignee, to Qanauj was quickly moved to the nearby more strategic commands of Kara and then Awadh.[15]

The response of the autochthenes varied according to their ability to resist the Mu`izzid incursions. In areas which were definitively conquered such as Delhi, Kuhram, Thangir, Budaun or Benaras there is no record of a successful revanche. Instead the autochthenes migrated away from their urban centres into the neighbourhood. For example, although Budaun never passed out of Mu`izzid control, Iltutmish was forced to launch a campaign into the region to defeat Rai Man. Similarly although Benaras was garrisoned after the defeat of the Gahadavala ruler Jaichandra, his successor Harishchandra continued to reside in the vicinity. After Harishchandra disappears from the historical record, his military subordinates were still present in the region. What seems to have existed in the countryside was a military "stand off" the content of which differed from region to region. In 607/1210 while political control over regions such as Gwalior was tenous for both the Mu`izzids and the local rulers, there is little doubt

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15. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 2, p. 17.

about the fact that in the interior of the country, indigenous political systems had started feeling the impact of the new authoritative structures in the neighbourhood.

It is important to remember, however, that while the "frontier" between the Mu`izzi appanages and the autochthenes surrounded each urban enclave, the stand off was not across the proverbial great wall of China. Instead the "frontier" needs to be understood more as a zone which was both fluid and permeable.[16] In the political and military sphere it meant that while on the one hand bands of Khokar or Mewatti marauders could carry out plunder raids into the suburbs of Mu`izzi garrison towns, on the other hand Qutub al-Din Ai-Beg (and perhaps some of the other commanders) could recruit military subordinates, rautagan wa thakran, of (vanquished?) native lords. Military conflict around Mu`izzi garrison towns also did not obviate meaningful economic interaction between these garrison towns and the countryside. Especially attendant upon Mu`izzi conquests, the migration of Muslims into north India, not merely as combatants, had made them familiar to indigenes as traders and pious men. Bakhtiyar Khalaji, for example, was not stopped during his sudden attack upon

16. For a sensitive treatment of the social frontier see Owen Lattimore, "The frontier in History" in Studies in Frontier History, Collected Papers 1928-1958 (London: University Press, 1962), pp. 469-491.

Lakhnauti because he was mistaken to be a horse-trader.[17] And as significantly, sometime in the early decades of the thirteenth century but before Sultanate intrusion into Damoh in Malwa, Baba Arjun Shah had migrated there from Akhsi in Farghana, Central Asia, and, as his name indicates, was recognised for his piety by Hindus and Muslims alike.[18]

The pressure upon the autochthenes from Mu`izzi urban garrison centres would mount gradually over the years; in this exchange over the "slow moving frontier" 607/1210 was a hiatus.[19] In and around 607/1210 there was military conflict between the autochthenes and the Muslim garrison towns without any significant loss of Mu`izzi territory. There was, however, a political and economic organisation in the making which would draw regional societies closer to the appanages. In this interaction, the idiom of the conqueror and conquered, the faithful/impure (mlechcha) and the infidel/pure, the black and the white indicated the

17. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 426: keh magar bazargan and wa asp baha'i awardeh and.

18. Baba Arjun migrated from Damoh to Petlad in Gujarat where he died. The inscription on his tomb dated 633/1236 already recognised him as a namesake of Arjun, the hero of the Hindu epic Mahabharata. See G. Yazdani, "Inscriptions in the tomb of Baba Arjun Shah, Petlad (Baroda State)" Epigraphica Indo-Moslemica (1915-16), pp. 15-18 and plate XIV.

19. For the argument about the "slow moving frontier" see John F. Richards, "The Islamic Frontier in the East: Expansion into South Asia", pp. 92-99.

presence of boundaries,[20] as much as the sigilum of the Nandi bull on coins of Mu`izzi governors and the corbelled arch in the Jama` Masjids of Delhi[21] and Bayana indicated the permeability of the frontier. In terms of political significance it was the conflict between the appanages that engaged the attention of the Mu`izzid governors in north India in 607/1210.

I: Dynastic change in the Lahore-Delhi appanage 607/1210:

In fundamental ways the problems created for the Mu`izzid principality by the death of Mu`izz al-Din were analogous to the difficulties encountered within the Lahore-Delhi appanage with the death of Qutub al-Din. It is difficult to refer to the "dilemma" of 602/1206 or 607/1210

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20. See Hasan Nizami, Taj al-Ma`athir, p. 209, where the author notes on the travails of his journey from Khurasan to Delhi: "The crow like Hindus had intercepted the roads and in the rapidity of their movements exceeded the wild ass and the deer, you might say they were demons in human form, and covered with blackness". The idiom of the black and the white, to distinguish the "Hindu" and the Turk has been developed by Annemarie Schimmel, "Turk and Hindu: a poetical image and its application to historical fact" in Islam and Cultural Change in the Middle Ages ed. Speros Vryonis jr. (Wiesbaden: Fourth Giorgi Levi Della Vida Biennial Conference, Otto Harrassowitz, 1975), pp. 107-126.

21. For a sensitive description of the Jama` Masjid of Delhi see Mohammad Mujeeb, "The Qutub Complex as a social document" in Islamic influence on Indian society (Delhi: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1972), pp. 114-127.

within the two domains as one posed purely by a problem of succession. The term "succession" assumes that there were specific rights, prerogatives and powers that could be transferred, or could continue as the estate of an heir. In a political system where military and political privileges were distributed amongst the bandagan-i khass within whom seniority was already a bone of contention, the choice to perpetuate the life of either of the two principalities by seeking a successor to Mu`izz al-Din or Qutub al-Din was only one of the options open to Mu`izzi subordinates. As we have already noticed, the alternative recourse of defying the authority of Ghazni or Lahore-Delhi, and emphasising independence was one that had been exercised by appanages from 602/1206. By 607/1210 Benaras and Awadh had joined Bayana, Sindh, and Lakhnauti in having little to do with Lahore-Delhi.

The overriding concern of the remaining notables who continued to link their fortunes with the Lahore-Delhi principality was a desire to protect privileges given to them during the reigns of the preceeding Sultans. In the absence of any inherited social right to political power, notables who had been elevated through the dispensation of office and command during the reign of either Mu`izz al-Din or Qutub al-Din desired to perpetuate their authoritative status. It is in this context that Juzjani identified the two contending groups for power in 607/1210 as the Mu`izzis

and Qutbis. In the ensuing conflict both the Mu`izzis and the Qutbis chose contenders for the throne who were amenable to control, and through whom the notables could continue to enjoy their privileges.

The Qutbis chose to support Aram Shah, the son of Qutub al-Din, not because of any loyalty to the lineage of the master but because he had little independent support in Lahore. The self-centred motivation of the Qutbis was evident in Juzjani's explanation that the Qutbi Turks and Amirs, Turkman wa 'Umara-yi Qutbi, upheld the cause of Aram Shah to "restrain rebellion and (promote) the comfort, aramish, of the people and the confidence, itminan, of the soldiers of the qalb".[22] The soldiers of the qalb in Lahore were led by a nucleus of Qutbi slaves, and of the three supporters of Aram Shah mentioned in Nizami two, Sarjandar Turki and Aqsunqur Khitai, were Turkish slaves.[23]

The rival group, located in Delhi, was described by Juzjani as the Mu`izzi Turks and Amirs, Atrak wa 'Umara-yi Mu`izzi.[24] It is likely that there were few senior Mu`izzi commanders within the Lahore-Delhi appanage by 607/1210 and so one can expect that the Mu`izzi supporters of Iltutmish

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22. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, pp. 418, 444.

23. Hasan Nizami, Taj al-Ma`athir, p. 237.

24. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 444.

were fewer than the Qutbis. The size of the Mu`izzi group diminished further when some of its members defected and joined the rival camp.[25] It is also likely that despite Juzjani's description of the supporters of Shams al-Din Iltutmish, there were, in fact, very few Mu`izzi Turks (i.e., slaves) in his following. In fact, three of the five members of the Mu`izzi group about whom we have information in Nizami and Juzjani,[26] `Izz al-Din Bakhtiyar,[27] Nasir al-

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25. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 444: "b`adi az Atrak wa 'Umara-yi Mu`izzi ba-ishan [Qutbi] jam`at kardand, some of the Mu`izzi Turks and Amirs joined the [Qutbis]".

26. Hasan Nizami, Taj al-Ma`athir, p. 237 and Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, pp. 400-2 and fn. 6, 444.

27. Juzjani includes this noble in the list of Iltutmish's Maliks. Raverty, however, confused him with Bakhtiyar Khalaji. See Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, trans. H.G. Raverty, vol. 1, p. 626, fn. 3. In most manuscripts of the Tabaqat-i Nasiri, only the name `Izz al-Din Bakhtiyar is mentioned in the list of Shamsi Maliks. Habibi, however, noted that in a variant manuscript the name was preserved as Malik `Izz al-Din Bakhtiyar Ghuri. See Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 400-1, fn. 6. There is no reason to read Khalaji with `Izz al-Din Bakhtiyar's name. Infact the presence of the nisba Ghuri in one of the extant Juzjani manuscripts makes it more likely that the notable was not a Khalaj but from the region of Ghur. There is independent confirmation from Amir Hasan Sijzi, Fawa'id al-Fu'ad, ed. Hasan Thani Nizami (Delhi: Urdu Academy, 1990), p. 256, where a Malik `Izz al-Din Bakhtiyar is mentioned together with the sufi saints Bakhtiyar Kaki and Jalal al-Din Tabrizi. These sufi saints were contemporaries of Iltutmish and Malik `Izz al-Din Bakhtiyar is probably the same notable mentioned by Juzjani.

Din Mardan Shah,[28] and Sipah Salar `Ali Ism`ail the Amir Dad of Delhi, were certainly free Amirs, and this may be a reflection on the larger composition of the Mu`izzids. It is likely, therefore, that the Mu`izzids were the smaller and weaker group.

The nature of the two rival dispensations in conflict becomes more explicable when placed in the context of the existing structure of political relationships and the system of military slavery. It explains, for example, the hesitation of the Qutbi group to rally around any one of themselves, for in choosing a Qutbi banda as leader, the balance of power maintained between the bandagan would have been destabilised. Moreover, since they had chosen somebody outside the charmed circle of influential Qutbi bandagan, support for Aram Shah did not imply any recognition of the seniority of a peer. Nor did the Qutbis have any moral qualms about manipulating Aram Shah towards their own ends, for after the death of the master, the emotional ties of

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28. This name is also mentioned in Juzjani's list of Iltutmish's nobles. In most manuscripts of the Tabaqat-i Nasiri, the name appears as Malik Nasir al-Din Miran Shah b. Mir Chaush Khalaj. Habibi, however, noted that in a variant manuscript, also used by Raverty, the reading of the name was Malik Nasir al-Din Mardan Shah Muhammad Chaush. The record of the variant manuscript is probably more accurate since it is also corroborated by Hasan Nizami. See Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 400-1, fn. 6, and idem, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, trans. H.G. Raverty, vol. 1, p. 626, fn. 3.

fosterage and association which linked the master and the slave were not automatically transferred to the heir.

These political traditions also make more explicable the otherwise intriguing reasons behind Mu`izzid support to a Qutbi slave, Shams al-Din Iltutmish the commander (<u>muqta`</u>) of Budaun. It needs to be remembered that of all the Qutbi <u>bandagan-i khass</u> Iltutmish was the one slave who might have had some attachment to Mu`izz al-Din. Aside from the fact that Iltutmish had been almost purchased by Mu`izz al-Din, a fact which probably had little influence in itself, the slave was also beholden to the Ghaznavid monarch for his manumission in 602/1205.[29] Together with his leanings towards the Mu`izzids, Iltutmish may have also been a judicious choice. He was the seniormost slave of Qutub al-Din whose ambitions of lordship, otherwise unacceptable to the Qutbi <u>bandagan</u>, could be tapped by the Mu`izzis. Finally, for a militarily weaker group like the Mu`izzids, Iltutmish was a particularly apposite choice for unlike Aram Shah, the slave did possess a military following of his own, and his senior slaves, <u>khadam-i khass-i u</u>, marched into combat at the <u>bagh-i Jud</u> in Delhi against the Qutbi supporters of Aram Shah.[30]

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29. See Chapter 1 and Juzjani, <u>Tabaqat-i Nasiri</u>, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, pp. 442, 444.

30. Ibid, vol. 1, p. 444. It is interesting that Juzjani does not use <u>bandagan-i khass</u> to describe the members of Iltutmish's retinue. <u>Khadim</u>, plural <u>khadam</u>, can mean slave as well as a close dependent. It is possible that Iltutmish's forces consisted a mix of people, some slaves

The conflict between the two rival dispensations within the Lahore-Delhi appanage was resolved in favour of the Mu`izzids and Shams al-Din Iltutmish in 607/1210.[31] The defeat of the Qutbis was important for at least until 607/1210 they had been the dominant political group in Lahore-Delhi. The victory of Iltutmish, however, did not imply a position of paramountcy for the slave.[32] Not merely did Qutbi opposition continue but more important was the influential position of the Mu`izzids in the new dispensation of power.

The existing precarious status of Iltutmish's position was evident from the way the slave attempted to gloss over the dynastic change that he had ushered. The circumstance of a slave succeeding his master was not without precedent

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and some free, both sharing the common feature of dependence upon their master. This is not far from Juzjani's understanding of the composition of the qalb, the central contingent led by the bandagan-i khass which also included trusted free Amirs.

31. For details see Hasan Nizami, Taj al-Ma`athir, p. 237.

32. Technically, of course, Iltutmish was no longer a slave, but within the traditions of military slavery in Islam a manumitted slave continued to have dependent ties with his patron or wali. See Paul G. Forand, "The relation of the slave and the client to the master or patron in medieval Islam" International Journal of Middle East Studies 2 (1971): 59-66. I continue to use the term slave for Iltumish to emphasise the contradiction in his political achievements and his social origins and the host of interpersonal and judicial complications this must have implied for a Sultan of slave origins.

in the history of the Sultanates within the central Islamic lands, but it was a development about which the Islamic community was still extremely ambivalent.[33] Despite the attempts of Iltutmish and Juzjani to overlook the controversies surrounding the succession to Qutub al-Din, it is unlikely that discussions concerning its legality came to an end.

In what is certainly an apocryphal story, Ibn Battuta, the Moroccan traveller into India in the early fourteenth century, narrated how the qadis of Delhi appeared before Iltutmish immediately after his accession to the throne of Delhi. Before the qadis could question Iltutmish, the slave showed his deed of manumission to the judges who then pledged their allegiance. Since a slave could not rule over free Muslims the qadis were concerned about the possible contravention of the Shari`a if Iltutmish had not been

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33. Closest in time and space to north India in the thirteenth century was the example of the slave Tughril Bozan(?) who overthrew the Ghaznavid monarch `Izz al-Dawla `Abd al-Rashid in 444/1053. Juzjani, for example, is not ambivalent about his condemnation of Tughril and refers to him in the Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 236 as "Tughril the damned", Tughril al-mal`un. Juzjani's was not a minority opinion. Other chroniclers referred to Tughril as kafir-i ni`mat, the ingrate, or maghrur makhdhul, the arrogant and contemptible. See C.E. Bosworth, The Later Ghaznavids 1040-1186, p. 41. It was only in the Mamluk dynasty of Egypt, with its institutionalised slave system and monopoly of power within the slave cadre that slave succeeded slave (despite brief interregnums of lineal descendents) as a "normal" practice. See in the writings of David Ayalon especially, L'Esclavage du Mamelouk, (Jerusalem: Israel Oriental Society, no. 1, 1951).

manumitted.[34] Although Ibn Battuta was merely recounting stories of the past Sultans of Delhi as they had been reported to him, part fact, part gossip, and part myth, they convey an unusual popular view of the past.[35] In the case of Iltutmish, the story repeated by Ibn Battuta suggests that years after the event, people (qadis in particular) still remarked upon the legitimacy of Shams al-Din's right to succeed Qutub al-Din Ai-Beg to the throne of Lahore-Delhi.

It was in an attempt to improve his rights to the throne that soon after the defeat of Aram Shah, Shams al-Din married the daughter of Qutub al-Din Ai-Beg. This matrimonial union was a departure from past practice. Hitherto within the Shansabanid family and the Mu`izzi

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34. Ibn Battuta, Rehla, trans. H.A.R. Gibb, The Travels of Ibn Battuta 1325-1354, (Cambridge: Hakluyt Society, second series no. 141, University Press, 1971), vol. 3, pp. 629-630. The Moroccan is usually believed to have worked and travelled in India between 734/1333 and 743/1342. Peter Jackson, The Mongols and India 1221-1351 (Cambridge: Phd. dissertation, 1976), pp. 219-230, pushes back the date of Battuta's departure from India to about 747/1346.

35. Ibn Battuta, Rehla, vol. 3, p. 628, noted the name of one of his informants: Qadi Kamal al-Din ibn al-Burhan al-Ghaznawi. Gibb assumed that he was the source used by Ibn Battuta for the history of the Delhi Sultans, but this is no where explicitly mentioned in the text. More likely Qadi Kamal al-Din was only one of Battuta's many informants.

bandagan-i khass, brides were given either to peers or to lineages who were socially superior.[36]

In effect, through the asymmetrical matrimonial union between the slave and the lineage of the master, Iltutmish sought to obscure dynastic change. Thus, while on the one hand Iltutmish started the process of taking apart the political dispensation of his master, on the other hand he emphasised continuity with the previous order by claiming an affinal right to succession. For an individual operating within a mamluk environment this was in many ways a rather predictable response. Within a corporate group of slave dependents, the only way that a slave could hope to achieve a preeminent status was by suggesting that he had a "special" relationship with his master. Ironically, it was exactly such an exclusive claim that the Qutbi slaves had sought to neutralise by supporting Aram Shah. It is important to note, however, that while Iltutmish might have succeeded in convincing later historians of the validity of his succession as son-in-law of Qutub al-Din,[37] his claims

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36. Note the Shansabanid genealogical chart and the discussion concerning the exchange of brides between Taj al-Din Ilduz, Qutub al-Din Ai-Beg and Nasir al-Din Qubacha in Chapter 1. Iltutmish's "innovation" would set a precedent which Shamsi slaves would subsequently follow; see chapter 4.

37. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 417, makes two references to the marriage of Qutub al-Din's daughter to Iltutmish. The first reference suggests that Iltutmish was a son-in-law before Qutub al-Din's death. The second reference mentions the order of events leading to Iltutmish's marriage more clearly. Rather than focusing on Iltumish's affinal relationship with Qutub al-Din Juzjani

failed to impress his peers.

Although the record of Iltutmish's reign in Juzjani and Hasan Nizami do not provide us with the details about how Iltutmish's relations with the Mu`izzids changed over time, the chroniclers do emphasise his conflicts with Mu`izzi rivals. They also draw our attention to the fact that over a period of time Iltutmish managed to raise a large body of dependable followers to whom he dispensed offices and commands. Taking one with the other, it is evident that other than the Qutbis, Iltutmish eventually also rid himself of the Mu`izzi competition and in his attempt towards politi-

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chose to emphasise the degree of trust reposed in the slave by the master. He noted, p.443, that Qutub al-Din called Shams al-Din his son, Sultan Qutub al-Din Ai-Beg u-ra farzand khwand wa ba-khud nazdik gardanid. By the sixteenth century `Abd al-Qadir Badauni (died 1596) introduced Iltutmish as someone who was a slave, [also] called a son, and a son-in-law of Qutub al-Din, bandah, wa farzand khwandah, wa damad Sultan Qutub al-Din bud. See `Abd al-Qadir Badauni, Muntakhab al-Tawarikh, edited Ahmad Ali and W.N. Lees (Calcutta: Bibliotheca Indica, 1868), vol. 1, p. 61. Scholars in the twentieth century have been more imaginative. Amongst others, Muhammad Aziz Ahmad, Political History and Institutions of the Early Turkish Empire of Delhi, pp. 152-155, R.P. Tripathi, Some aspects of Muslim Administration, pp. 24-25, A.B.M. Habibullah, The foundation of Muslim rule in India, pp. 76-77, S.L. Rathor, "A plea against the charge of usurpation by Iltutmish" Islamic Culture 32 (1958): 262-267 and Gavin Hambly, "Who were the Chihalgani, the forty slaves of Sultan Shams al-Din Iltutmish of Delhi" Iran 10 (1972): p. 60, have ignored the chronology of events leading to Iltutmish's marriage with Ai-Beg's daughter and have argued instead that Aram Shah was not the "real son" of Qutub al-Din (although this is clearly stated in the text, p. 418), and that Iltutmish had a "special" relationship with Qutub al-Din. None of the authors, excluding the contemporary chronicler, Juzjani, have seen the succession of Iltutmish as a dynastic change.

cal paramountcy created a new body of dependent and loyal notables, described by Juzjani as the Shamsi Maliks.

II: Competitors and military paramountcy in north India, 607-633/1210-1236:

Iltutmish's precarious political authority was evident in 607/1210 itself, when the autonomy of Lahore-Delhi was challenged by the Mu`izzi slave Ilduz who was located in Ghazni-Lahore. Unable to resist the Sultan of Ghazni, Iltutmish accepted the ceremonial parasol and staff from Ilduz as an evidence of his subordinate status, Ilduz az Lahore wa Ghazni ba u `ahd bast, u-ra chatr wa durbash farmud.[38]

This loss of status was driven home immediately after Qutub al-Din's death when Iltutmish's competitors seized control of vast areas of the Lahore-Delhi appanage. In 607/1210 Ilduz had reportedly already occupied Lahore, which marked the beginning of a conflict over the city between Taj al-Din and Nasir al-Din Qubacha (now Sultan of Sindh). Between 607/1210 and 613/1217 Lahore seems to have exchanged hands several times between Ilduz and Qubacha,

38. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 444.

but was nominally under the control of Ghaznavid forces.[39] Between 607/1210 and 613/1217, however, Qubacha had seized Multan, Tabarhind, Kuhram and Sursuti (modern Sirsa) from Iltutmish.[40]

The same period saw the presence of new competitors in the north-west as well. In 612/1215-16, driven out of Khwarazm by the Mongols, Jalal al-Din Khwarazm Shah seized Ghazni, and made his presence felt in the north Indian marches. From 618/1221 onwards, the Khwarazm Shah, his subordinates, Saif al-Din Hasan Qarluq, Uzbeg-bei and the

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39. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 444. Elsewhere Juzjani also noted the conflict between Ghazni and Sindh over Lahore; see ibid, p. 418. When he mentioned, p. 419, that Qubacha seized Lahore several times, Lahor-ra chand karrat ba-qirift, (obviously losing it several times as well) it was from the forces of Taj al-Din Ilduz who treated it as a part of their domain. Juzjani noted quite clearly (p. 419) that previously (az pish) Qubacha's forces had been defeated in the environs of Lahore by Ilduz's wazir, Muayyid al-Mulk Sanjari. Since the wazir was killed by the Turkish Maliks and Amirs of Ghaznin before 612/1215-16 (Juzjani, Tabaqat..., p. 413), the conflict with Qubacha, obviously, preceded this date. From 607/1210 Lahore seems to have exchanged hands several times and going by the number of times Juzjani mentions the defeat of Qubacha's forces, the region must have been under at least the nominal control of Ilduz's forces. After the defeat of Ilduz at Tarain in 612/1215-6 Lahore lapsed into Qubacha's control from whom it was subsequently seized in 613/1217 by Shams al-Din Iltutmish. See Hasan Nizami, Taj al-Ma`athir, pp. 239-241. There is no evidence to suggest that Lahore was held by Qubacha and was seized by Taj al-Din only in 612/1215-1216 as suggested by Peter Jackson, The Mongols and India, p. 69, Muhammad Aziz Ahmad, Political History and Institutions of the Early Turkish Empire of Delhi, p. 165; A.B.M. Habibullah, The Foundation of Muslim Rule in India, p. 77.

40. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 419.

Khalajis under Malik Khan Khalaj, together with Chengiz Khan and the Mongol commanders, Dorbei Doqshin and Mengutei constituted a powerful political presence in the north-west.[41] In effect, very soon after his accession, Shams al-Din Iltutmish had lost Lahore and the western wing of the Lahore-Delhi appanage. As a result from 607/1210 itself, Delhi had become the sole headquarter of the principality almost by default.

In 607/1210, however, Iltutmish was challenged by competitors not just on the peripheries but in and around Delhi, the core area of his domain. Juzjani, the only contemporary chronicler to note these challenges, was characteristically vague in reporting details that might sully the image of his patron's father. Nevertheless he noticed that

> on several occasions from different parts of [north] India, digar dar atraf-i mamalik-i Hind, hostilities arose with the Amirs and the Turks, ba umara wa atrak mukhalif uftadsh,....and all those who revolted or sowed dissension, khuruj mikard wa ya `isyan mibarzid against [Iltutmish] were reduced, maqhur migasht.[42]

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41. On the career of Jalal al-Din Khwarazm Shah and the Chengiz Khanids in north India see the useful work of P. Jackson, The Mongols and India, pp. 71-86.

42. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 444.

Juzjani recorded that in Iltutmish's subsequent campaigns, different parts of the kingdom, atraf-i mamalik, and the dependencies, mudafat, of the towns of Delhi, Budaun, Awadh, Benaras and (the) Siwalikh(s) were seized by the Delhi monarch.[43]

The arrangement of Juzjani's narrative suggests that chronologically these events occurred before 612/1215-16;[44] we are left to conjecture, however, about the identities of the "rebels" in the different parts of Iltutmish's domain. The first group to challenge Iltutmish's authority must have been those Qutbi and Mu`izzi Amirs and Turks, supporters of Aram Shah, who had been dispersed by Iltutmish at the bagh-i Jud in Delhi. In all likelihood it was their recalcitrance, and the dissension which they continued to sow, `isyan mibarzid, that drew the attention of Juzjani. Other campaigns were directed respectively against Rai Man in the neighbourhood of Budaun, and the Mu`izzid Maliks Husam al-Din Aghul-Beg in Awadh, Qaimaz Rumi in Benaras, and Baha al-Din Tughril in Bayana-Sultankot.[45] At least in the region of Delhi the military expeditions were most probably aimed against the Mewattis who would come to have a history of continued belligerence to Sultanate authority.

43. Ibid, vol. 1, p. 445.

44. Ibid. See also fn. 3 above for a discussion on the date of the conquest of Awadh, Benaras and Budaun.

45. For references see above.

The Siwalik campaign extended Iltutmish's control upto Nagaur and protected crucial trade routes from Gujarat,[46] and around the same time the campaign into Jalor was launched where the primary aim was tribute and not annexation.[47]

With the defeat of these "rebels" in the core area of his domain Iltutmish responded to the challenge of the more powerful Mu`izzi adversaries. In 612/1215-16 Ilduz was defeated, imprisoned and killed during his attempted march upon Delhi. In 613/1217 Lahore, Tabarhind and Kuhram were seized from Nasir al-Din Qubacha, and Iltutmish's eldest son, Nasir al-Din Mahmud, was appointed as the governor of

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46. In the narrative on Iltutmish's reign Juzjani enumerated the campaign into the Siwalikh region together with those into Budaun, Awadh and Benaras. Without further details we can assume that these were campaigns within the same time frame (circa 612/1215-16). Elsewhere Juzjani mentioned Nagaur in a manner which indicated that it was already occupied in 617/1220 and at that time controlled by Malik Karim al-Din Hamzah. See Juzjani, <u>Tabaqat-i Nasiri</u>, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, pp. 445, 284-5. The need to control Nagaur was also necessitated by the fact that the trade routes from Gujarat and Uchch to Delhi passed through the town. In 626/1229 information reached Delhi that emissaries bringing the Caliphal investiture to rule had reached Nagaur. See Juzjani, <u>Tabaqat.....</u>, vol. 1, p. 447.

47. Hasan Nizami, <u>Taj al-Ma`athir</u>, pp. 238-9, provides the details on the Jalor expedition. Nizami places it before Iltutmish's conflict with Ilduz in 612/1215-16. Although Habibi does not include Jalor in the list of Iltutmish's victories in his edition of the <u>Tabaqat-i Nasiri</u>, he notes that it is mentioned in a variant manuscript which was also used by Raverty in his translation. See Juzjani, <u>Tabaqat-i Nasiri</u>, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 452, fn. 5.

the region in 614/1217.[48] The north-west frontier was hardly stable in these years and the control of Lahore would fluctuate at least until 620/1223 between Iltutmish, Qubacha and the Khwarazm Shah. Yet, over this time Iltutmish's confidence had increased sufficiently until he could challenge Sultan Jalal al-Din Khwarazm Shah at Lahore in 618/1221 and divert him into Sindh and Qubacha's territory.[49] This success was followed by a string of campaigns that brought Lakhnauti, Bihar (622/1225),[50] Ranthambhor (623/1226) and Mandor (623/1226) under his control. These were transitory victories however, and some of these territories, like Lakhnauti (in 628/1231), would have to be reconquered soon enough. Nevertheless these initial campaigns did reflect the change in the military potential of Delhi and its ability to coerce or conquer some of the

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48. For details see Hasan Nizami, Taj al-Ma`athir, pp. 239-241 and Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 445.

49. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 445. See also the comments of Peter Jackson, The Mongols and India, p. 72.

50. Bihar is not included in the list of Iltutmish's victories. In the narrative of the reign of Husam al-Din `Iwaz Khalji Juzjani notes that Iltutmish seized Bihar and appointed his own Amirs there. The seizure of Bihar was associated with Iltutmish's first campaign into Lakhnauti at which time Iltutmish's eldest son held the governorship of Awadh. Bihar may have been under the supervision of Awadh and Lakhnauti. Subsequently Malik Yughantat was appointed to the wilayat of Bihar sometime between 630/1232 and 631-1233-4. See Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, pp. 437-8, 453-4, vol. 2, p. 9.

hitherto autonomous Mu`izzi appanages. As important was the decline in power of Iltutmish's competitors which were a result of the campaigns of the Khwarazm Shah in Sindh; not merely did he keep Qubacha's attention diverted, but by the time Jalal al-Din withdrew into Kirman and western Iran in 620/1223, he had also weakened the Sultan of Sindh sufficiently to change the balance of power between Delhi and Multan.

The defeat of Qubacha after a string of campaigns through 625/1227 and 625/1228 brought the Sindh provinces of Uchch, Multan, Bhakar and Diwal under the command of the Delhi Sultan and, more crucially, it also marked the end of the Mu`izzi challenge to Iltutmish's authority. Significantly it was only in 626/1229, after the removal of Iltutmish's competitors, when there were no other rival Sultans in north India comparable to the Delhi monarch in effective military potential, that al-Mustansir, the `Abbasid Caliph in Baghdad (623/1226-640/1242), invested Sultan Iltutmish with the responsibility of governing over the Muslim community in north India.[51]

In the remaining years of his reign (626/1229-633/1236) Iltutmish sought to realize in practice these theoretical

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51. The implication of Caliphal investiture to rule have been described by H.A.R. Gibb, "Some considerations on the Sunni theory of the Caliphate" and "al-Mawardi's theory of the Caliphate" <u>Studies on the Civilization of Islam</u> ed. Stanford J. Shaw and William R. Polk (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), pp. 142-165.

claims of sovereignty over north India. Campaigns against territories that had rebelled against the authority of the Delhi Sultan commenced; western Bengal was re-conquered from Balka Khalaji in 628/1230-1, and Gwalior from Rai MILK (?) Deo in 629/1232-630/1233. Plunder campaigns were launched against Malwa in 631/1233-4 and the campaigns in the last years of his life (632/1234-5) were directed against the subordinates of Jalal al-Din Khwarazm Shah in Banian and Karman, the remnants of one of Iltutmish's competitors for control over north India.

III The Shamsi dispensation:

Through a series of campaigns over a twenty-six year reign Iltutmish managed to successfully vanquish, coopt or simply keep at bay competitors to the authority of Delhi. A concurrent effort was also made to establish a body of supporters through whom the Sultan of Delhi could in fact govern his domain. Juzjani had not missed Iltutmish's efforts to recruit a following:

> To all sorts of people (asnaf-i khalq) from learned jurists (dastar-band), princes (kulah dar), landlords (dahaqin), traders (tujjar), to travellers from foreign cities (ghuraba-yi amsar) his grants (in`am) were universal. From the begining of his reign, the dawn of his power, he spent more than a hundred lakhs (of jitals?) each year on the community of eminent learned individuals (ijtima`-i `ulama-yi ba-

> nam[52]), respected Sayyids, Maliks, Amirs, Sadrs and great men. He gathered together in Delhi--which is....the centre of Islam....the sanctuary (qubba, literally dome, arch) of Islam in the eastern hemisphere--people from all sides of the world.[53]

Through the patronage and recruitment of emigres of such eminence from eastern Iran, individuals with training and experience of governance, Iltutmish managed to create a body of dependent followers, other than those with whose help he had gained the throne. Yet, emigres were by no means the only group recruited by Iltutmish, nor necessarily the most important in his dispensation of offices and privileges. We are fortunate that Juzjani included biographies of the great Maliks and Khans who were important in the reign of Shams al-Din Iltutmish and his successors in the twenty-second section of his chronicle. It is

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52. The printed text has istijma` (?) which seems to be a mistake for ijtima`, community, group. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 440.

53. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 440-1. These migrations were provoked by the Chingiz Khanid invasions into Khwarazm and eastern Iran from 615/1218 onwards. This immigration was also commented upon in the mid-fourteenth century by Zia al-Din Barani, Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi, ed. Sayyid Ahmad Khan (Calcutta: Bibliotheca Indica, 1862), p. 27; ed. Shaikh Abdur Rashid (Aligarh: Department of History, 1957), p. 32 and from around the same time period by `Isami, Futuh al-Salatin, ed. A.S. Usha (Madras: University of Madras, 1948), pp. 114-5 who emphasised the migration of different types of artisans, kasiban; embroiders, naqshbandan; craftsmen, san`at-garan; jewel merchants, juwahar-furrushan; and physicians hakiman, tabiban. For migrations into north India see also the conclusion to Chapter 1, and the discussion below.

significant to note that all the twenty-five biographies were of the slaves of the Sultan; Juzjani did not deem it necessary to include a single free Malik in the section entitled "the Shamsi Maliks in the kingdom of [north] India (Hind)".[54] This might have been because of a personal bias of Juzjani; not all the important Shamsi slaves were provided with biographies either and Juzjani does clarify that he chose to give the biographies of only those notables to whom he was personally beholden.[55] In fact, as the narrative of Iltutmish's reign brings out, slaves as well as free individuals were recruited and patronised by the Sultan.

The transformation in the power and position of the Delhi Sultan was made possible by the support of both these groups. To study the content and extent of this transformation we must be clearer about the composition of the social groups that supported Iltutmish, the nature of their relationship with the monarch and with each other, and the types of political responsibilities entrusted to them.

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54. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 2, p. 1.

55. The Shamsi slave Qutlugh Khan and the eunuch Imad al-Din Raihan were probably the more significant political personalities ignored by Juzjani.

a) Free military commanders (Maliks) subordinate to Iltutmish:

During the Mu`izzi military expeditions into north India we had noticed that it was not the entrenched elite class from Afghanistan that chose to stay behind after plunder campaigns in the insecure marches of the frontier. Instead individuals of a lower social status with little to lose in their homeland sought the opportunity to improve their stock in north India. Subsequently, the efforts of the Mu`izzi bandagan-i khass to consolidate their appanages and the "pull" of their patronage to emigres led to an increase in migrations in the first decade of the thirteenth century.

The subsequent wave of migrations into north India occured after Chingiz Khan's conquest of Transoxania, and campaigns into Afghanistan in pursuit of Jalal al-Din Khwarazm Shah, 616-618/1219-21. The distinguishing feature of these migrations was that now the social elites from the central Islamic lands also sought their futures in north India. The court of Shams al-Din Iltutmish however, was only one of the destinations for the migrants fleeing Mongol destruction, and in the 1220's not even the most popular choice. Despite gratitude for the patronage received from the Delhi Sultans, Juzjani still recognised the "pull" of the Sindh court to notables, akabir, from

Khurasan, Ghur, and Ghazni who received grants, in`am, and numerous rewards, ikram-i wafir, from Sultan Nasir al-Din Qubacha.[56]

Amongst those migrants who made their way to Delhi, a large group consisted of military adventurers. Some of them were appointed to serve in Iltutmish's armed contingents and were used by him to man administrative posts. That a number of these immigrant military commanders were of high social standing from Khwarazm and Ghur is evident from the titles (laqabs) or nisba of affiliation attached to their names: Malik `Ala al-Din Jani Shahzadah (Prince) of Turkistan, Malik Ghur `Izz al-Din Muhammad Shah Mahdi, Malik Nasir al-Din Madini Malik Ghur, Malik Qutub al-Din Hasan `Ali Ghuri, Malik Firuz Shah Iltutmish Shahzadah of Khwarazm, Malik Taj al-Din Inaltegin Shahzadah of Khwarazm.[57]

A privileged background in the central Islamic lands, however, did not automatically translate into an authoritative administrative, military post in Iltutmish's dispensation. Malik Qutub al-Din Hasan `Ali Ghuri, for exam-

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56. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 419.

57. See Juzjani's list of Iltutmish's Maliks, dairah-i Muluk-u. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, pp. 450-452. For the evidence from variant manuscripts see ibid, vol. 1, p. 450, fn. 6 and for complete titles for `Izz al-Din Muhammad and Qutub al-Din Hasan see ibid, vol. 1, p. 476 in the list of Sultan Nasir al-Din's (644/1246-664/1266) notables.

ple, was forced to flee to north India in 620/1223 because of the recalcitrance of his subjects in Tulak in the face of Chingiz Khanid pressure.[58] Despite his social position, he remained unrecognised in the narrative of Iltutmish's reign but rose to importance after 633/1236 in the reign of the Sultan's successors.[59] In 639/1241 Qutub al-Din became na'ib-i mulk, deputy of the realm. It is possible that during Iltutmish's rule Qutub al-Din occupied a position in the Sultanate not unlike Malik Taj al-Din Inaltegin Shahzadeh of Khwarazm. Malik Inaltegin immigrated to north India in 596/1199 together with his cousin Malik Firuz Shah

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58. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 2, pp. 134-135 for his career in Saifrud and Tulak, and pp. 140-141 for a vivid description of the immigration.

59. Diya al-Din Barani noted in passing that Qutub al-Din was the wakildar of Sultan Iltutmish. Diya al-Din Barani, Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi ed. Khan, pp. 31, 39, ed. Rashid, pp. 37, 46. The information was provided in the context of an apocryphal story where Iltutmish was held as an ideal sovereign. Barani in the same context also mentioned `Izz al-Din Muhammad Salari. These references were used by Jackson to argue that free-notables were probably important in Iltutmish's reign, but Juzjani, who was biased in favour of the bandagan, chose to ignore them. See Peter Jackson, "The Mamluk Institution in Early Muslim India" Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1990), p. 344, and fn 17. Although Juzjani did not write a biography of Qutub al-Din as he did of the Shamsi slaves, he hardly ignored the free Amir who belonged to the same town of Tulak as the author (see references above). It is unlikely that Juzjani would have failed to recognise Qutub al-Din if he had been an influential personality in Iltutmish's reign; he had no hesitation in giving `Izz al-Din Salari his due. Qutub al-Din was certainly important in the post-Iltutmish period and it is likely that Barani assumed (as he did in the case of the future Sultan Balban, see below) that the Amir had always been an eminent notable in Sultanate politics.

Iltutmish, also a Shahzadeh. There seems to have been no rapid promotions for Malik Inaltegin, who twenty-one (lunar) years later, still held a subordinate post under Malik Karim al-Din Hamzah[60] at Nagaur. In 617/1220 Inaltegin killed the Khwaja Najib al-Din, stole an elephant, migrated to Uchch where he later joined Sultan Jalal al-Din Khwarazmshah and left for Kirman to become in 622/1225 the Malik of Nimruz.[61] Curiously enough, despite their status, and in contrast to their subsequent achievements, neither of the Maliks enjoyed high posts within Iltumish's dispensation of power.

Even those free Maliks who were fortunate enough to receive important positions sometimes found themselves deprived of their posts and, with no further information about their deployment, it would be safe to assume that their subsequent appointments gave them less political prominence. The best example is that of Malik `Ala al-Din Jani Shahzadeh of Turkistan who was appointed governor of Lakhnauti, only to be dismissed sometime between 629-630/1231-1233, with the Shamsi slave Saif al-Din Ai-Beg appointed in his place. `Ala al-Din Jani's case is very similar to that of Sipahsalar Rashid al-Din who was

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60. The same as Malik Taj(?)/`Izz(?)/Rukn(?) al-Din Hamzah `Abd al-Jalil(?)/Mulk(?). See Juzjani's list and Shamsi Maliks and their variant readings. Juzjani, <u>Tabaqat-i Nasiri</u>, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 450, fn. 6.

61. Ibid, vol. 1, pp. 284-5, and vol. 2, pp. 184-185

appointed as kotwal, commander, of Gwalior in 630/1233. His appointment to Gwalior was only for a short duration; in 632/1234-5 the Shamsi slave Nusrat al-Din Tayisi al-Mu`izzi was given the military command over Bayana, Sultankot, and, in another example of a banda-i khass taking over charge from a free notable, the Shahnagi, superintendency, of Gwalior.[62]

It would hardly be safe to conclude from the little information that we possess that Iltutmish refused patronage to emigre notables of eminence. Indeed, the patronage given to Malik `Izz al-Din Muhammad Salari Mahdi would suggest the opposite trend. Malik `Izz al-Din was Iltutmish's Amir Hajib in 625/1228, and participated in the Uchch campaign together with the slave Taj al-Din Sanjar Kazlak Khan.[63] His importance, apparently, did not diminish during Iltutmish's reign and at the time of the Sultan's death the Malik occupied the important military assignment, iqta`, of Budaun. It is likely that the deployment of `Izz al-Din is indicative of the patronage that Iltutmish was willing to give to military commanders pushed into north India by the Chingiz Khanid campaigns in the central Islamic lands.

62. Ibid, vol. 1, p. 448, and vol. 2, p. 10.

63. Ibid, vol. 1, p. 446.

Yet, it is important to correct any notion of the uniform liberality of the monarch.[64] As already noted, a high social status and a privileged background (and this includes useful experience in governance) of these commanders in the central Islamic lands did not immediately guarantee them a commensurate political appointment under Iltutmish. Some, like Rashid al-Din `Ali, did receive appointments only to be later dismissed, others, like Qutub al-Din Hasan, remained fairly obscure only to rise to prominence after Iltutmish's reign. While the patronage of the monarch was forthcoming in most cases, Iltutmish was hardly impressed with social status if notables like `Ala al-Din Jani had given him cause for displeasure. Iltutmish might honour individuals with an enviable genealogy, even employ them, but not automatically raise them to important commands within his dispensation.[65] In fact individuals who

64. See Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 440 where Iltutmish is described as a hundred times more generous patron than Qutub al-Din Ai-Beg who was famous as lakh-bakhsh, the giver of a hundred-thousand (presumably the copper coin, jital). This has been uncritically followed by (amongst others) Muhammad Aziz Ahmad, Political History and Institutions of the Early Turkish Empire of Delhi, p. 157, R.P. Tripathi, Some Aspects of Muslim Administration, p. 26, and K.A. Nizami, "Sultan Shamsuddin Iltutmish" in A Comprehensive History of India, The Delhi Sultanate ed. Muhammad Habib and K.A. Nizami (New Delhi: Peoples Publishing House, 1982 reprint), pp. 225-6, and K.A. Nizami, Religion and Politics in India, p. 127.

65. See for example the case of the Shansabanid migrant Malik Nasir al-Din Abu Bakr who received respect, `awatif, from the other nobles at Delhi but no command. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 340.

did not make much of their <u>nisba</u> or their <u>laqab</u>, those who were "socially dead" might be more favoured in the strategic posts of the Sultanate. Without any social recognition and alternate ties, the monarch was more confident of their dependence and loyalty. Hence the complicated political arrangement within the Shamsid dispensation: even though increasing numbers of social elites sought patronage and were recruited by the Sultan only some were promoted to positions of influence. Instead smaller groups of the socially unfree, the <u>bandagan-i Shamsi</u>, without any change in their social status were given dominant political roles in the Sultanate.

As long as Iltutmish had the capacity to purchase and deploy slaves he could afford to be particular about recruiting the free immigrant military commanders to the highest posts within the Sultanate. This is evident from the hiatus in the careers of several maliks as they made the passage to India. In the search for slaves as loyal subordinates, despite the different social and political contexts and motivations, Iltutmish's conclusion paralleled Mu`izz al-Din's.

b) Slave subordinates of Shams al-Din Iltutmish, 1210-1236:

Much like the organisation of the Mu`izzi slaves the Shamsi <u>bandagan</u> were separated in rank; there was an elite

cadre, senior in status to the newly purchased slaves. In his narration of Shams al-Din's reign, Juzjani, in fact, does not use the term bandagan-i khass to describe the senior, elite cadre of slaves of Sultan Iltutmish although he does distinguish between bandagan of long standing occupying important offices and newly purchased slaves who served as pages in the court. He identified the senior Shamsi bandagan as the slaves of the dynasty, bandagan-i daulat, who were close to his royal majesty (Iltutmish), ba-hadrat-i saltanat-i u qarbati dashtand.[66] The sense of a larger corps of slaves within which there was an elite cadre privileged by the trust reposed by the Sultan is well brought out in the mid-fourteenth century chronicle of Zia al-Din Barani. He noted that Sultan Ghiyath al-Din Balban (664/1266-686/1287) was one of the Shamsi slaves, banda az bandagan-i Shamsi bud, and was manumitted together with the "forty" Turkish slaves, wa dar miyan-i bandagan-i turk-i chihalgani azad shuda.[67] Manumission, of course, did not alter the juridical tie of dependence, wala, or the emotional bond of association that tied the slave to his

66. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 458.

67. Zia al-Din Barani, Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi, ed. Khan, p. 25; ed. Rashid, p. 30.

master.[68] Instead it was a reward given to only some (bandagan-i turk-i chihalgani) from the larger body of slaves (bandagan-i Shamsi) in return for faithful service. The banda-i khass, the future Sultan Shams al-Din Iltutmish, had been thus rewarded by Qutub al-Din Ai-Beg, and according to Barani, Ghiyath al-Din Balban, together with the other chihalgani, belonged to a similar privileged category.

Gavin Hambly was the first scholar to see the chihalgani, the corps of forty slaves, as a privileged cadre of slaves within the larger retinue of bandagan-i Shamsi.[69] Hambly argued that the bandagan-i Shamsi included in the twenty-second section of Juzjani's Tabaqat-i Nasiri were twenty-five of the forty members of the chihalgani. He based this conclusion on the argument that since Juzjani chose to narrate their biographies they must have been important slaves of Iltutmish. Moreover, most of them shared the essential qualities attributed to the chihalgani

68. see, Paul G. Forand, "The relation of the slave and the client to the master or patron in medieval Islam". For the technial position of the freed slave in Islamic law see Joseph Schacht, The origins of Muhammad Jurisprudence, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 161, and The Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition, s.v. "`Abd" and "Ghulam".

69. Gavin Hambly, "Who were the Chihalgani, the forty slaves of Shams al-Din Iltutmish of Delhi". The author also provides (pp. 57-58) a fairly clear survey of the existing historiographical debate on the subject which I have chosen not to repeat.

TABLE 2

JUZJANI: Tabaqat-i Nasiri (ed. Habibi, vol. 2: 1-89) — SHAMSI BANDAGAN IN ILTUTMISH'S REIGN

# in text	REFERENCE in Habibi ed.	NAME OF SHAMSI SLAVE ETHNIC BACKGROUND	PURCHASED FROM	DEPLOYMENT OF NOTABLE IN ILTUTMISH'S SERVICE > indicates changes in the slave's career.
1	II:3-5	MALIK TAJ AL-DIN SANJAR KAZLAK KHAN ?; probably of Turkish origin	Khwaja `Ali Bastabadi	Bought in Ai-Beg's reign>grew up with Nasir al-Din> Chashnigir>Amir Akhur>625/1228 wilayat of Wanjrut in Multan>iqta` of Kuhram>mahrusa-yi, garrison town, of Tabarhind>fort,town & suburbs of Uchch> d. 629/1231-2
2	II:5-7	KABIR KHAN AYAZ AL-MU`IZZI Rumi; Turk from Anatolia	heirs of Nasir al-Din Husain Amir-i Shikar	Slave of Nasir al-Din Husain Amir Shikar> sold to Iltutmish by Nasir al-Din's heirs> 625/1227-8 town,fort, qasabat, market towns,& territory of Multan> circa 1231 Palwal for his maintenance>
3	II:7-8	MALIK NASIR AL-DIN AI-TAMAR AL-BAHAI ?; probably of Turkish origin	heirs of Baha al-Din Tughril of Bayana	Slave of Baha al-Din Tughril> sold to Iltutmish by Baha al-Din's heirs> sar jandar> iqta`of Lahore> after 625/1227-8 wilayat of Siwalik, Ajmer, Lawah(?), Kasli, Sanbharnamak & grant of elephant> killed during ghazw in Bundi region.
4	II:8-9	MALIK SAIF AL-DIN AI-BEG-I UCHCH Of Turkish origin.	Jamal al-Din	Purchased by Iltutmish before his accession as Sultan> Sar-i Jandar> iqta` of Narnaul> Baran> Sunam> Uchch after Taj al-Din Kazlak Khan's death in 629/1231-2>
5	II:9-10	MALIK SAIF AL-DIN AI-BEG YUGHANTAT Khitai Turk	heirs of Ikhtiyar al-Din Chust Qaba	Amir-i Majlis> by 625/1227-8 wilayat of Sursuti/Sirsa as iqta`> Bihar> after `Ala al-Din Jani's removal: Lakhnauti and title of Yughantat> died in 631/1233-4.
6	II:10-13	MALIK NUSRAT AL-DIN TAYISI AL-MU`IZZI Of Turkish origin.	? a slave of Sultan Mu`izz al-Din	Slave of M`uizz al-Din> ca. 625/1225-8 iqta` of Jind, Barwala > ca. 630/1233 Bayana, Sultankot & shahnagi of Gwalior> ghazw into Kalinjar>
7	II:13-18	MALIK `IZZ AL-DIN TUGHAN KHAN TUGHRIL Qara Khitai	?	Saqi-yi khass> sar dawat dar> chashnigir> Amir Akhur> in 630/1232 iqta` of Budaon> wilayat of Bihar when Malik Yughantat received Lakhnauti> 631/1233-4 & Yughantat's death, became muqta` of Lakhnauti>
8	II:17-18	MALIK TAMAR KHAN A Qipchaq Turk	Asad al-Din Mankali	a member of the ghazw contingent against Rai Chandwal> naib amir akhur> after 630/1232 & Tughan Khan's appointment to Budaon became Amir Akhur>
9	II:18-19	MALIK HINDU KHAN MUAYYID AL-DIN MUBARAK AL-KHAZIN "Hindu"	Fakhr al-Din Isfahani	Purchased by Iltutmish before his accession as Sultan> Yuzban> Mash`alah dar (while Iltutmish in Baran)> tasht dar (while Iltutmish in Budaon)>tasht dar +khazaneh dar>

TABLE 2 (continued)

# in text	REFERENCE in Habibi ed.	NAME OF SHAMSI SLAVE ETHNIC BACKGROUND	PURCHASED FROM	DEPLOYMENT OF NOTABLE IN ILTUTMISH'S SERVICE > indicates changes in the slave's career.
10	II:19-20	MALIK IKHTIYAR AL-DIN QARAQUSH KHAN AI-TEGIN Qara Khitai	?	An old slave of Iltutmish> Saqi khass>iqta`of Barihun(?) & Darnakwan (?) > shahna of khalisa of Tabarhind> after Malik Kabir Khan: iqta` of Multan & title QaraQush>
11	II:20-22	MALIK IKHTIYAR AL-DIN ALTUNIA-I TABARHIND ? ethnic origin	?	sharab dari> sar chatr dar>
12	II:22-23	IKHTIYAR AL-DIN AI-TEGIN Qara Khitai Turk	Amir Ai-Beg Sanami	sar-i jandar> iqta` of Mansurpur> Kujat & Nandanah>
13	II:24-25	MALIK BADR AL-DIN SUNQAR AL-RUMI Rumi; Turk from Anatolia	?	Tasht dar> bahlah dar> shahna of the zarrad khah, the armoury, of Budaon> naib amir akhur>
14	II:25-27	MALIK TAJ AL-DIN SANJAR QUTLUQ Qipchaq Turk.	Khwaja Jamal al-Din Nadiman	sar jandar> shahna akhur>
15	II:27-28	MALIK TAJ AL-DIN SANJAR KURET KHAN Qipchaq Turk.	?	shahna-i bahar wa kishtiha>
16	II:28	MALIK [IKIT/BAT] KHAN SAIF AL-DIN AI-BEG KHITAI Khitai	?	jandar>
17	II:28-29	MALIK TAJ AL-DIN SANJAR TARKHAN Karakhi Turk.	?	?>
18	II:30-33	MALIK IKHTIYAR AL-DIN YUZBEG TUGHRIL KHAN Qipchaq Turk.	?	naib chashnigir during Gwalior siege (ca 629/1231-2)>
19	II:33-35	MALIK TAJ AL-DIN SANJAR ARSALAN KHAN AL-KHWARAZMI ?;probably Khwarazami Turk.	Ikhtiyar al-Mulk Abu Bakr Habshi	khasah dar>

TABLE 2 (continued)

# in text	REFERENCE in Habibi ed.	NAME OF SHAMSI SLAVE ETHNIC BACKGROUND	PURCHASED FROM	DEPLOYMENT OF NOTABLE IN ILTUTMISH'S SERVICE > indicates changes in the slave's career.
20	II:36-40	MALIK `IZZ AL-DIN KUSHLU KHAN AL-SULTANI Qipchaq Turk.	from a merchant at Mandor	purchased at Mandor (ca.623/1226) > saqi> sharab dar at Gwalior (ca.629/1231-2) >iqta` of Barhamun(?)> Baran>
21	II:40-42	MALIK SAIF AL-DIN ARKALI DAD BEG Qipchaq Turk.	Khwaja Shams al-Din Ajami Malik al-Tujjar	?> sent as ambassador/courier (ba-muhimmat-i buzurg ba-itraf-i mamalik)>
22	II:42-43	MALIK BADR AL-DIN NUSRAT KHAN SUNQAR SUFI Rumi; Turk from Anatolia	?	?>
23	II:43-44	MALIK NUSRAT AL-DIN SHER KHAN Ilbari (Yimak) Turk	?	?>
24	II:45-47	MALIK KESHLI KHAN SAIF AL-DIN AI-BEG AL-SULTANI MALIK AL-HUJJAB Ilbari (Yimak) Turk	Ikhtiyar al-Din Abu Bakr Habash	a slave in the dargah-i khass>
25	II:47-89	AL-KHAQAN AL-MU`AZZAM AL- KHAN AL-`AZAM BAHA AL-HAQQ WA AL-DIN ULUGH KHAN BALBAN AL-SULTANI Ilbari (Yimak) Turk	from Khwaja Jamal al-Din Basri	bought by Iltutmish in 630/1232-3> khasah dar>

by Barani: "Turks, Shamsi slaves, holders of high offices and titles."[70] He goes on to add that since two of the chihalgani identified by Barani, Ghiyath al-Din Balban and Sher Khan Sunqur, also had their biographies in Juzjani then the bandagan in the Tabaqat-i Nasiri must be a part of the "forty" elite slaves of Iltutmish.

The basic presumption in Barani's statement was that those Shamsi slaves (like Balban) who held high offices and titles in the reign of Sultan Nasir al-Din Mahmud (644/1246-664/1266) must have also held posts of equal status in Iltutmish's reign. Hambly based his argument on the same false presumption. If we refer to Table 2 which presents the information from Juzjani on the career of the bandagan-i Shamsi it becomes immediately apparent that of the twenty-five Shamsi slaves, eight (numbers 11, 16, 17, 19, 22, 23, 24, and 25) held no positions of privilege during Iltutmish's reign. Ghiyath al-Din Balban (number 25), around whom hangs Barani's tale of the "forty" slaves, was purchased only in 630/1232-3, which was towards the very close of Iltutmish's reign (died, 633/1236). It is not likely that he was manumitted during the remaining three (lunar) years of Shams al-Din's life nor was he a senior Shamsi slave. He was only a khasa dar (falconer) by the end of Iltutmish's rule and received his first advancement only

70. Ibid, p. 62.

in Sultan Radiyya's service (633/1236-637/1240). Until that time he had still not been trusted with a military, administrative command. Nor could someone like Malik Ikit[71] Khan Saif al-Din Ai-Beg Khitai (number 16) have been a Shamsi bandagan-i khass. He was a lowly bodyguard, jandar, in Iltutmish's reign, and had progressed to the post of chief bodyguard, sar-jandar, in `Ala al-Din Mas`ud's dispensation (639/1242-644/1246). If the Shamsi bandagan-i khass like the chihalgani were senior, privileged slaves, holding important commands because of Sultan Iltutmish's trust and patronage, then, at least all of Juzjani's "twenty-five" slaves, including Balban, were not Barani's "forty".

Years ago Muhammad Habib had explained that forty was merely "a formal number", and that the actual number of slaves that comprised the "chihalgani" was probably far lower.[72] What Habib was alluding to was the fact that

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71. Habibi read the name of the slave as Bat (BT?) Khan Saif al-Din Ai-Beg Khitai and also recognised the existence of different readings in the various manuscripts. Peter Jackson suggestion of Ikit Khan as a reading of the Malik's name was based upon the B.M. Ms 26,189 and I.O. Ms 1952. See Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 2, p. 28, and vol. 1, p. 476 and fn. 11 where Ikin (AIKN) Khan was the reading in a variant manuscript. See Peter Jackson, The Mongols and India, p. 92, fn. 137.

72. Muhammad Habib, "Introduction to Elliot and Dowson's History of India, vol. 2" in Politics and Society during the Early Medieval Period ed. Khaliq A. Nizami (New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1974), vol. 1, p. 107. Muhammad Habib's arguments were misrepresented by Aziz Ahmad, "The early Turkish nucleus in India" Turcica, Revue d'etudes Turques 9 (1977), p. 102, fn. 19. Aziz Ahmad incorrectly cited Habib's estimate of the number of Chihalgani as more than one thousand.

within Biblical and Quranic contexts, "forty" was a synonym for "many" and should seldom be taken literally. There are innumerable examples of the usage of "forty" in this context, and in a form much like the "chihalgani", the Book of Dede Korkut referred to Dirse Khan's "forty warriors".[73] In both cases "forty" should be understood as a metaphor for "a large (unspecified) number" and Barani's usage of the term chihalgani is clearer when interpreted in this sense.[74] Barani was accurate in defining the chihalgani as

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73. The Book of Dede Korkut, trans. Geoffrey Lewis (New York: Penguin Books, 1982 reprint), p. 28 and fn. 3.

74. There have been several interesting efforts to account for the "forty" notables of Iltutmish. The most imaginative exercise is by Khurram Qadir, "Amiran-i Chihalgan of Northern India" Journal of Central Asia 4 (1981), p. 97, who calculated that "Iltutmish had four qadis, two wazirs, twenty one amirs and ten offsprings (sic. Iltutmish, infact, had nine children. See Table 2 for details). If one were to include the three Mu`izzi contenders for the throne of Aram Shah, the list of individuals thus involved in the power struggle during Iltutmish's reign comes to forty". Peter Jackson's comments, The Mongols and India, p. 208, fn. 82, however, need to be taken more seriously. He suggested that rather than "forty slaves" the "use of the distributive numeral [qani] suggests...that each [slave] was [a] commander of a company of 40 mamluks. In Egypt the royal mamluks were divided into groups of fifty." Jackson relied upon David Ayalon's work, "Studies on the structure of the Mamluk Army: I" Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 15 (1953), pp. 204-6, for his comparison with the Bahri Mamluks of Egypt. Ayalon, however, was very cautious about his numbers and, with insufficient evidence, merely noted the possibility that each of the forty muqaddamu al-mamalik commanded fifty Royal Mamluks. If one were to continue to play with comparative numbers, Ayalon also noted that the highest rank that the Wafidiya, the immigrant free notables in the Mamluk sultanate, could hold was Amir of Forty (Tablkhana) irrespective of the actual number of soldiers in their command. Perhaps the parallel with the Chihalgani lies here? See D. Ayalon, "The Wafidiya in the Mamluk kingdom" Islamic Culture (1951) p. 91. On the other hand if there had been a tradition of

an elite cadre within the bandagan-i Shamsi, effectively a group of Shamsi bandagan-i khass. These would be a group of slaves, trusted and commended for their actions, raised above others by Shams al-Din Iltutmish, and manumitted as a reward for their service. Barani, however, was inaccurate in suggesting that Balban was a member of this group and subsequent scholars mistaken in interpreting his usage of "forty" too literally.[75]

The steps through which slaves rose to prominence and influence within the Shamsi slave corps has been detailed

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numerical commands within the early Delhi Sultanate army it is inexplicable that Juzjani, who paid considerable attention to the careers of the bandagan-i Shamsi, made no reference to it whatsoever. For that matter, it seems too far fetched to assume that Fakhr-i Mudabbir, Hasan Nizami, and Amir Khusrau would all ignore such a system of hierarchical commands until Barani, writing more than a hundred years after Iltumish's reign, mentioned it in passing. On the other hand, a near contemporary of Barani, `Isami, Futuh al-Salatin, ed. A.S. Usha, p. 122, also mentioned "forty turkish slaves" during the reign of Iltutmish. `Isami did not use the distributive numeral with forty, he mentioned the slaves as "chihal bandah-yi turk..." and the context made it clear that the author implied not forty but an indeterminate number.

75. Barani was attempting to explain the process through which the bandagan-i Shamsi had managed to prolong their stay in power by removing other competitors during the interregnum between Iltutmish and Balban. Balban had excelled in this politics of manipulation, and had come to effectively control power within the Sultanate from 647/1249. One way of explaining Balban's influential position was by suggesting that he had always been in the circle of power as a banda-i khass, gradually gaining strength as the Shamsi elite cadre of slaves died. Barani was wrong on some of his facts but his analysis of the organisation of the Shamsi slave system was accurate.

by Juzjani and this information has also been incorporated in Table 2. From this information it is clear that most Shamsi slaves were purchased and went through stages of training and service in the household of the monarch in the same manner as had the Mu`izzi slaves. The slave Malik Taj al-Din Sanjar Kazlak Khan (number 1 in Table 2), for example, had been bought as a child and was brought up and nourished (parwarish) in the royal residence together with the eldest Prince Nasir al-Din Mahmud.[76] He was then appointed as the supervisor of the Sultan's kitchen (chashnigir), and was promoted thereafter to the commander of the horses (amir akhur).[77] Similarly, the slave Malik `Izz al-Din Tughan Khan Tughril (number 7 in Table 2) graduated from the senior cup bearer (saqi-yi khass), to the senior keeper of the royal writing case (sar dawatdar), to supervisor of the Sultan's kitchen (chashnigir), to commander of the horses (amir akhur), until he finally received a military and administrative assignment, iqta`.[78] The length of time spent in close association with the Sultan and the nature of his subsequent deployment were two fairly reliable indicators of the seniority of the banda

76. "Ba-u (Malik Nasir al-Din Mahmud) yek ja dar hujr-i daulat parwarish yaft." Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Haibi, vol. 2, p. 4.

77. Ibid.

78. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 2, p. 13.

within Iltutmish's slave corps. Without doubt some of the Shamsi bandagan-i khass were individuals like Malik Taj al-Din Sanjar Kazlak Khan; Malik Saif al-Din Ai-Beg; Malik Hindu Khan Muayyid al-Din Mubarak and Malik Ikhtiyar al-Din Qaraqash (numbers 1,4,9, and 10 in Table 2). All of these slaves had been bought, and trained by Iltutmish before he became Sultan. Because of this early bonding and service it is also not surprising that when their master became Sultan they were trusted and deployed by him in some of the most crucial posts (in Uchch, Multan and as the treasurer) within his realm.

The time spent together in the household of the monarch also created a sentiment of corporate affiliation amongst the Shamsi slaves. Years after Iltutmish's death, circa 648/1250, during the conflict between the Shamsi slaves Malik `Izz al-Din Balban Kushlu Khan and Malik Nusrat al-Din Sher Khan over Uchch, Malik Kushlu Khan sought to resolve the hostilities through negotiations placing confidence in the fact that they were both from one house, az yek khana, and one threshold, az yek asitana.[79] Matrimonial relations within slave families also sought to achieve the same ends as in the case of Malik Tamar Khan who had

79. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 2, p. 38. Malik Kushlu Khan's confidence was misplaced and he was imprisoned by Sher Khan. The recognition of the sentiment of corporate solidarity amongst slaves is in itself important, as is its dissolution after the death of Iltutmish, on which see chapter 4.

married Malik Saif al-Din's daughter.[80] As with the Mu`izzi bandagan, vertical linkages between Shams al-Din and his slaves were as important as the horizontal links within the slave corps itself. It was only when the Sultan was reasonably assured about the loyalty of his slave that he was deployed in a military administrative post.

There were other similarities between Mu`izzi and Shamsi slave systems. The information on the ethnic origins of the slaves mentioned by Juzjani indicates that Iltutmish favoured the practice of his day by buying slaves of central Asian origin. Of the 25 slaves about whom we have fairly complete data in Juzjani's biographical section, 12 were Turks from different tribes (numbers 3, 6, 8, 14, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23-25 in Table 2; Qipchaqs predominated, and then the Ilbaris[81]), 3 were from Rum who, as their names

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80. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 2, p. 18.

81. Juzjani noted that both Sultan Iltutmish and Balban were Ilbari Turks and there has been considerable speculation about the background of these Ilbaris. There is no reference to an Ilbari tribe or clan in Kashgari, Diwan Lughat al-Turk, (see R. Dankoff, "Kashghari on the tribal and kinship organisation of the Turks" Archivum Ottomanicum 4 (1972), pp. 29-35), nor in the Anonymous, Hudud al-Alam, trans. V. Minorsky (Karachi: Indus Publications, 1980 reprint) or in Fakhr-i Mudabbir, Tarikh Fakhr al-Din Mubarak Shah, ed. E.D. Ross. It is fairly certain that the Ilbari clan was ignored by most medieval authors because it was not terribly significant. Juzjani noted that Shams al-Din Iltutmish's father's title was Il-Khan, which translates literally as subordinate chief; Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 441. One possible inference from this information can be that the Ilbaris were a subordinate clan, batn, or branch (insignificant enough not to be mentioned by most authors) of a larger Turkish tribe. That the inference is probably accurate is suggested by

indicate, were probably Turks purchased in or around Anatolia (numbers 2, 13, 22), 5 were described as Qara Khitai, in all probability Turks (numbers 5, 7, 10, 12, 16),[82] 4 were of unmentioned origin (numbers 1, 3, 11, 19)

Juzjani's concluding verse, qat`a, in the Tabaqat-i Nasiri, vol. 2, pp. 220-1 where Balban is eulogised as the "Khan of the Ilbaris and Shah of the Yimak, Khan-i Ilbari ast wa shah-yi Yimak". The Yimak was a large tribal confederation that had broken off from the Kimak and Qipchaq confederacies. On the basis of information in Amir Khusrau, Nuh Sipihr, ed. M. Wahid Mirza (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 173, one can conclude that (enslaved) members of the Yimak were present in north India in the thirteenth and fourteenth century. If Juzjani's information is correct, and there is no reason to doubt it, the Ilbaris were probably a subordinate clan of the Yimak. Elsewhere Juzjani, is fairly precise about associating the Ilbaris with the related tribes of Qipchaq, Qanqali and Yimak. See vol. 2, pp. 175-6. Interestingly enough, Juwaini, Tarikh-i Jahan Gush, trans. Boyle, vol. 1, p. 107, described the process of enslavement of Qanqali youths in Khwarazm and Afghanistan and their sale in what was most probably north India and Egypt. See Sunil Kumar, The Creation and Representation of Order: Ghiyath al-Din's Tughluqabad, for the full details of the relationship between these tribes and their presence in north India in the thirteenth century.

82. It is not clear how Juzjani used the term Qara Khitai. The Qara Khitai confederacy located in Balasaghun (Hu-ssu Ordo) were of Mongol antecedents and one possibility is that the slaves mentioned in Juzjani were of Mongol ethnic background. It is more likely, however, that Juzjani used Qara Khitai in a geographical sense to mean the lands occupied by the Western Liao. The slaves mentioned as Khitai or Qara Khitai were in all probability Turks from that geographical region. In support of this interpretation note the examples of Maliks Saif al-Din Ai-Beg (Yughantat) and Ikhtiyar al-Din Ai-Tegin who Juzjani described as Qara Khitai Turks. See Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 2, pp. 9, 22 and Table 1. On the Qara Khitai see Karl A. Wittfogel and Feng Chia-Sheng, "Appendix V: Qara Khitay" in History of the Chinese Society: Liao (907-1125) (Philadelphia: Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, 1946), vol. 36, pp. 619-674, and C.E. Bosworth, "Kara Khitay" in Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition, s.v..

but atleast 2 of their names were identifiably Turkish (numbers 1, 3), and 1 in all likelihood was a Turk from Khwarazm (number 19). Finally 1 was a Hindu from, or captured in the region of MHR in the Ganga-Jumna do-ab (number 9).[83] Thus, in all, 22 out of 25 slaves mentioned by Juzjani were of central Asian background.

Yet, unlike the Mu`izzid slaves, not all the Turk and other bandagan of Shams al-Din were recently enslaved. From Juzjani's biographies it is evident that at least three slaves had served previously in Afghanistan and north India and were sold to Iltutmish by the heirs of their masters. Kabir Khan Ayaz al-Mu`izzi had been a slave of the Mu`izzi notable Nasir al-Din Husain Amir Shikar,[84] Malik Nasir al-

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83. On the qasaba of MHR see the discussion in chapter 3.

84. Malik Kabir Khan's name is also included in the list of Iltutmish's notables as `Izz al-Din Kabir Khan without the al-Mu`izzi nisba. Juzjani noted explicitly in Kabir Khan's biography (Juzjani, ed. Habibi, vol. 2, p. 5) that he was a slave of Nasir al-Din. Traditionally, the slave, manumitted or otherwise, included in his own name the name of his master as the nisba of affiliation or belonging. Thus Iltutmish did not hesitate to publicly proclaim himself al-Qutbi. See from many examples the inscription of Iltutmish dated 608/1211: M.M. Shu`aib, "Inscriptions from Palwal" Epigraphica Indo-Moslemica (1911-12), p. 3. But then why did Malik Kabir Khan the slave of Nasir al-Din use the nisba Mu`izzi? Juzjani may well have confused masters. To obscure matters further Juzjani does mention other Maliks with the nisba of Nasiri in his list of Shamsi notables: Malik al-Umara Sunqar Nasiri and Malik Bidar Kolan--Muhammad Kulan Turk Nasiri in a variant manuscript (see Habibi, vol. 1, p. 450, fn. 6). We know nothing of their social backgrounds. If they had been slaves (?) their nisba of affiliation, Nasiri, indicated that they had been closely associated to a patron with that name. This could have been Malik Nasir al-Din Husain Amir-i Shikar, or possibly Nasir al-Din Qubacha.

Din Ai-Tamar al-Bahai[85] had been a slave of the Mu`izzi banda-i khass Baha al-din Tughril, and Malik Nusrat al-Din Tayisi al-Mu`izzi had apparently been a slave of Mu`izz al-Din himself sold to Iltutmish under unclear circumstances.

Through these purchases, Iltutmish went against the traditional practice of buying slaves that were natally and socially uprooted.[86] These three slaves had already established political and social ties with individuals in the area of their deployment and because of their connections they were not as dependent upon their new master for privileges. Significantly enough, Malik Kabir Khan Ayaz al-Mu`izzi provides the only example of a Shamsi banda-i khass who had his privileges reduced. In 625/1227-8 he was appointed as commander of the town, and fort of Multan

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85. Habibi reads the name as Ai-Tam? (AITM) Bahai, and the Malik's name is also included in the list of Iltutmish's notables (vol. 1, p. 451) as Malik Nasir al-Din AITM Bahai. In the list of Iltutmish's nobles Habibi also mentions the alternate reading Ai-Tamar in a variant manuscript. I have preferred the Turkish reading Ai-Tamar. See Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, pp. 450-1 and fn. 6. In the list of Iltutmish's notables (vol. 1, p. 451) another dependent of Baha al-Din Tughril is also mentioned: Malik `Izz al-Din Tughril Bahai. It is possible that Malik `Izz al-Din was not important enough in Iltutmish's reign, or in that of his successors, to merit a separate biographical reference, but he carried enough prestige to be recognised in Iltutmish's list of notables.

86. On the significance of natal alienation and social death in slavery see Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social Death, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).

together with its surrounding territory and towns, qasabat. Multan was a plum appointment; the city straddled the major trade routes into Sindh, Afghanistan and eastern Iran and it was also a strategic frontier outpost against Mongol incursions into the Delhi Sultanate. Circa 629/1231,[87] however, Malik Kabir Khan was removed from Multan and given (the town of?) Palwal for his personal maintenance, ba-wajh-i mayahtaj hal. Kabir Khan's loss of power and privileges would only be reversed in the reign of Rukn al-Din Firuz Shah (633/1236-634/1236).

Clearly an "imperfectly" recruited slave corps defeated the purposes for which it had been raised, and Malik Kabir Khan's insubordination was therefore quickly dealt with. However, rather than casting doubt upon the effectiveness of the bandagan-i Shamsi the case of Malik Kabir Khan enlarges upon the pressures upon Shams al-Din to not pay any particular attention to tradition in the purchase of his bandagan. It must be remembered that the Shansabanid Sultan Mu`izz al-Din had ignored the normative system advised by the Seljuqid vizier in his Siyasat Namah in much the same way. The urgency with which Iltutmish sought to recruit and deploy military personnel, especially just before and right after his accession, might also explain

87. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 2, p. 6, notes that his removal from Multan took place after two or four (lunar) years of his appointment.

the surprising presence of Malik Hindu Khan Muayyid al-Din Mubarak al-Khazin as a banda-i khass. Malik Hindu Khan, to my knowledge, was the first indigene to be advanced to the status of banda-i khass since Tilak, the slave of Sultan Mas`ud Ghaznavi (421/1031-432/1041),[88] and would be followed subsequently by the slave Khusrau Khan Barwari elevated by Mubarak Shah Khalaji (716/1316-720/1320).[89] The circumstances influencing Hindu Khan's recruitment and promotion differed from the other examples of Hindu slaves, as did his conduct which, unlike that of Khusrau Khan Barwari, remained exemplarily loyal to his master.

The Shamsi bandagan were the most favoured group in Iltutmish's dispensation precisely because, contrary to established historical opinion, they were not a slave or a

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88. On Tilak see C.E. Bosworth, The Ghaznavids 994-1040, op. cit., pp. 101, 127-8.


89. I have deliberately excluded from the category of Shamsi bandagan-i khass the example of the eunuch, khwaja sara, Imad al-Din Raihan who was also of Hindu origin. Juzjani recognised Imad al-Din Raihan's prominence in the politics of the Delhi Sultanate only in 650/1252 during the reign of Sultan Nasir al-Din Mahmud. There is no information, however, concerning his enslavement and early service. His importance in the early years of Nasir al-Din's reign (644/1246-664/1266) suggests that he was purchased, like his rival Balban, sometime in the last years of Iltutmish's reign (died, 633/1236). As a result he would have been too young to have been a Shamsi banda-i khass. His rise to prominence, unlike Tilak or Khusrau Khan, was not a result of the favour and trust of the monarch. Imad al-Din rose to power, much like Balban, through his own successful ability to utlilize the opportunities for political manipulation present in the unstable years of Iltutmish's successors. See chapter 4 for a full discussion.

Turkish "bureaucracy".[90] Rather than professional service regulations between an officer and the state, it was dyadic bonds created through careful fostering, parwarish and education, tarbiyat that influenced relationships between the master and slave. "Promotions", when they were given, were rewards for "approved/agreeable service", khidmat pasandida kardeh bud,[91] and while there might be a range of "approved actions", these were ultimately judged against the cultural expectations of a slave's selfless service in the cause of his master. For that matter, despite Nizam al-Mulk's advice there were no time bound "promotions" within this cadre. Some slaves seemingly "languished" with the same responsibilities for years; even when Malik Hindu Khan (number 9 in Table 2) was appointed khazanehdar, treasurer, he continued as tashtdar, ewer-bearer, for the remaining years of Iltutmish's reign.[92] Juzjani, presented this information as an evidence of the affection borne for the

90. See for example, Muhammad Habib, "Introduction to Elliot and Dowson's History of India, vol. 2", pp. 103-110; K.A. Nizami, "The Early Turkish Sultans of Delhi", pp. 224-226 ("an all-India military-cum-administrative service manned entirely by foreigners...Turkish slave officers and Tazik"); idem, Religion and Politics in India during the thirteenth century, pp. 128-133 (where the Turkish nobles constituted one element of the bureaucratic organisation of the Sultanate); and S.B.P. Nigam, Nobility under the Sultans of Delhi, pp. 106-110.

91. From many examples in Juzjani, see for example, ibid, vol. 2, pp. 9, 10.

92. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, vol. 2, p. 19: "ta akhir-i `umr dast az tasht dari na-dasht".


THE DEPLOYMENT OF
SHAMSI BANDAGAN
Kajakot
Nandana
LAHORE
MULTAN
UCHCH
Tabarhind
Kuhram
Sunam
Sursuti
Barwala
Hansi
DELHI
Baran
Budaun
Kasli
Mandor
Kol
Sambhamamak
Bayana
Ajmer
Gwalior
Ranthambhor
AWADH
Benaras
LAKHNAUTI
Dewal

master by the slave and the honour given to the banda who was allowed such close proximity and intimacy, qurbat tamam dasht, with the Sultan over an extended period of time. Malik Hindu Khan's career "languished" only if we understand it from the anachronistic perspective of a bureaucratic system.

Because of the degree of trust gained by the elite Shamsi bandagan they were widely deployed in the realm of their master. If we follow the career of the bandagan-i Shamsi in Table 2 then one can get a sense of the areas under the purview of their command. In the north-west and Sindh regions, senior Shamsi slaves had appointments in Multan, Wanjrut (near Multan), Uchch, Mansurpur, Lahore, Nandana and Kuja (? probably Kajakot, north-west of Nandana, south of the Indus). In the Punjab, between Lahore and Delhi, slaves had assignments in Tabarhind, Hansi, Barwala, Jind, Kuhram, Sunam, Sursuti (Sirsa). In the biographical twenty-second section of his chronicle Juzjani mentioned that in the region west and south-west of Delhi and north Rajasthan, Gwalior, Ajmer, Sambharnamak (the town Sambhar on the Sambhar salt lake), Kasli, Narnaul, Bayana-Sultankot and Palwal were held by Shamsi slaves. In the narrative on Shams al-Din's reign (section twenty-one), Ranthambhor and Mandor were also mentioned as areas con-

quered by the Sultan's slaves.[93] Although both areas were subsequently garrisoned, perhaps by these slaves, these were not definitive conquests and the area eventually lapsed back to the autochthenes. In the eastern Gangetic plain military and administrative assignments were held by slaves in the Bihar corridor and the province of Lakhnauti. In Uttar Pradesh, north of Delhi, slaves occupied posts in Baran (modern Bulandshahr) and Budaun. The area under the direct control of the royal slaves in the area of modern Uttar Pradesh was perhaps greater than that suggested by the information in Juzjani.[94] Writing in the mid-fourteenth century Barani supplied the additional information that two or three thousand members of the qalb, the central contingent of Iltutmish's army in which slaves were predominant, also had revenue grants (in contrast to military, administrative appointments) in the Ganga-Jumna do-ab for their personal maintenance.[95]

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93. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, pp. 445-6.

94. Towns such as Kol, Jalesar, Mahawan/Mahaban, Meerut, Patiali, MHR/ Marahara, Benaras, Awadh, Qanauj, and Kara were also under Shamsi subordinates. We have little information on the social background of commanders who were given charge of most of these towns. Some of these towns were under free military commanders (for example, Patiali) some were under royal princes (for example, Awadh).

95. These were grants like the one given to Malik Kabir Khan who received (the town of?) Palwal for his personal maintenance, ba-wajh-i mayahtaj hal, after he had been removed from the governorship of Multan. See Dia al-Din Barani, Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi, ed. Khan, p. 61, ed. Rashid, p. 72. Khan mentions two thousand horseman from Shams al-Din's qalb retinue with iqta`s in the Ganga-Jumna

The dispersal of the Shamsi bandagan-i khass over the newly annexed regions is a telling indicator of the impact of Iltutmish's conquests and the absorbtion of the Sultanates of north India within a politically paramount Delhi Sultanate. While, as we have seen in the last chapter, remnants of the conquered elite might continue to reside in their old principalities like Bayana-Sultankot, effective political power passed into the hands of Shamsi subordinates. Their appointments followed the conquests of the disparate regions and their full deployment over north India therefore dates only from the late 1220's. These provincial commands of the Shamsi slaves were described by Juzjani as iqta`, wilayat, or a town, shahr, together with its environs, mudafat and neighbouring towns, qasabat. We do not have any information concerning the functional difference between appointments in these areas, but the geographical and strategic context of each appointment must have made a difference. Multan, Uchch, Lahore, Budaun, and Lakhnauti, for instance, were important appointments at this time, and even here the responsibilities of the governor of Multan must have differed from that of Budaun and Lakhnauti. The terms iqta` and wilayat, irrespective of their location and size, were synonymous in the sense that

do-ab; A. Rashid's edition mentions two or three thousand horseman.

these were administrative and military posts where the subordinate of the Sultan resided with his own dependents and mustered troopers.[96]

The muqta` (notable appointed to an iqta`) must have had their own entourage of slaves and administrators to aid them in local governance. Juzjani provides us with little information from Iltutmish's reign, but evidence from a slightly later period suggests that the Shamsi bandagan must have had military slaves like Qara Jamaq, a bandagan-i khass of Balban, and free men who performed administrative duties for them like Khwaja Salih who was the na'ib, deputy, and kotwal, commander, of Uchch for Hindu Khan Khazani. Elsewhere Juzjani mentioned that in Nasir al-Din's reign, Balban had administrators and servants (slaves?), muta`alliqan wa khuddam, to look after his iqta`.[97]

Juzjani's description of the activities of the several muqta`s suggests that as in Mu`izz al-Din's reign these subordinates continued to possess considerable military initiative. Nevertheless, the authority of the Sultan

96. K.A. Nizami, "The Early Turkish Sultans of Delhi", pp. 226-7, on the basis of Barani's evidence included the grants given by Iltutmish to soldiers of the qalb in the Ganga-Jumna do-ab as (small) iqta`s. During Iltutmish's reign such grants were not referred to as iqta`s. These were more likely what Juzjani, a contemporary writer, described as revenue grants given for "personal maintenance", ba-wajh-i mayahtaj hal, without any associated military or administrative responsibilities.

97. See Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 2, pp. 67, 170, 61.

intruded into the <u>iqta`s</u> to a greater extent. Iltutmish accomplished this by appointing administrators/accountants, <u>khwajas</u>, in <u>iqta`s</u> together with Maliks. It is unclear how widespread the appointment of <u>khwajas</u> in <u>iqta`s</u> might have been but the casualness with which Juzjani provides us with the one instance from Nagaur, where Malik Karim al-Din Hamzah and Khwajah Najib al-Din functioned together in circa 618/1221, suggests that it was already a common practice.[98] The presence of the <u>khwaja</u> as an accountant and administrator together with the military commander in Iltutmish's reign makes it necessary, however, for us to correct

98. Juzjani, <u>Tabaqat-i Nasiri</u>, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 284. Although in the context of Nagaur Juzjani did not clarify the functions of the <u>khwaja</u>, he was far more specific when he described the administration of Tulak. In Tulak, Juzjani noted, the Malik (Taj al-Din Muhammad son of Qutub al-Din Hasan `Ali Ghuri) was in charge of the armed forces, and (Qadi Jalal al-Din Majd al-Mulk Ahmad Uthman Hakim Nishapuri as) the <u>khwaja</u> (who was also the <u>mutassarif</u>) was responsible for the administration of the area. See <u>Tabaqat-i Nasiri</u>, vol. 2, p. 134. This reference also clarifies that the term <u>khwaja</u> referred to an officer whose duties were more specific than that of a general administrator, <u>mutassarif</u>, and probably more like that of a <u>mustaufi</u>, or accountant. This is also evident from the fact that <u>khwaja</u> was also used much like the titles <u>qadi</u> and <u>mustaufi</u>, as an honorific to indicate certain "professional", socially applaudable accomplishments of an individual. The best example of such a usage is that of Sultan Mu`izz al-Din Bahram Shah's (637/1240-639-1242) <u>wazir</u> Muhammad `Iwaz to whose name Juzjani sometimes added the title <u>mustaufi</u> and at other times <u>khwaja</u> (Juzjani, <u>Tabaqat....</u>, vol. 1, pp. 463, 465). Note also the name and title of Malik Baha al-Din Ai-Beg Khwaja (Juzjani, <u>Tabaqat....</u>, vol. 1, p. 482, vol. 2, p. 58). Other than the Sultan, the military notables evidently (note the example of Khwaja Salih above) also appointed <u>khwajas</u> as accountants in their own commands.

Habib's argument that the "duo" were first apparent only in Balban's reign (664/1266-686/1287).[99]

The appointment of an accountant together with the military commandant in Iltutmish's reign marked a transition in the limits of action and resources delegated to military subordinates. In the reign of Iltutmish while an attempt was made to control the countryside through the appointment of slaves to iqta`s, control over the interior of the provinces, (iqta`s, and wilayats), and between provinces remained in most cases in the hands of the autochthenes. Campaigns against autochthenes were incessant and this certainly generated considerable revenue as tribute and plunder within the iqta`s. A unique coin of Iltutmish suggests that this activity was carried out not just in areas distant from garrison towns where Shamsi Maliks resided but sometimes also in their immediate

99. In Ghiyath al-Din Balban's reign (664/1266-686/1287) there is a solitary reference to the presence of the two officers, the khwaja and muqti` within an iqta`. See Barani, Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi, ed. Khan, p. 36; ed. Rashid, p. 43. Habib (following R.P. Tripathi, Some aspects of Muslim Administration, p. 251) has argued that this might be the first reference to the presence of the accountant (khwaja) who was now auditing the collection and expenditure of revenue in (some?) military assignments and perhaps remitting excess sums to Delhi. See Irfan Habib, "Iqta`s: distribution of revenue resources among the ruling class" in Cambridge Economic History of India, ed. Irfan Habib, (Delhi: Orient Longmans reprint, 1984), vol. 1, p. 70.

environs.[100] The primary task of the _khwajas_ was evident in this context. They kept an account of the tribute and treasure troves seized by the _muqta`s_ and they were responsible for its subsequent distribution amongst the fighting forces, the notables, and the remission of the fifth portion as _khums_ to the Sultan in Delhi. In a reference to the apportioning of plunder, _ghanaim_ (singular, _ghanima_), and setting aside the fifth, _khums_, for Iltutmish, Juzjani noted that the Shamsi slave Malik Tayisi's campaign into Kalinjar in 631/1233-4 had netted vast sums of booty, such that in fifty days the Sultan's fifth was noted as two million five hundred thousand (jitals?), _bist o panj lakh khums Sultani dar qalam awarad_.[101] To be able to achieve any proportionate division

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100. See Nelson Wright, _The coinage and metrology of the Sultans of Delhi_, p. 20: #52, pp. 71-72. The silver coin dated circa 632/1234-5 refers to tribute/plunder gained from the environs of Qanauj, an area which had passed from Mu`izzi to Shamsi control in the beginning of Iltutmish's reign. The marginal estampage on the reverse of the coins reads: "_min kharaj Qanauj wa kufr_" and Wright's translation presents the sense correctly "out of the capitation (_kharaj_ = _jaziya_) levied on Qanauj and infidels". Wright translated _kharaj_ as a capitation tax, synonymous with _jaziya_, and more recent research suggests this to be an accurate understanding. See Peter Hardy, "djizya, Hind" in _The Encyclopaedia of Islam_, op. cit., second edition, s.v., and Irfan Habib, "Agrarian taxation" in _Cambridge Economic History of India_, vol. 1, pp. 60-62.

101. Elsewhere Juzjani contradicted himself and noted that the Sultan's share was two million, two hundred thousand (jitals?), _khums Sultani dar in muddat-i nazdek bist o du lak hasil shudah bud_. Juzjani, _Tabaqat-i Nasiri_, ed. Habibi, vol. 2, pp. 11, 62. This contradiction should make us doubt the actual amount that might have been apportioned to the Sultan from the Kalinjar campaign. On the other hand the fact that Juzjani sought to provide (from memory) the

of tribute and spoils amongst the Sultan and those who participated in the campaign the khwajas must have also maintained a register of the fighting forces of the muqta`.

It is unlikely that Juzjani was recording here a normative juridical statement on the division of spoils amongst Muslims,[102] especially when he had made no such statement in his narrative on Mu`izz al-Din, Qutub al-Din Ai-Beg or Bakhtiyar Khalaji. Indeed, he had always been extremely vague when it came to the division of plunder during Mu`izz al-Din's and Qutub al-Din's reign and this was probably closer to reality in a situation where subordinates enjoyed considerable autonomy.[103] The recognition of a formal

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actual khums, calculated in money (it may have been precious metal or other goods seen as valuta), only lends credibility to the systematic division of booty that was practised. Fakhr-i Mudabbir, Adab al-Harb, ed. Sahili Khwansari, p. 398, lists horses, camels, cattle, goats, slaves, weapons and armour, asp wa ushtur wa gao wa gusfand wa burda wa muta` wa silah, as treasure from which khums should be set aside for the Sultan before distribution amongst the soldiers.

102. For normative statements on the distribution of war booty written in the north Indian context see Fakhr-i Mudabbir, Adab al-Harb, ed. Suhili Khwansari, pp. 398-99, and Fakhr-i Mudabbir, Adab al-Muluk wa kifayat al-Mamluk, ed. Muhammad Sarwar Maulavi (Teheran: Haidari, 1976), p. 23 (on the mushrif who apportioned the khums). From a later period (circa 760/ 1359) see Haji `Abd al-Hamid Muharrir Ghaznawi, Dastur al-Albab fi `ilm al-Hisab, trans. S.A. Rashid Medieval India Quarterly, vol. 1, pp. 64-5.

103. Concerning the distribution of plunder after the conquest of Bengal, for example, Juzjani noted that Bakhtiyar Khalaji sent a large portion (?) of the plunder to Qutub al-Din Ai-Beg, az an ghanaim wa amwal-i bisyar bakhidmat-i Sultan Qutub al-Din firistad. See Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 427 and chapter 1 for a full discussion.

khums, the Sultan's fifth, was a transition where the monarch's claim was more clearly stated and apportioned. While there must have been instances of collusion between the muqta` and khwaja, this does not detract from the intent of the scheme which implied greater knowledge of the details of the provinces through the presence of administrators in the iqta`s. This was knowledge not merely of the financial resources gained by the subordinates but also, through the register of soldiers involved in the campaigns of the muqta`, an idea of his military potential. Other than musters organised by the Sultan, the provincial commanders also reviewed their forces and occasionally raised extraordinary levees for campaigns which required additional armed personnel. Although evidence of these musters does not exist from Iltutmish's period, Juzjani referred to them during the reigns of the Sultan's sons where they were not described as novel exercises.[104] It is consistent with

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104. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 493, vol. 2, p. 83, mentioned the Diwan-i `Arid-i Mamalik, and on another occasion the Sahib-i Diwan-i `Arid-i Mamalik in a reference to individuals responsible for the royal musters. He also described two occasions (vol. 2, pp. 75, 83) when the `ard (muster) was held to impress visitors with the might of the accumulated forces of the Sultanate. More indirect references (vol. 2, pp. 70, 76) exist for occasions when provincial commanders mustered/prepared (ist`adad) their forces to participate in campaigns at the direction of Delhi. The evidence for extraordinary levees is suggested by Juzjani's references to occasions when he recited a tadkir exhorting "people to enrol in the army for fighting with the infidels". I agree with the interpretation of tadkir suggested by A.B.M. Habibullah, The Foundation of Muslim Rule in India, p. 219, and S.H. Hodivala, Studies in Indo-Muslim History, vol. 1, p. 211.

Iltutmish's concerns with military administration to have kept records of his armed forces and certainly Fakhr-i Mudabbir provided a detailed account of how such musters should be organised.[105]

Juzjani's information, included in Table 2 also indicates, that military administrative assignments were not made in perpetuity; the elite slaves were moved around from assignment to assignment as strategic needs dictated. As Habib has pointed out this was a change from Mu`izzi practice and suggests once again the intrusion of the Sultan's authority in the functioning of his subordinates.[106] Sometimes slaves were appointed to a specific command while the area was the scene of conflict, after which other Maliks might be appointed to the region. For example, Juzjani's biography of Malik Taj al-Din Sanjar Kazlak Khan indicated that the slave's appointment to Wanjrut in 625/1228 was only for the duration of Sultan Iltutmish's campaign against Qubacha. This might have been a part of the cleaning up operations associated with the campaign, after which Malik Sanjar Kazlak Khan was appointed to the older and more prestigous post of Kuhram. Wanjrut was, in all

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105. Fakhr-i Mudabbir, Adab al-Harb, ed. Suhili Khwansari, pp. 276-280.

106. Irfan Habib, "Iqta`s: Distribution of revenue resources among the ruling class", p. 69.

likelihood, amalgamated with the larger neighbouring province of Multan.

In Juzjani's narrative the peripatetic careers of the Shamsi bandagan is seen as an evidence of increasing trust and "rewards" given to the slave for commendable service. Nevertheless, the fact that slaves were moved around frequently did serve to ensure that no slave in Iltutmish's reign developed any sentiment of "possessing" an iqta` as his inherent right, and even a senior slave like Kabir Khan Ayaz could find himself stripped of his charge. In this sense the juridical norm that the privileges, commands and acquisitions of the slaves were a behest from the master was frequently used by Iltutmish to elevate or diminish the royal slaves.

The sense that "transfers" were advancements or rewards given to slaves in commendation for approved service is evident from the history of some regions, appointments to which were seen as the apogee of a banda's career. These areas were seemingly "reserved" as commands for slave officers, and some bandagan served in these regions for lengthy periods of time. Uchch, for example, was conquered in 625/1228 and, when the royal forces withdrew, its charge was handed over to the Shamsi slave Malik Taj al-Din Sanjar Kazlak Khan (number 1 in Table 2). Malik Taj al-Din's governorship came to an end with his death in 629/1231-2, upon which another slave, Malik Saif al-Din Ai-Beg-i Uchch

(number 4 in Table 2), was appointed as governor of the region. Malik Saif al-Din remained as governor of Uchch through the ramaining portion of his master's reign. The case of Multan was identical. After its conquest, its charge was handed over to the slave Malik Kabir Khan Ayaz al-Mu`izzi (number 2 in Table 2). After he was removed in disgrace, circa 629/1231, the charge of Multan was handed over to the slave Malik Ikhtiyar al-Din Qara Qush Khan Ai-Tegin (Number 10 in Table 2) who continued as governor through the remainder of Iltutmish's reign. The strategic locale of both Uchch and Multan seemed to necessitate the appointment of trusted subordinates from the very outset. As Table 2 also reveals, interestingly enough, three of the four amirs (numbers 1, 4, and 10) appointed to Multan and Uchch were old slaves of Iltutmish dating back to a period before he had succeeded in becoming Sultan. Not accidently seniormost slaves of Shams al-Din were appointed to positions of trust.

The close nexus between strategic commands and the deployment of senior slaves is also well brought out by the case of Lakhnauti. Here, unlike the case of Uchch and Multan, it was the free Amir `Ala al-Din Jani who was appointed governor of Lakhnauti after the death of Prince Nasir al-Din Mahmud in 628/1230-1.[107] Subsequently, some-

107. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, pp. 438, 448, 453-4. There has been considerable confusion concerning Nasir al-Din Mahmud's death. Juzjani mentioned in vol. 1, p. 447 of the edited text, that Nasir al-Din

time in 629-630/1231-1233, Malik `Ala al-Din Jani was dismissed, ma`zul shud,[108] and in his place the slave Malik Saif al-Din Ai-Beg (number 5 in Table 2) was appointed. Unlike Malik Jani, Malik Saif al-Din's governorship was a huge success and the Sultan appreciated his remission of elephants to Delhi sufficiently to reward him with the title Yughantat. Saif al-Din established the new tradition for Lakhnauti for the remainder of Iltutmish's reign. After Saif al-Din's death in 631/1233-34, the governorship of the province passed into the hands of the slave Malik `Izz al-Din Tughan Khan Tughril (number 7 in Table 2).

Other than their deployment as governors of strategic areas and new conquests, the elite bandagan-i Shamsi were also deployed in the crucial office of shahna, superinten-

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died in 626/1229. Later in his chronicle (vol. 1, p. 454) he mentioned that the prince died in Lakhnauti a year and a half after (b`ad az yek sal o nim) the arrival (626/1229) of the Caliphal envoys in Delhi. In other words he died sometime around 628/1230-1. This seems to be the more likely date for the Prince's death. The inscription on the door of the Prince's mausoleum in Delhi notes the date of construction as 629/1231-2. See J. Horowitz, "The inscriptions of Muhammad ibn Sam, Qutubuddin Aibeg and Iltutmish" Epigraphia Indo-Moslemica (1911-12), p. 24, and S.A.A. Naqvi, "Sultan Ghari, Delhi" Ancient India 3 (1947), p. 5. Nasir al-Din's death probably occured the year before the construction of the mausoleum, in early 628/1230. This date coincides with Juzjani's latter statement and the date of Iltutmish's campaign into Lakhnauti against Balka Khalaji (628/1230-1) whose rebellion Juzjani mentioned (vol. 1, p. 448) as occuring immediately after the Prince's death. At the termination of the expedition, Iltutmish appointed `Ala al-Din Jani as governor of Lakhnauti.

108. Ibid, vol. 2, pp. 9-10.

dent, within the Sultanate. In contrast to the muqta`, the military commander of a region, who still possessed considerable initiative, the shahna, a superintendent, had a more precise responsibility. He was normally detailed for specific tasks under the direction of the Sultan, an officer through whom the Sultan maintained direct control over certain establishments or crucial functions of the government.[109] The treasury, for instance was under the senior slave, Malik Hindu Khan Muayyid (number 9 in table 2) who was purchased by Iltutmish before he became Sultan. There is a similar example of another senior slave, Malik Ikhtiyar al-Din Qaraqush (number 10 in table 2) who, before he was appointed governor of Multan, had been the shahna of the khalisa, lands reserved for the crown, in the region of Tabarhind. While the presence of unalienated khalisa lands itself indicated an attempt by the Sultan to increase his revenue from taxation on the produce of land, in contrast to an income largely from plunder and tribute, it is sig-

109. Although there is insufficient evidence to draw a parallel, there are certain features that are common between the areas where shahnas were used in the Seljuqid state and the early Delhi Sultanate. For the Seljuqids see Ann K.S. Lambton, "Internal structure of the Seljuq Sultanate" in The Cambridge History of Iran, ed. J.A. Boyle (Cambridge: University Press, 1968), pp. 244-5. The office itself is of a Turkish background and was introduced into the central Islamic lands by the Seljuqs.

nificant that the administration of this "crown land"[110] was under the command of a shahna who was also a slave. Slaves were also appointed as shahnas to the armoury, zarrad khanah, of Budaun (number 13 in Table 2), of the river and the boats, shahnah-i bahar wa kishtiha (number 15 in Table 2), of the imperial stable, shahnah-i akhur (number 14 in Table 2). In effect, senior slaves were appointed by the Sultan to such commands as were deemed to be of strategic importance in the protection of his power.

Mu`izz al-Din's and Iltutmish's usage of military slaves reveals how bandagan might be deployed to consolidate power within very divergent political traditions. Mu`izz al-Din monopolised power within his domain by using slaves to exclude collatoral cousin lineages. Yet, consistent with the tradition of disaggregated authority within the Shansabanid family, Mu`izz al-Din allowed his slaves a fair amount of latitude within their commands; they were seldom moved around, and their governorships in north India were treated like appanages.

Although Iltutmish followed Mu`izzi practise in favouring military slaves to lead and then man the newly con-

110. Note the reservations of W.H. Moreland, The Agrarian system of Moslem India, (Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, 1968), p. 29, fn. 1, on translating khalisa lands as "crown lands" with its feudal connotations. It is likely that some soldiers of the qalb, the central contingent which included slaves, received grants for their personal maintenance from this khalisa land.

quered domains, the Shamsi bandagan were not allowed to convert their commands into appanages. While strategic provinces were still administered by bandagan of long standing, the fact that they were deracinated dependents of their master was driven home by their sometimes swift removal from favour. Unlike Mu`izz al-Din, Iltutmish chose to use his prerogative to frequently move his slaves around, to reward or punish, and maintain an accountability over his subordinates which, through the khwajas, was worked into the administration of the Sultanate.

The Mu`izzi and Shamsi deployment of bandagan indicates how important it is not to understand these politically influential commanders as "nobles",[111] or individuals who possessed a social status determined by genealogy and a code of conduct associated with their aristocratic position.[112] The bandagan were commodities like all other

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111. Probably the most confused usage of "noble" is to be found in the work of S.B.P. Nigam, Nobility under the Sultans of Delhi. The status of the nobility was not determined by birth (pp. 2, 97) or feudal privilege (pp. 93-103), but the author does not explain why then they were noble. The same ambiguities persist in other monographs: see I.H. Qureshi, The Administration of the Sultanate of Dehli, pp. 52-3, K.A. Nizami, Religion and Politics in India during the thirteenth century, p. 124, Kanwar Muhammad Ashraf, Life and Conditions of the People of Hindustan, p. 84.

112. For useful overviews of current research on nobility in western Europe see, Lawrence Stone, "Prosopography" in Historical Studies Today ed. F. Gilbert and S. Graubard (New York: Norton, 1972), pp. 107-140, George Beech, "Prosopography" in Medieval Studies: an introduction ed. James M. Powell (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1976), pp. 151-184, Bernard S. Bachrach, "Some Observations on The Medieval Nobility: a Review

slaves (burdas, domestics, kanizik, concubines) and their deployment, importance and privileges were derived from and dependent upon the will of their owner. Yet, the fact that trusted slaves were often expected to play crucial, strategic and unsupervised roles within the Sultanate drew the attention of contemporaries who emphasised the normative code of loyalty and obedience owed by the slave to his master. From the early `Abbasid period itself, the conduct of the ghulam/mamluk/banda was idealised as the paradigm of obedience and self-less loyalty.[113] Thus, by a rather per-

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Essay" Medieval Prosopography 1 (1980): 15-33. Two collection of essays provide an introduction to the major issues of interest in the field: Timothy Reuter, ed. and trans., The Medieval Nobility (Amsterdam: Europe in the Middle Ages, selected studies, vol. 14, North-Holland Publishing company, 1978) and Georges Duby, The Chivalrous Society trans. Cynthia Postan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977). I use the term "noble" in the twelfth and thirteenth century sense of the term. A useful comparison can be made between the ministerialis and the military slaves to highlight how "unfree" individuals were used to segregate authority in German and Islamic societies. Such a comparison would also serve the useful purpose of emphasising dissimilarities in the two medieval societies whereby the ministerialis managed to improve their social position over a period of time but the bandagan could not. On the ministerialis see other than the articles in Reuter, Benjamin Arnold, German Knighthood 1050-1300 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), and John B. Freed, "Nobles, Ministerials, and Knights in the Archdiocese of Salzburg" Speculum 62 (1987): 575-611.

113. al-Tabari, writing in the ninth century, recalled the `Abbasid Caliph al-Mahdi's sentiments: "The mawali (freed slaves) deserve such a treatment, for only they combine in themselves the following qualities. When I sit in public audience, I may call a mawla and raise him and seat him by my side, so that his knee will rub my knee. As soon, however, as the audience is over, I may order him to groom my riding animal and he will be content with this and will not take offence. But if I demand the same thing from somebody else, he will say: "I am the son of your supporter and

verse irony, the trusted slaves were not judged by values applicable to commodities but by their "noble", selfless conduct in the service of their master.

A slave's political life was for the duration of his master's reign, the new Sultan, if he had any pretensions to independent decision making, had to create his own body of dependents. In the long term there was a contradiction between reliance upon bandagan, by definition a one-generation-nobility, and dynastic succession which implied the removal of the predecessor's notables and a fresh dispensation of power under the new monarch.[114] Contemporary authors described, but refused to discuss this phenomenon;[115] they dwelt instead on the strengths of the

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intimate associate" or "I am a veteran in your [`Abbasid] cause (da`wa)"...And I shall not be able to move him from his [obstinate] stand". Cited by David Ayalon, "Preliminary remarks of the Mamluk Military Institution in Islam" in War, Technology and Society in the Middle East ed. V.J. Parry and M.E. Yapp (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 49.

114. This was, of course, as true for the Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt. See in particular, David Ayalon, L'Esclavage du Mamelouk; idem, "Aspects of the Mamluk phenomenon" Der Islam (1976): 197-225, (1977): 1-32; idem, "Studies on the structure of the Mamluk Army I and II" Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 15 (1953): 203-228, 448-476; idem, "Studies in al-Jabarti I and II" Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 3 (1960): 148-174, 275-325.

115. With perhaps Ibn Khaldun as the sole exception. See Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah, translated Franz Rosenthal, edited and abridged N.J. Dawood (New Jersey: Bollingen series, Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 146-7.

TABLE 3

SHAMSI LINEAGE

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GENERATIONS
    1                                    2                                        3

                 |----mother? ---------Nasir al-Din
                 |                      Mahmud
                 |                      HANSI>AWADH>
                 |                      LAKHNAUTI (d.628/1230)
                 |
                 |----mother: ---------Rukn al-Din    ---------------------'Ala al-Din
                 |    Shah Turkan;      Firuz Shah                             Mas'ud Shah
                 |    servant in        BUDAUN>LAHORE>                         DELHI IV (r. 639/1242-644/1246)
                 |    Harem.            DELHI I (r. 633/1236-634/1236)
                 |
                 |----mother? ---------Ghiyath al-Din
                 |                      AWADH (d. 633-4/1236?)
                 |
                 |----mother: ---------Radiyya al-Din
SHAMS AL-DIN ----|    Turkan Khatun;    DELHI II (r. 634/1236-637/1240)
ILTUTMISH        |    important in
                 |    Harem.
                 |
                 |----mother? -----|----Mu'izz al-Din
                 |                 |    Bahram Shah
                 |                 |    DELHI III (r. 637/1240-639/1242)
                 |                 |
                 |                 |----daughter* re-married
                 |                      Ikhtiyar al-Din
                 |                      Al-tegin
                 |
                 |----mother? ---------Jalal al-Din
                 |                      Mas'ud Shah
                 |
                 |----mother? ---------Qutub al-Din
                 |                      (d. 633-4/1236)
                 |                                       *wife #1 ------------son
                 |----mother:           Nasir al-Din--- ----daughter of
                 |    Malika-i---------Mahmud             Ghiyath al-      |----Rukn al-Din
                      Jahan Jalal       DELHI V             Din Balban       |    Firuz Shah
                 ===== al-Din           (r.644/1246-                         |
                 |                      664/1266                             |----Taj al-Din
                 |    (re-married to)   |                                    |    Ibrahim Shah
                 =====Qutlugh Khan      |---------------*wife #2--------|
                                                          daughter of?      |----Mu'izz al-Din
                                                                            |    Bahram Shah
                                                                            |
                                                                            |----Shihab al-Din
                                                                                 Muhammad Shah
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NOTE:	DELHI I etc.:	Indicates sequence of succession to the throne of Delhi.
	*:	Indicates marriage.
	mother:	Indicates the wives of Iltutmish and the mothers of his children.
	AWADH etc.:	Indicates commands given by Iltutmish to his sons. No subsequent appointments are shown on this table.
	d.:	Date of death.
	r.:	Regnal years.

system of military slavery which allowed for the effective segregation of authority. The contradictions in this structure of political relationships was apparent after the death of Qutub al-Din Ai-Beg when the rival Mu`izzi and Qutbi dispensations struggled for power under the banner of their respective candidates. The problem would recur again with the death of Iltutmish because the Delhi Sultan clearly envisaged the continuance of power within his family and had associated his adult sons in the governance of his principality. While the deployment of the Shamsi bandagan and the princes served the immediate purpose of consolidating Iltutmish's power in relation to his rivals, the slaves and Iltutmish's sons had divergent long term interests which drew them into eventual conflict.

c) The deployment of the Shamsi princes:

We are less then well informed about Iltutmish's descendents and even the list of the Sultan's sons provided by Juzjani is not present in all the manuscripts of the Tabaqat-i Nasiri. The Shamsi lineage presented in Table 3 accounts for Iltutmish's descendents into the third generation. In all probability the genealogy is less than comprehensive, especially with regard to the Sultan's

daughters.[116] Yet, on the basis of the information provided by Juzjani one can reconstruct the deployment and role of the Shamsi Princes during Iltutmish's reign.

Atleast superficially there was a similarity in the deployment of the royal Princes and the Shamsi bandagan. Like the slaves of the monarch, the Princes were entrusted with territorial commands in the most strategic areas of the Delhi Sultanate. Again, in conformity with the practise followed with the slaves, these commands were not given in perpetuity; Iltutmish periodically reorganised the principalities under the responsibility of the royal Princes. Nasir al-Din Mahmud, for example, was given the charge of Lahore in 614/1217 when Shamsi control was hardly confirmed over the region. He was subsequently given Hansi, and then moved to Awadh in 623/1226.[117] In 624/1227 Prince Nasir al-Din seized Lakhnauti and was appointed the governor of the province until his death in 628/1230.[118] Similarly Rukn al-

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116. The manuscript used by Habibi did not include the list of the Sultan's sons. Habibi, however, incorporated this information in a footnote. See Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, pp. 451, fn. 6, and idem, trans. Raverty, vol. 1, p. 625. For one reference to a daughter of Iltutmish, see Juzjani, Tabaqat...., ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 463, where a uterine sister, ham-shira, of Mu`izz al-Din Bahram Shah is mentioned in the narrative only because of her husband's opposition to the reigning Sultan.

117. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 453.

118. Ibid, vol. 1, pp. 438, 447, 454.

Din was given the command of Budaun in 625/1228 and was moved to Lahore in 631/1233 which he governed until 633/1236.[119] We have uncertain information about the administrative charges held by the other descendents of Iltutmish. Juzjani does suggest that the Prince Ghiyath al-Din was old enough for military command by 633/1236 when he seized treasures from Lakhnauti bound for Delhi. In that year Ghiyath al-Din either had the command of Awadh or of a neighbouring region.[120]

The social and political prestige that accrued to the members of the royal lineage was, however, clearly different from that of the bandagan. The military slaves had close, individualised relationships with the master and although there might have been variations in the military strength and responsibilities possessed by the various slaves, the Sultan sought to create fraternal bonds between the bandagan where there was no element of social

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119. Ibid, vol. 1, p. 454.

120. See Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 455. The sequence of events mentioned by Juzjani, vol. 2, pp. 12-13, concerning the appointment of the slave Nusrat al-Din to the command of Awadh circa 634/1236, suggests that the Malik was appointed to Awadh only after the death of Prince Ghiyath al-Din. This would suggest that Ghiyath al-Din did hold the charge of Awadh in the last years of Iltutmish's reign. A few of the other children were too young to be given independent commands or like the daughter Radiyya stayed in Delhi. Some young Princes might have stayed with their mothers in neighbouring garrisons. The "junior" Nasir al-Din was brought up by his mother in the small town, qasaba, of Luni near Delhi (Juzjani, Tabaqat..., vol. 1, p. 472).

seniority. While both the older Princes must have possessed their own personal subordinates and military retinues like the bandagan-i khass,[121] in a clearer departure from privileges given to military slaves, the Princes were given occasional commands over other notables of the realm in addition to their territorial charges. The seniority of the royal lineage was clearly in evidence when the governor of Awadh, Prince Nasir al-Din, had been given supervisory powers over notables appointed in the Bihar corridor. It was for this reason that Malik `Ala al-Din Jani appealed to the Prince for help when faced by intrusions from Sultan Ghiyath al-Din `Iwaz of Lakhnauti.[122] It is also from the 624/1227 campaign into Lakhnauti that we have evidence of Shamsi notables being ordered by the Sultan to serve under his son. Juzjani noted that the troops of Hindustan were placed under the Prince at the command of Iltutmish, together with famous notables, muluk-i namdar, like Bulan and Malik `Ala al-Din Jani. In this sense, the royal Princes were additional "agents" used by Iltutmish to con-

121. But see Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 490, vol. 2, p. 29 where the author mentions Malik Beg Timur Orkhan-i Rukni who, as his nisba of affiliation (Rukni) suggests, must have been a slave of Rukn al-Din. There is no way to ascertain, however, if Malik Beg Timur had been acquired while Rukn al-Din was a Prince or Sultan. Logically, however, if Shamsi bandagan-i khass organised their independent military retinues, one would expect Shamsi Princes to have done the same.

122. Ibid, vol. 1, p. 438.

solidate his authority over dispersed provinces, neutralise all competitors, and provide a check on the conduct of subordinates.

It is important to bear in mind, however, that while Iltutmish conceded that his sons should receive territorial commands, these commands were never organised as autonomous appanages. Iltutmish was the eponymous progenitor of the Shamsid lineage and his seniority was not disputed by any kinsman of his generation. As a result the Delhi Sultan avoided the problems of a fractionalised dominion where power was shared within a corporate kin group. Nor did he favour the development of these traditions. Because of the frequent reorganisation of the territorial charges under Nasir al-Din and Rukn al-Din, none of his sons could claim a geographical portion of his father's dominion as his share of the inheritance; unlike the Shansabanid Sultanate of Ghur, the Sultanate of Delhi was not apportioned amongst the Princes.

Instead, without diminishing the prestige of the imperial lineage, Iltutmish emphasised a horizontal integration within his dispensation where rights and privileges emanated from the Sultan. The Delhi Sultan deliberately sought to create close ties between some of his important subordinates and his elder sons in an effort to further cohesion within the Shamsid dispensation, and perhaps, strike a balance between its important constituent

elements. The slave Taj al-Din (number 1 in Table 2) was bonded to the elder Nasir al-Din through the experience of being brought up and fostered, parwarish, together.[123] When Rukn al-Din was entrusted with the charge of Budaun he was also given the experienced vizier `Ain al-Mulk Husain Ash`ari as a guide.[124] Although Juzjani presented no further information on the fate of `Ain al-Mulk, it is likely that the notable Baha'i al-Mulk Husain Ash`ari, who served Rukn al-Din when he became Sultan, was the son of the erstwhile vizier.[125]

The position of the royal Princes in relation to the other members of the Shamsi dispensation and the Sultan can be clarified by a comparative study of their respective titles. The eulogistic inscription on the doorway of Nasir

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123. Ibid, vol. 2, p. 4.

124. Ibid, vol. 1, p. 453. `Ain al-Mulk's role may well have been that of a tutor-father. Similar roles had been played by other viziers in the Islamic world. Closest to time and space to the Delhi Sultanate is the example of the Seljuqid vizier, Nizam al-Mulk, and his relationship of atabeq (father-commander) to the Sultans Alp Arsalan (455/1063-465/1072) and Malik Shah (465/1072-485/1092). For the relationship between the Barmakid viziers and the early `Abbasid Caliphs see S.D. Goitein, "The origin of the Vizierate and its true character" in Studies in Islamic History and Institutions (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1968), pp. 168-196. Goitein emphasised that the term wazir meant "burden-bearer", "helper" and "assistant" which would be closer to the sense in which Juzjani uses the word. "Minister", "finance minister" or "Prime minister" reify the functions and role of the subordinate into an extremely inaccurate, anachronistic meaning.

125. For a reference to Baha'i al-Mulk Husain Ash`ari see ibid, vol. 1, p. 456.

al-Din's mausoleum, inscribed no doubt with Iltutmish's approval, referred to the Prince as the Malik of Maliks of the east, Malik-i Muluk al-Sharq.[126] While Malik al-Sharq was a traditional encomium, the inscription clarified further that the status of the Prince, as "Malik of Maliks", had been senior to the other notables of the Sultan. One such notable was the slave Farrukh, who extolled himself as Iftikhar al-'Umara al-Muluk al-Sharq, or the Glory of the Amirs and the Maliks of the east.[127] In effect, the slave Farrukh claimed that while one of a body of Amirs and Maliks, he was the most glorious. While the publicly proclaimed status of the Prince was senior to Farrukh, both the Maliks still operated and identified themselves on separate levels as [great] notables within the Shamsid dispensation of Maliks and Amirs. If there were any uncertainties about seniority in this order, Iltutmish allayed all doubts by personally claiming the title Sultan of the east, Sultan al-Sharq.[128] The singularity of Iltut-

126. J. Horowitz, "The inscriptions of Muhammad ibn Sam, Qutubuddin Aibeg and Iltutmish", p. 24, #22, Plate XVI #1, (inscription on the gateway, tomb of "Sultan Ghari", Malikpur) and S.A.A. Naqvi, "Sultan Ghari, Delhi", p. 5.

127. J. Horowitz, "The inscriptions of Muhammad ibn Sam, Qutubuddin Aibeg and Iltutmish", p. 23, #20, Plate XXVIII (inscription on the northern wall of the courtyard of the Sayyid Wara mosque, Bilgram).

128. J. Horowitz, "The inscriptions of Muhammad ibn Sam, Qutubuddin Aibeg and Iltutmish", p. 30, #32, Plate XXIII (inscription on the central arch, Arhai din ka Jhonpra, Ajmer).

mish's position rested on the fact that he was not the Sultan of the Sultans of the east; according to Iltutmish he was a Sultan without peer.

It was consistent with Iltutmish's concern to maintain a united domain that he strove to overcome divisive tensions which could originate over the question of succession to the throne of Delhi. In 626/1229, at the height of his power, Iltutmish sent one of the robes he had received from the Caliph together with a red parasol to Nasir al-Din, then governor of Lakhnauti, and recognised him as his heir to the Delhi Sultanate. Two facts need to be noted here: first, in nominating Nasir al-Din as heir Iltutmish confirmed that he did not envisage a division of the Delhi Sultanate; Nasir al-Din was the future Sultan of Delhi, and not Bengal. Second, the recognition of Nasir al-Din as the heir to Delhi implied subsidiary positions for the Sultan's other sons. While Iltutmish's second son, Rukn al-Din, continued as governor of Budaun, his subordinate position to Nasir al-Din was evident in that he only received a green parasol.[129]

As it turned out Nasir al-Din predeceased Iltutmish in 628/1230 but this did not detract the Sultan from his attempt to resolve all ambiguities concerning succession to the Delhi throne. Iltutmish's subsequent choice of succes-

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129. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 454.

sor was Radiyya, his eldest daughter, but just before his death in 633/1236, Iltutmish settled upon Rukn al-Din as the heir apparent, and brought the Prince to Delhi from Lahore to ensure a smooth transition of power.[130]

Unlike the crisis in the Lahore-Delhi appanage with the death of Qutub al-Din in 607/1210, when the very existence of the principality was in doubt, let alone the hoary problems of "succession", one would not have expected the death of Iltutmish to plunge members of the Shamsi dispensation into mutual conflict. Iltutmish had after all subordinated competing Sultanates in north India, placed his own subordinates in command, and designated his heir before his death. Yet, the members of the Shamsi dispensation failed to provide support to Iltutmish's successors. They envisaged a role for themselves which was substantially different from that of a mere prop to the sons of their master.

IV Conclusion:

The state of the existing evidence makes it impossible to graph the transition in power from the Sultanates of north India to the paramountcy of the Delhi Sultanate. We are especially poorly informed on the reactions of the

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130. Ibid, vol. 1, pp. 458, 454-5.

regional military elites to their conquest. Certainly by the late 1220's, with Iltutmish's string of political and military successes, the resources available to the Delhi Sultan's competitors started to decline. Diminishing resources would be suggested if, for example, a political authority was forced to divest itself of strategically crucial assets to raise money. That this was indeed the response of Iltutmish's Mu`izzi competitors can be inferred from the example of Nasir al-Din Husain Amir-i Shikar's heirs who were forced to sell their father's slave Kabir Khan Ayaz to Iltutmish. In a similar fashion the successors of Baha al-Din Tughril, Sultan of Bayana, sold their father's slaves Nasir al-Din Ai-Tamar and `Izz al-Din Tughril to the Delhi Sultan.[131] Trained slaves commanded an excellent price and while their sale might have helped in overcoming the immediate financial difficulties of Nasir al-Din's and Baha al-Din's successors, this must have been achieved only at the cost of a diminished military potential. In this context the fact that the military slaves were purchased by none other than the Delhi Sultan, the main competitor of Nasir al-Din and Baha al-Din, suggests not merely that Iltutmish possessed the financial resources to mop up the bandagan retinues of his competitors, but

131. See Table 2 and Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 2, pp. 5, 7 and vol. 1, p. 451 for the reference to `Izz al-Din Tughril.

that these opponents could also be pressurised to sell their slaves to him.

By the 1230's the primacy of Iltutmish in the political world in and around the urban centres of north India was complete. Unquestionably, this was made possible by a period of slow conquests (including reversals no doubt, although these are glossed over) and the deployment of military slaves as an exclusive corps of dependents over newly annexed territories. The free military commanders were also a large element within Iltutmish's body of subordinates, but few of them were elevated to positions of political authority primarily because their dependence upon the Sultan was suspect. Although lacking an administrative system in the institutionalised, bureaucratic, anachronistic sense of the term, Iltutmish possessed extreme control over his subordinates and to the end was capable of manipulating their careers.

There is little doubt about the fact that Iltutmish dispensed hierarchy and political status to such individuals as he chose while he reigned, a prerogative which he wished his sons to inherit. But the inherent tensions within such an enforced political regime, although ignored by Juzjani and other chroniclers, were certainly present and became explicit in their narration of events after the death of the Sultan. To some extent, the presence of simmering hostilities and the yearning for lost office can be

traced in the manner in which disgraced notables like `Ala al-Din Jani, and Kabir Khan Ayaz quickly manipulated themselves back to prominence after Iltutmish's death. Similarly, the exclusion from power of emigres such as Qutub al-Din Hasan Ghuri during Iltutmish's reign seems hardly to have been successful in delimiting their political and social power bases; soon after Iltutmish's death many free military commanders possessed sufficient support to become an important group in the conflict for political power.

The social and political dimensions of the conflict in the post-Shamsi period will be dealt with more fully in the fourth chapter. More relevant at this stage is to draw attention to another important change which had occured between 607/1210 and 633/1236, developments which were best contrasted by Juzjani. In 607/1210 he had noted the presence of four contending dominions in north India: Ghazni, Sindh, Delhi and Lakhnauti. Circa 635/1237, two lunar years after Iltutmish's death, Juzjani presented an astonishing mental map of the Delhi Sultanate. The author noted that in Sultan Radiyya's reign (634/1236-637/1240)

> the kingdom was at peace, aram girift, and the extent of the state apparent, daulat-ra bastat zahir shud, and from the domain of Lakhnauti to Diwal, az mamalik-i Lakhnauti wa Diwal all the Maliks and Amirs submitted, hameh-i Muluk wa

'Umara inqiyad namudand.[132]

Juzjani credited the creation of an integrated dominion consisting of urban centres and their adjoining environs, linked to each other by overland routes to the activities of Sultan Iltutmish. In his statement there was an implied link between the consolidation of a dominion and the submission of local notables to the authority of Delhi, measures which, as we have seen in this chapter, Iltutmish accomplished during his reign. Yet, it does need to be remembered that the north Indian Sultanates conquered by Iltutmish had built up successful material and political bases for themselves, and the Delhi Sultan's major definitive conquests -- that of Sindh and Lakhnauti -- dated only from 625/1228 which was very late in his reign. Despite the political integration of these provinces with the Delhi Sultanate in the last eight lunar years of Iltutmish's reign, it is apposite to question whether this integration was sufficient to diminish longer established regional identities. Surely creating the idea of a contiguous Sultanate of Delhi had to depend upon more than just political subordination of the north Indian Sultanates and their control through trustworthy slave subordinates.

132. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 459.

However, it is important to recognise that Iltutmish's achievements of conquest and consolidation were significant because they coincided with far reaching structural transformations in eastern Iran and Afghanistan. As north India was coming under a paramount military power, the societies of the central Islamic lands were suffering dislocation and destruction because of the campaigns of `Ala al-Din Khwarazm Shah and then Chingiz Khan. The increasing migration of displaced Muslims from Iran and Afghanistan into the urban settlements of north India implied that a large number of elites had little sense of regional loyalties. Excluding the military commanders who were indeed recruited in the various Sultanates and therefore had a stake in their preservation, for the larger number of emigres, physical security and productive commercial relationships were more immediate concerns which the campaigns of Delhi did not threaten. More significantly, the response of the leaders and opinion makers amongst the Muslim community, the ahl-i qalam (people of the pen) and the piety minded Muslims, to the trauma of their dispersal from their homelands made them anxious to promote a composite character for the Muslim community in north India. A large number of them accepted grants and positions of public responsibility from Iltutmish and they did provide ideological support to the ideal of a unitary domain for the faithful. Juzjani's map of a politically contiguous

Delhi Sultanate during Radiyya's reign may have been hyperbole, but in imagining such a geographic configuration at all, it is worth investigating if Juzjani was representing a view formulated and disseminated by people of his background.[133]

Together with (an uneven) political integration of the lands between "Lakhnauti and Dewal" there were other forces at work which made the notion of a contigous domain meaningful to Juzjani's readership. The next chapter explores the nature of the change which occured in Muslim society of north India in the early thirteenth century and the agents which were involved in creating a consciousness of an entity such as the Delhi Sultanate.

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133. It is surprising, for instance, that `Isami writing a century and a half after Iltutmish, should share Juzjani's estimation of the Delhi Sultan's accomplishment in establishing a unitary dominion encompassing much of north India. See `Isami, Futuh al-Salatin, ed. A.S. Usha, pp. 115-6, 124. This is particularly interesting for `Isami was writing his history in the rival Deccani Bahamanid court and he had no reason to present a flattering picture of the court of the Delhi Sultan as the sanctuary and axis of Islam in India. The author noted (pp. 115-6) that the city of Delhi profited from the number of immigrants from the central Islamic lands and was purified by the sacred zamzam waters from Mecca which were mixed with the waters of the reservoir constructed by the Sultan (Shamsi talab). The mental image of the Delhi Sultanate from the Bay of Bengal to the Indus river is also mentioned on p. 124.

Chapter 3

THE `ULAMA AND THE EMERGENCE OF DELHI AS THE SANCTUARY AND AXIS OF ISLAM IN NORTH INDIA

The defeat and death of Qubacha in 625/1228 may well be regarded as a turning point in the making of the Delhi Sultanate. Other than the fact that the death of the Sultan of Sindh marked the removal of Iltutmish's most powerful adversary, the mid-1220's was also the time when increasing number of refugees fled the central Islamic lands in the face of Mongol raids. Eastern Iran, Khwarazm and Afghanistan had already felt the brunt of their plundering campaigns but in the mid-1220's the Mongols also made their presence felt in the Indus plain and Sindh. The establishment of a politically paramount Sultanate in north India with its headquarters in Delhi coincided with the influx of migrants from the neighbouring urban centres of Muslim culture and civilization. Because of the new political realignment in north India and the Mongol "push", emigres increasingly moved towards eastern Punjab and the

Gangetic plain. Although there is no quantitative evidence through which one can judge the actual growth in population, this increase is suggested by the fact that old towns such as Budaun, Baran, and Kara became more important and that there were increasing references to settlements such as Sirsa, Nagaur, Patiali, and MHR.[1]

The character and nature of the growth of urban settlements in north India was strongly influenced by the overwhelming military character of Sultanate society and the

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1. See Irfan Habib, "Economic History of the Delhi Sultanate--an Essay in Interpretation" The Indian Historical Review 4 (1978): 287-303. Raverty transliterated MHR as Mahir, Mihar, and Mihir and he was certainly misled in placing the town in the Sagar and Narbada territories. See Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, trans. Raverty, vol. 1, p. 744, fn. 9 and s.v. index. In the Persian text (ed. Habibi, vol. 2, pp. 11, 44) Juzjani mentioned the qasaba (on the qasaba see below) of MHR in connection with the towns Kol, Bayana, Jalesar, Mahawan/Mahaban, Qanauj, Gwalior and Balaram. This association suggests that MHR lay somewhere in the Ganga-Jumna doab near the aforementioned towns. In an oral communication Muzaffar Alam suggested Marahra as a possible reading for MHR, and there is some merit in this identification. Marahra was a town in the Ganga-Jumna doab which was frequently exchanged between the Delhi and Jaunpur Sultanates in the conflict between Sultan Bahlul Lodi (855/1451-894/1489) and Husain Shah Sharqi (862/1458-883/1479). In the references to the conflict in Nizam al-Din Ahmad, Tabaqat-i Akbari, ed. B. De, vol. 1, pp. 310, 316, Marahra was mentioned in conjunction with Jalesar, CHNDWAR (probably a mistake for Chanwar), and Sakit. Elsewhere it was mentioned together with qasaba-yi KNBL (probably Kampil), Patiali, Shamsabad, Sakit, Kol, and Jalali. See also Abu al-Fadl, `Ain-i Akbari, trans. H.S. Jarrett and Jadunath Sarkar (Delhi: New Taj Office, 1989 reprint), vol. 3, p. 197 where Marahra is listed in the district, sarkar, of Kol. The location of Marahra coincided with the approximate locale of MHR and if indeed the two are one and the same place then it is possible that MHR is either a corrupt transcription of Marahra or an earlier version of the name.

prominence of the military elite. The small urban settlements referred to as qasabat (singular, qasaba) in the early thirteenth century literature, for example, did not possess the commercial, rural-urban market functions which were to become one of their distinguishing characteristics in a later time period. Nor did the term contain the connotations of "chief town" ascribed to it in the Maghreb and north Africa. In this time period the qasaba was a fortified encampment, sometimes independent, at other times associated with a town, with military subordinates of the Sultan or his commanders.[2] It is therefore not surprising that one way to trace the transformation of a qasaba into a town (shahr) is by following the careers of the Shamsi military commanders. During Mu`izz al-Din's reign, Baran

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2. For the connotations of "chief town" ascribed to the qasaba in the Maghreb and north Africa see G. Deverdun, "Kasaba" Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition, s.v.. In the early thirteenth century both the qasaba and the shahr shared military-administrative functions. This was evident in the case of the qasaba of Luni which also possessed a fort, qil`a (Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 472) and subordinates of the military commander. Note Juzjani's description (Juzjani, vol. 2, p. 61) of his journey through the wilayat of Balban (in 647-8/1249-50), during which the author received aid from subordinates of Ulugh Khan who were resident in each qasaba, shahr and qil`a. That the qasaba was a military outpost frequently dependent upon the shahr is suggested by Hasan Nizami, Taj al-Ma`athir, p. 224, who noted that in Mu`izz al-Din's reign Husam al-Din Ughul Beg received charge of Kol and its neighbouring qasabat. According to Juzjani (vol. 2, p. 5), in Iltutmish's reign, his slave Kabir Khan Ayaz was given command of the town and citadel of Multan and its associated towns, and regions (shahr wa hisar-i Multan wa qasabat wa atraf wa nuwah-yi an).

(modern Bulandshahr), was described as a qasaba when Iltutmish received its charge.[3] During Iltutmish's reign two bandagan-i Shamsi were appointed to Baran (numbers 4 and 20 in Table 2). The subsequent rise to importance of the qasaba can be gauged from the frequent appointments of Shamsi slaves to the town between the years 633/1236 and 644/1246.[4] Already by 644/1246 Baran was important enough that its commander Malik Ikat Khan (number 16 in Table 4) possessed the prominence to be appointed wakil-i dar, or deputy in the court of Sultan Nasir al-Din Mahmud (644/1246-664/1266). This appointment was no accident; subsequent to Ikat Khan, in 654/1256, another commander from Baran, Malik Taj al-Din Sanjar Tarkhan was appointed as wakil-i dar (number 17 in Table 4). The qasaba must have grown to become a relatively important urban centre and command by the middle of the thirteenth century to be given to two of the more important military commanders in the Delhi Sultanate.

Although today historians regard increasing population and urbanisation as indicators of historical change and "progress", the agents of this transformation in the early thirteenth century -- the military elite -- were not universally appreciated by their contemporaries. Both Juz-

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3. Ibid, vol. 1, p. 443.

4. See numbers 11, 14, 15, 16 in Table 4, chapter 4.

jani and the sufi Nizam al-Din Auliya recognised the role of military personnel and the patronage of the Sultan as an important ingredient in the process of urbanisation, yet in contrast to Juzjani, Nizam al-Din's response to the activities of the ruling elite was an entirely negative one. He described Ghiyathpur, his choice of residence, as an unknown, sparsely populated village, maud`a'i majhul bud wa khalaq andak.[5] According to Nizam al-Din, with Kaiqabad's (686/1287-689/1290) establishment of a fort and residence in the neighbouring region of Kilukhari, the coming and going of notables to the Sultan's court commenced, a city and congregational mosque were constructed, and since Ghiyathpur was close by, the number of visitors to see the Shaikh also increased. Nizam al-Din complained that because the Sultan's residence was in Kilukhari, Ghiyathpur also became uncomfortably busy and loud until the bustle

5. Amir Hasan Sijzi, Fawa'id al-Fu`ad, ed. Khwaja Hasan Thani Nizami Dihlawi (Delhi: Urdu Academy, 1990), p. 243. The Delhi edition of the Faw'id al-Fu`ad is an exact duplicate (including pagination and critical commentary) of M.L. Malik's edition published from Lahore (Lahore: Malik Siraj al-Din and Sons, 1966). Since I do not have access to the complete Lahore edition at present, all references are to the Delhi version. Compare Nizam al-Din's comments with the fulsome praise of Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, vol. 1, p. 421 (for Baha al-Din Tughril), p. 436 (for Husam al-Din `Iwaz and Basankot-Lakhnauti), pp. 440-1 (for Shams al-Din Iltutmish and Delhi) and vol. 2, p. 52 (for Ulugh Khan and the iqta` of Hansi).

almost drove him away.[6]

While Nizam al-Din's was an entirely personal, and perhaps deliberately exaggerated response to the disturbance introduced in his environment by the existing political regime,[7] his comments nevertheless draw attention to the need to study the reaction of the local Muslim communities to the political structures of governance constructed by the Delhi Sultans. We are still quite unaware whether, or to what extent, or in which manner the local urban Muslim communities supported or participated in the political life

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6. ibid, pp. 242-243. See also Amir Khurd, Siyar al-Auliya, ed. Sayyid Mahdi Ghuri (Lahore: Markaz-i tahqiqat-i Farsi Iran wa Pakistan, no. 23, Mu'assi-yi Intisharat-i Islami, 1978), pp. 110-111. This edition is exactly the same as the Delhi, Muhib-i Hind Press, 1302/1885 lithograph. The only difference is in the pagination where the table of contents and the introduction have added ten additional pages to the Lahore edition. Thus pp. 110-111 of the Lahore edition are pp. 100-101 of the Delhi edition. Nizam al-Din's experience of moving his residence to Kilukhri was also repeated by Hamid Fadl Allah Jamali, Siyar al-`Arifin, (Delhi: Ridwi Press, 1311/1893), pp. 63-4.

7. Nizam al-Din's account of his decision to move to Ghiyathpur was faithfully reproduced in all later Sufi biographical compilations. All of these note that Ghiyathpur was a wilderness and that Kilukhri prospered after Sultan Kaiqabad's decision to live there. Diya al-Din Barani, Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi, ed. Khan, p. 130, ed. Rashid, p. 151, describes the increase in population and prosperity of Kilukhri in a similar fashion. Kilukhri, however, had already been a fortified residence of Sultan Rukn al-Din Firuz (633/1236-634/1236), see Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 456. Although the "new city" certainly declined after that monarch's death, it is unlikely that Kilukhri relapsed to become quite the desolate place described by Nizam al-Din Auliya and others. This exaggeration was useful to emphasise Nizam al-Din's own spiritual and ascetic personality.

of the Delhi Sultanate. Especially during the years of rapid political and demographic change concurrent with the reign of Iltutmish, not merely were new regions conquered but large numbers of Muslims were also very recent migrants into the Delhi Sultan's domains. Together with a dispensation of power to carefully considered notables, Iltutmish also sought to integrate local Muslim urban communities into a homogenous body of the Delhi Sultanate. Iltutmish's success in this endeavour is debatable, and we will have more to say about it later in this chapter. But "actual" success and failure notwithstanding, the very presence of a map of a contiguous territory of the Delhi Sultanate by the end of Iltutmish's reign suggests the introduction of a new idea which few would have found acceptable in the beginning of the Sultan's reign. In fact, together with the absence of any political unity it was the lack of homogeneity between the rulers and the ruled and within the Muslim community which was most obvious during the better part of Iltutmish's reign.

I: Ethnic differences within the Muslim community in north India

In the previous chapters we have seen how with Mu`izz al-Din's campaigns and the subsequent consolidation of his conquests under his subordinates there was an increase in

the number of individuals of Turkish background in positions of power and influence in north India. Until the 1220's, and the Chingiz Khanid invasions in eastern Iran and Afghanistan, most of the Turks were military slaves, many of the older ones being the elite bandagan-i khass. Subsequently, free Amirs of Turkish origin also made their way into north India although few of them received influential commands, the bandagan-i khass continuing as favoured subordinates. In short, by the end of Iltutmish's reign the influence of the Turkish bandagan on the political structure of the Sultanate was disproportionate to their numbers and social status.

Although these Turks had undergone the trauma of natal alienation and as part of their training had received an introduction to the Islamic creed and the decorum of the court, they still retained their Turkish ethnicity. This was to be expected for they had only just been uprooted from their homes in the central Asian steppes. Fakhr-i Mudabbir whose Tarikh has a large section on the Turks, never travelled in central Asia. Much of his information must have been culled from travellers and merchants, but parts of the author's observation on languages, scripts and religious beliefs of the Turks came either from direct observation or were received first-hand from Turks in north

India.[8] Fakhr-i Mudabbir's account suggests that in the first decade of the thirteenth century, the Turks maintained their racial affinity in north India and retained at least some elements of their cultural identity. This is also suggested by the fact that in this period Turkish was a flourishing language in the Delhi Sultanate. Fakhr-i Mudabbir explained that

> .....after the Persian language (tazi) none is finer and more dignified, bahtar wa ba-haibattar, than Turkish. And now-a-days the Turkish language is more popular that it ever was before, imruz rughbat-i mardman ba-zaban Turki besh az an ast. This is due to the fact that the majority, bishtar, of Amirs and Commanders (Sipahsalaran) are Turks. And it is the Turks who are most successful and most wealthy; and so all have need of that language, wa daulat ba-ishan ast wa ni`amat wa zar wa sim dar dast-i ishan ast; wa jumleh-yi khal'iq ra badan hajat ast. And the highest no[ta]bles are in the service of the Turks....[and from their success derive].....peace, prosperity and honour.[9]

Other than suggesting that the Turks maintained a certain composite racial, cultural and linguistic identity, Fakhr-i Mudabbir also noted the social and political promi-

8. See Fakhr-i Mudabbir, Tarikh-i Fakhr al-Din Mubarakshah, pp. 38-42, where the description of Turkistan was probably culled from the reports of travellers and merchants. The account of the language, poetry and religious beliefs, pp. 43-46, was most probably received first-hand.

9. Fakhr-i Mudabbir, Tarikh-i Fakhr al-Din Mubarak Shah, pp. 43-44. I have followed E.D. Ross's translation of this passage barring a minor correction. See E.D. Ross, "The Genealogies of Fakhr al-Din Mubarak Shah", p. 405.

nence of this group in north India. That this prominence led "the highest notables" to seek patronage from the powerful Turkish lords of the realm is also interesting. But Fakhr-i Mudabbir's statement is particularly significant because it draws our attention to the considerable distance which separated the lords from the members of the realm that they governed, so much so that Persian speaking secretaries had to master a "foreign" language to function as their subordinates. Fakhr-i Mudabbir's statement should not be taken to mean that the the Turkish slaves of the Delhi Sultans knew no Persian (see for example, the case of the Turk slave Malik Saif al-Din who functioned as a judge and must have known at least some Persian and Arabic), but that in the early Delhi Sultanate for a Persian subordinate to prosper in a Turk's service, knowledge of the Turkish language would be an advantage.[10]

Turkish ethnicity was to some extent deliberately preserved in north India amongst the Turk _bandagan_ by the

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10. For the details on Malik Saif al-Din see Juzjani, _Tabaqat-i Nasiri_, ed. Habibi, vol. 2, pp. 40-42. The later testimony of Amir Khusrau confirms Fakhr-i Mudabbir's observations on the efforts by the _Taziks_ to learn Turkish. See Amir Khusrau, _Dibacha-yi Diwan Ghurrat al-Kamal_, ed. Sayyid `Ali Haidar (Patna: Institute of Postgraduate studies and research in Arabic and Persian learning, 1988), p. 40: "I have seen many Persians, not Turks, _chandin tazik na Turk_, who have learnt Turkish studiously and industriously, _ba-ta`allum wa kasab_, in Hindustan. And they speak [Turkish thus] that (when) the eloquent speakers of that language, _fusaha-yi an taifa_, come from [Turkistan] (_az bala' biamadand_, literally: "come from the upper-lands"), they are astonished, _furu mandand_".

Delhi Sultans who were themselves Turks. As a part of the process of divesting old relationships and creating new identities and bonds for the slaves, the bandagan were renamed by the Sultans. Rather than giving Turkish slaves, Muslim names or naming them after Persian folk heroes, the slaves were, without exception, given new Turkish names by Qutub al-Din and Iltutmish. Qutub al-Din gave his slave Ai-Beg, a compatriot of Iltutmish, the name Tamghaj, and all the Turk bandagan-i Shamsi mentioned in Juzjani's twenty-second section were given new, but Turkish names by Sultan Iltutmish.[11]

What seems to have prevailed in the early Delhi Sultanate was a phenomenon similar to the one described by David Ayalon for the Mamluks of Egypt. There the Turkish

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11. On Ai-Beg/Tamghaj see Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, pp. 442-3, on the Shamsi slaves refer to Chapter 2, Table 2, bearing in mind the fact that a large number of the titles mentioned by Juzjani were given to the Shamsi slaves by Iltutmish's successors. Juzjani, for example, frequently reports the presence of "Khan" as a part of the titulature of the slaves. This was almost certainly a later, post-Iltutmish usage. Balban, for example, received the title Ulugh Khan, the "Great Khan" only in 647/1249 (Juzjani, vol. 2, p. 60) and we have no information concerning his earlier name or title. It is also important to remember that in Turko-Mongol usage the title "Khan" was reserved only for a member of the imperial lineage and Juzjani seems to have been aware that the appropriation of this title was a usurpation of "royal" privileges. Juzjani narrated a long story of doubtful authenticity to legitimise Balban's title. In this story the supreme lord of the Mongols, Khaqan Hulegu, out of respect for Balban's achievements, approved of the Shamsi slave's usage of the title Ulugh Khan. See Juzjani, vol. 2, p. 87.

slaves "attached supreme importance to the name-barrier....[which separated]...them from the local Muslim population.... [It] served as an almost watertight proof of their belonging to the Mamluk ruling class and as a most distinctive mark of their superiority over all outsiders".[12] There is much to commend Ayalon's analysis: the systems of military slavery in north India and Egypt were similar inasmuch as the bandagan in both regions were an exclusive, deracinated military elite who controlled power and privilege. Unlike the Mamluks of Egypt however, the monopolistic control of power within the bandagan corps in the Delhi Sultanate was not based solely upon a shared Turkish ethnicity. All Shamsi bandagan-i khass, Turk and non-Turk, had a close rapport with the Delhi Sultan. A shared Turkish ethnicity served to establish an additional bond between the Turk bandagan-i khass (who were in any case a majority within the elite cadre) and the Sultan, although it did not imply the distancing of other elite non-Turkish slaves like Hindu Khan.

Despite this reservation, to observers like Fakhr-i Mudabbir what appeared was a divide between rulers and ruled, those with power, influence and wealth and those who sought access to such a privileged life. These material

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12. David Ayalon, "Studies in al-Jabarti I" Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 3 (1960), p. 152 and idem, "Names, titles, and Nisbas of the Mamluks" Israel Oriental Studies 5 (1975): 189-232.

distinctions were also given an ethnic colour where the possessors of military authority were subsumed under the rough category of "Turk". While Fakhr-i Mudabbir writing for a Turk patron only developed the positive elements and accomplishments of the Turkish race, other individuals who served or depended upon the Turk bandagan also ascribed the group a composite ethnic identity but with completely different moral qualities.

The Chishti sufi saint Nizam al-Din Auliya, who never otherwise identified individuals according to their ethnicity seldom noticed the Sultan's central Asian slaves by name, or title; to him they were just anonymous Turks. The anonymity of the Turk benefactors in the sufi literature might be explained by the fact that they were finally incidental agents of God's beneficence. Thus it was through God's intervention, and not the devotion or generosity of "a Turk", that Maulana Kaithali was given twenty tankas, enough money to clear an outstanding debt.[13] Similarly, Shaikh Najib al-Din was comforted by Baba Farid on being removed from the mosque, house and office of imam conferred upon him by "a Turk" because he had criticised the Turk's wasteful, selfish expenditure. Shaikh Najib had advised his master to spend the money instead on charitable service for the Muslim community. Nizam al-Din mentioned that perhaps

13. Amir Hasan Sijzi, Fawa'id al-Fu`ad, pp. 112-114.

the Turk's name was Ai-Tamar for Baba Farid prophesied that "if an Ai-Tamar departs, God brings forth an Ai-Takar (in his place)" and indeed another Turk by the name Ai-Takar subsequently became Shaikh Najib's benefactor.[14] Thus, even when the reader was informed about the identity of the Turk, it was made clear that one Turk benefactor was much like another, the names were incidental. It is important to note, however, that Nizam al-Din did not stereotype any other group of people. Other individuals were also "incidental agents" of God's will on Earth but they were identified by name, or place of origin, or by their occupation: military commander (Amir, Malik), merchant (tajir), governor (wali), or judge (qadi, hakim). It was only the Turks who required no further form of description; the reference to their ethnicity encapsulated the host of qualities understandable to the saint's audience.

Some of these qualities were suggested in Shaikh Najib's story, but the distinction between the Turks and and the Persians was best described by Nizam al-Din in a story about Khwaja Hamid and the Turkish slave Tughril. Khwaja Hamid was a dependent of Tughril who suddenly, one day, saw a mysterious face that taunted him. The face reappeared on several occasions and finally explained the reason for harassing the secretary:

14. ibid, p. 134.

> Oh Hamid! why are you standing before this man?.....You are a learned man and he is ignorant, you are a freeman and he is a slave, you are a pious man and he is an uncultured sinner.[15]

Apparently Khwaja Hamid had never perceived his position from that perspective and he promptly left Tughril's service. In a pithy anecdote Nizam al-Din thus encapsulated all the qualities of the Turks. They were slaves, not learned in the secretarial or Islamic sciences, they were rude, bellicose, vain, and their military calling undoubtedly led to the unjust killing of innocent people. But the central conundrum in Nizam al-Din's stories revolved around the fact that it was "these Turks" that possessed power, wealth and patronage which attracted individuals like Khwaja Hamid (and Fakhr-i Mudabbir for that matter) to their service.

Like Fakhr-i Mudabbir, Nizam al-Din Auliya also remembered the presence of an ethnic divide in the early thirteenth century which followed the distinction between those who held political power and wealth and those who were excluded from it. Yet, Nizam al-Din disagreed completely from Fakhr-i Mudabbir's opinion that the Turks were a superior race, badin khasa'is bar digar ta'ifa tarjih darand,

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15. Amir Hasan Sijzi, Fawa'id al-Fu`ad, pp. 342-343: "Ai Hamid! pish-i in mard cheh mi'ayisti?....tu `ilmi wa u jahil, tu hurri wa u bandeh, tu salihi wa u fasiq".

who used their virtues to serve and promote the cause of the Muslim community.[16] Depending upon the circumstance and the observer, the virtues of "the Turks" differed, but to the audience of the day they did appear as a homogenous group, powerful, rich and very different.

Although the making of this ethnic divide was present during the governorships of the Mu`izzi subordinates it was the arrangement of the Shamsid dispensation that accentuated the exclusive position of the Shamsi bandagan-i khass. Perhaps the most significant consequence of Iltutmish's political system was that the slave agents of the Sultan were distanced from local society. While this arrangement was politically useful in that it ensured the dependence of the subordinate upon the monarch it also introduced a host of very ambiguous attitudes in the minds of the subjects towards their governors.

It is important to note that the classical divide between the rulers and the ruled consistently posited in Sultanate studies as a relationship between the Sultan's officers on the one hand, and the peasantry (re`aya) on the other, is far from clear for the early thirteenth century. As has already been mentioned in the last chapter, Iltutmish's control between, and in the vicinity of the urban garrisons was extremely tenous. From the perspective of

16. Fakhr-i Mudabbir, Tarikh-i Fakhr al-Din Mubarakshah, p. 48.

both the amirs and the re`aya, "ruled" or "governed" implied little more than the occasional seizure of plunder or tribute. While this plunder and tribute was useful in sustaining the economy of the Sultanate, at least as far as the political stucture of the Delhi Sultanate was concerned, the peasantry were an "occasional subject population" as yet unintegrated in its political life.

This was far from true in the urban centres of Iltutmish's domains where the military elite and the administrators of the Sultan interacted on a daily basis with the other residents of the town. It was in the shahrs and the qasabat that the ruling elite had to build up support from the local communities to consolidate their power.[17] As the evidence of Nizam al-Din Auliya brings out however, not all Muslims rallied behind their rulers as "natural leaders" or nobles. Despite the numbers that were attracted to the service of the military elite, many of their subordinates considered them uncultured boors who had illegitimately monopolised power and privilege. Social, cultural and functional differences separated local society from the lords of the realm and the range of positive and negative qualities ascribed to the military elite were subsumed in the ethnic generalisation: "Turk".

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17. The need to understand "authoritative relationships" from this perspective has been forcefully argued by Peter Hardy, "The Authority of Muslim Kings in Medieval South Asia" Purusartha 9 (1986), pp. 42-3.

II Different ways of being a pious Muslim

The distinction between the rulers and the ruled was only one aspect of the lack of homogenity within the Muslim community. In fact generalisations such as "Muslim community" while convenient to the historian serve to obscure the more meaningful sentiments of corporate belonging present amongst Muslims in thirteenth century north India. Even amongst Sunni Muslims the religious practice, affiliation, and sense of identity was prompted more by their recognition of the merits of one school of legal or theological reasoning over another, or their acknowledgement of one or the other mystic preceptor, than by any immediate sentiment of jama`at solidarity. The shi`i groups constituted yet another stream of piety which claimed the affiliation of many Muslims. Hodgson explained that in this period Islam presented three faces: "one, Shari`a-minded, concerned with outward, socially cognizable behaviour, accepted as their care by the Shar`i `ulama; the other mystical-minded, concerned with the inward, personal life of the individual, accepted as their care by the Sufi pirs. Often the same religious leader was at once pir and Shar`i scholar, or at least took both sides of Islam very seriously; just as most of the Muslim public respected and took guidance from both pirs and `ulama. Always however, there were those who accepted the one face of Islam as gen-

uine and mistrusted the other, or even rejected it as spurious.....`Alid loyalism with its chiliatic vision [was the third face]. Sometimes it was merged with Shari`a-mindedness, in the Shar`i `ulama of the Shia; sometimes it contributed to Sufism, when its esoteric notions proved illuminating; from time to time it emerged as a positive independent force."[18] Early thirteenth century piety was still extremely individualistic so that Muslims could indulge in considerable "borrowing" from the separate Islamic streams of belief without any sense of contradiction.

It is therefore not surprising that while all three streams of piety were in evidence in the early Delhi Sultanate, there was considerable divergence in opinions concerning the piety of each tradition. This was evident, for example, in the reports concerning the Shi`i Qarmatian community in north India. According to Juzjani, the Shari`a-minded chronicler of the Delhi Sultans, the Qarmatians, believers in the Isma`iliyya Imamate of the Fatimids, were mulahada or heretics. They had their stronghold in the urban centres of Sindh and had opposed the

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18. See Marshall Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974) vol. 1, pp. 359-364, and vol. 2, pp. 203-4.

Ghaznawids and subsequently, Mu`izz al-Din Ghuri.[19] In Juzjani's mind, the nefarious activities of the Qarmatians was always a cause of instability in the Sunni community, and he blamed them, in circumstances which are not nearly so clear, for Mu`izz al-Din's assassination.[20]

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19. For the Fatimid affiliation of the Isma`ili community in Multan see the anonymous, Hudud al-`Alam, trans. V. Minorsky (London: Luzac and Co., E.J.W. Gibb Memorial Series, new series, vol. 11, 1937), pp. 89, 246. For the Isma`ili, Ghaznawid conflict see C.E. Bosworth, The Ghaznavids, 994-1040, pp. 52-4, 76, 199-200, and 235; idem, The Later Ghaznavids, 1040-1186, pp. 14, 31, and S.M. Stern, "Isma`ili propaganda and Fatimid rule in Sind" Islamic Culture 23 (1949): 298-307. See Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 396 for Mu`izz al-Din Ghuri's capture of Multan and dispersal of the Qarmatians.

20. Fakhr-i Mudabbir, Tarikh-i Fakhr al-Din Mubarakshah, ed. E.D. Ross, pp. 29, 72, was in Lahore at that time and closest in time and space to Mu`izz al-Din's death. In his history, however, Fakhr-i Mudabbir mentioned the assassination of the Sultan without any further elaboration. Juwaini, Tarikh-i Jahan-Gush, trans. J.A. Boyle, vol. 1, p. 326, credited the murder to Hindu assassins (fida'is). V.V. Barthold, Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion, (London: Luzac and Company ltd., E.G.W. Gibb Memorial Series, new series V, 1977), p. 352, fn. 7, mentioned that in Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil fi al-Tarikh, ed. C.J. Tornberg, vol. XII, pp. 139-40, the assassins are recorded as being Hindus and Isma`ilis. Like Juzjani, Hasan Nizami, Taj al-Ma`athir, p. 236, blamed the mulahada for the Sultan's murder. Interestingly enough the epithet mulahada was also used for the Nidari Isma`ilis, and they are also known as the "Assassins". While Mu`izz al-Din's murder bore evidence of the type of assassinations that had won the Nidari Ism`ilis so much infamy, it is doubtful if they were involved in Mu`izz al-Din's murder. It could not have been a reprisal for Mu`izz al-Din's campaigns against the Qarmatians because contrary to the common assumption there was no known connection between the Qarmatian Isma`ilis in north India and the Nidari Isma`ilis of Alamut. On the contrary in the late twelfth and early thirteenth century there had been a falling out between the Fatimid Isma`ilis (who were linked with the Qarmatians) and the Nidari Isma`ilis. See S.M. Stern, "Isma`ilis and Qarmatians" in L'Elaboration de l'Islam, Colloque de Strasbourg Juin 1959 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1961), pp. 99-108, and W.

Juzjani's narration of the Qarmatian mulahada attack on the Delhi Jama` Masjid (congregational mosque) in 634/1236 clarified the extent to which he believed that community was organised in opposition to the majority of the Sunni Muslims. According to Juzjani, the Qarmatians of Hindustan were incited by a "sort" of learned man, shakhsi danishmand guna, by the name of Nur Turk. Nur Turk's following of common people, khalq-i `awamm, from Gujarat, Sindh, the environs of Delhi and the banks of the rivers Ganges and Jumna assembled in Delhi, affirmed loyalty to each other, and listened to Nur Turk's exhortations against the `ulama of the legal schools of Abu Hanifa and Shafi`i who were described as nasibi and murji'a. For an individual who was loyal to the memory of `Ali and his descendents, nasibi were those people who ignored `Ali's claim to the Caliphate and "set up" (nasib) others in his stead. The murji'a were pious Muslims who sought to diminish the divisive impact of the `Ali, Mu`awiya conflict (35/656-40/661) on the Muslim community by ignoring the claims of the rival camps and postponing (murji') any decision on the validity of the actions of the two contenders to the day of judgement and God's adjudication. For the followers of `Ali, the attempt of the murji'a to postpone a decision to the end of time,

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Madelung, "Karmati"; idem, "Isma`iliyya" Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition, s.v..

detracted from the wrongs inflicted on the Prophet's son-in-law which had to be redressed. In this sense the _nasibi_ and the _murji'a_ were associated together as groups with anti-\`Ali sentiments and, according to Juzjani, Nur Turk's exhortations against them motivated the rebels to attack the Muslims at prayer in the Delhi _Jama\` Masjid_.[21]

Juzjani's account of Nur Turk's teachings and actions were obviously coloured by his own perception of piety, and this was problematical to his near contemporary readership. In a conversation that took place on the 13th Sh\`aban 718/October 10, 1318 the Chishti saint[22] Nizam al-Din Auliya responded to Juzjani's accusations and clarified that Nur Turk's faith was free from any heresy.[23] In his opinion, Nur Turk was a pious man, renowned for his sermons, _u-ra sakhan giri bud_, who owed no allegiance to a _sufi_ master. Nizam al-Din's portrayal of Nur Turk was hardly that of a Qaramati heretic and the Chishti saint clarified that it was because Nur Turk believed (and no

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21. Juzjani, _Tabaqat-i Nasiri_, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 461.

22. I use the term "saint" (_wali_, plural: _auliya_) fully aware that there was no centralised machinery or institutionalised process of canonisation in Islam. The implications of this point have been forcefully argued and developed by P.M. Currie, _The Shrine and Cult of Mu\`in al-Din Chishti of Ajmer_ (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 1-19.

23. Literally, "he was purer than water from the heavens, _az ab-i asman pakizatar bud_." Amir Hasan Sijzi, _Fawa'id al-Fu\`ad_, p. 334.

doubt preached) that the `ulama of Delhi were polluted by the material world, aluda-yi duniya, that they in turn spread all kinds of caluminous tales about him.[24]

Nizam al-Din also explained Nur Turk's doctrinal beliefs that had provoked this "insurrection" against the `ulama. Significantly enough the Chishti saint weaned out all evidence of `Alid sentiments in his explanation of Nur Turk's beliefs. He gave a taciturn explanation that nasibi meant heretical sentiments but did not suggest that they were a part of Nur Turk's beliefs. Nizam al-Din developed in relatively greater detail the two streams of murji'a thought. According to the Chishti saint, the first was the conventional position of the murji'a teachers which emphasised that "good faith" rather than "good work" defined the true Muslim. According to this belief, faith alone assured a Muslim of God's mercy and ultimate salvation even if he were a sinner. The second, and the "less pure", ghair khalis, murji'a opinion favoured by Nizam al-Din and shared by Nur Turk emphasised that the Muslim should believe in God's mercy as well as punishment. The fear of God's wrath should motivate Muslims to abstain from sinful actions. By introducing the conditionality of action in judging a good

24. Nizam al-Din noted that while in Hansi Nur Turk's impassioned sermons were famous and on one occasion he met and praised Baba Farid al-Din Ganj-i Shakar. Sometime later when Nur Turk was in Delhi Sultan Radiyya was sufficiently impressed by his piety to offer him a cash sustenance which he spurned; ibid, pp. 334-5.

Muslim, Nizam al-Din reserved for himself and Nur Turk the freedom to criticise the actions of Muslims without challenging God's prerogative to be the final arbiter.[25] In the Chishti exposition, efforts were made to absolve Nur Turk of all shi`i Qaramati links, and consistent with these efforts were Nizam al-Din's public statements that he shared Nur Turk's views on matters of faith.

In his effort to exonerate Nur Turk, Nizam al-Din could have quite simply denied Juzjani's allegations. The fact that Nizam al-Din had to explain and legitimise murji'a opinions on piety suggests that this might have been a central theme in Nur Turk's criticism of the `ulama, and that Nizam al-Din's audience were not familiar or knew only the shi'i objections to murji' ideas. Although the evidence is not at all clear on the subject, the manner of Nizam al-Din's protestations does suggest that Nur Turk was perhaps a darwish (?), with Shi`i sentiments, who built up a sizable following of `Alid-loyalists and challenged the moral authority of the Shari`a-minded jurists of Delhi in the last years of Iltutmish's reign. That Nur Turk, an

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25. Ibid, p. 334. For a further elaboration on Nizam al-Din's views on the Muslim who is a sinner, and his disagreement with the mu`tazila see also pp. 118-9. On the development of murji'a doctrine see W.M. Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology (Edinburgh: University Press, 1979), pp. 27-35; A.J. Wensinck, The Muslim Creed: its genesis and historical development (London: Frank Cass and Co. ltd., 1965), pp. 36-82; and J. van Ess, "Kadariyya" Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition, s.v..

individual with shi`i leanings, was also regarded as a mystic saint by Nizam al-Din Auliya and later sufi writers like `Abd al-Haqq Muhaddith Dehlawi, should not surprise us unduly.[26] Loyalty to the family of `Ali could be harmonised with the special status accorded to Muhammad by all mystics.[27] Moreover, the very fact that Nur Turk questioned the piety of the religious scholars and jurists, presented grounds for a meeting of minds with sufis. Both criticised the conduct of the `ulama which was believed to be never more than technically correct and frequently against the spirit of the Shari`a.

On another level there was nothing particularly exceptional about Nur Turk; there were, as we have noticed, many ways in which Muslims could practise their piety in the early thirteenth century. The lack of agreement concerning the spiritual merits of individuals can be further thickened by reports about disagreements surrounding basic ritual practises of prayer, namaz,[28] or specific sufi

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26. `Abd al-Haqq Muhaddith Dehlawi, Akhbar al-Akhyar, Urdu trans. Maulana Muhammad Fadil (Karachi: Madina Publishing Company, n.d), p. 164. The Akhbar al-Akhyar was completed in the late sixteenth century.

27. See Annemarie Schimmel, And Muhammad is His Messenger: The Veneration of the Prophet in Islamic Piety (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985).

28. Note for example, Nizam al-Din Auliya's comments that the Suhrawardy saint Baha al-Din Zakariyya was extremely strict about the completion of the prescribed rituals associated with prayer (Fawa'id al-Fu`ad, p. 391). Although Baha al-Din's practice here would seem to be closer to that of the `ulama, yet the Suhrawardy saint disagreed with Qadi Qutub al-Din Kashani over the prescribed

traditions of sama` (invocatory singing and music).[29] Nor did this diversity of opinion concerning pious conduct follow a simple divide between mystics of competing schools of affiliation or between sufis and `ulama. In the early thirteenth century the Chishti tariqa had hardly evolved, and there was a noticeable absence of consistency on matters of doctrine and conduct amongst the Suhrawardy saints.[30] For that matter the mystic leanings of the jurist, Juzjani, led

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rituals of prayer. Against Zakariyya's claim that his ritual was legitimated by his "inner light", nur-i batin, Qadi Kashani argued that when such an "inner light" contravened the dictates of the holy law, ahkam-i Shari`a, it was illegitimate, an zulmat ast (ibid, pp. 399-400). Similarly, in his narration of a story of Jalal al-Din Tabrizi, Nizam al-Din reported how the Suhrawardi saint chided the hakim (judge) Qadi Kamal al-Din Ja`fari of Budaun for not knowing the proper way of performing prayer, namaz. Jalal al-Din Tabrizi was reported to have told the Qadi that while the `ulama were concerned about reading namaz facing the Ka`aba in Mecca, the sufis did not pray until they had seen the throne of God which was their qibla. In other words, in contrast to the pedantic computations of the `ulama to ascertain the correct location of the Ka`aba, the sufis relied upon their intuitive genius to guide them in the direction of the Almighty. Nizam al-Din Auliya spoke approvingly of the sentiments present in Jalal al-Din's comments and regarded them as an evidence of his high mystical attainments (ibid, pp. 401-2).

29. For the narration of an early dispute concerning the practise of Qadi Hamid al-Din Nagauri and Bakhtiyar Kaki, see Amir Hasan Sijzi, Fawa'id al-Fu`ad, pp. 407-408, 409, and from a slightly later period, p. 166. Opposition to Qadi Hamid al-Din Nagauri's practise of sama` also received an exaggeratedly inaccurate notice in `Isami, Futuh al-Salatin, ed. A.S. Usha, pp. 117-120.

30. Note especially the critical letter written by Jalal al-Din Tabrizi to Baha al-Din Zakariyya's concerning his conduct as a "man of the world". See Amir Hasan Sijzi, Fawa'id al-Fu`ad, p. 172.

Nizam al-Din Auliya to agree with the opinions of a friend that the `alim should have been a Shaikh al-Islam and not just a qadi.[31] According to Nizam al-Din it was Juzjani, together with the Suhrawardy saint Qadi Hamid al-Din, who popularised sama` in Delhi.[32] Yet, Juzjani's piety never came under dispute, largely because the author's mystical inclinations were tempered by his shari`a-mindedness and he could live his life in harmony with different types of public expectations. But Juzjani was the exception. The piety of many charismatic Muslims was disputed out of fear that they may become the source of a divisive following within the Muslim community. As was evident from the differing reactions towards Nur Turk, the appraisal of a charismatic individual's piety was dependent upon very individualistic norms, but they provoked public and very virulent conflicts.

The same level of diversity in opinions and conflict surrounded Najm al-Din Sughra, a Shari`a-minded individual who had been honoured by the post of Shaikh al-Islam by Sultan Iltutmish. Curiously in the Chishti and Suhrawardy

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31. Amir Hasan Sijzi, Fawa'id al-Fu'ad, pp. 429-30. See below for a fuller discussion on the Shaikh al-Islam.

32. Ibid, pp. 407-8. Qadi Hamid al-Din's sentiments concerning the efficacy of sama` were not shared by his contemporary Baha al-Din Zakariyya, although Nizam al-Din does report one instance where the latter also participated in (a "closet" performance of) that mystical exercise (ibid, pp. 234-5).

literature Najm al-Din was never portrayed as a pious man. He was described instead as a petty, jealous, worldly-minded individual, who used his position of Shaikh al-Islam to harass both Chishti and Suhrawardy sufis. Najm al-Din's pride and pettiness were evident in his relations with the Chishti saints Mu`in al-Din and Bakhtiyar Kaki. According to the biographical compendium of Chishti saints, Siyar al-Auliya, while there was affection, muhabbat, between Mu`in al-Din Chishti and Najm al-Din Sughra, the latter resented the presence of Mu`in al-Din's disciple in Delhi. Apparently Bakhtiyar Kaki would not recognise the authority of the Shaikh al-Islam.[33]

Najm al-Din also had strained relations with the Suhrawardy saint Jalal al-Din Tabrizi. The Fawa'id al-Fu`ad provided the first hint of a conflict when it reported disagreements and enmity between the two men and quoted Jalal al-Din Tabrizi's enigmatic remarks concerning Najm al-Din's responsibility in evicting him, birun kard, from Delhi.[34]

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33. Amir Khurd, Siyar al-Auliya, p. 64.

34. Amir Hasan Sijzi, Fawa'id al-Fu`ad, p. 245, recorded Nizam al-Din's observation that while in Budaun Jalal al-Din clairvoyantly knew of Najm al-Din's death in Delhi. On that occasion Jalal al-Din reportedly remarked to his followers that just as the Shaikh al-Islam Najm al-Din had driven him out of the city of Delhi, his own pir made him forsake the world (agar Shaikh al-Islam-i Dehli ma-ra az shahr birun kard, Shaikh-i ma u-ra az jahan birun kard). The story was subsequently recounted in Amir Khurd, Siyar al-Auliya, pp. 408, 585, and `Abd al-Haqq Dihlawi, Akhbar al-Akhyar, pp. 102-3.

The story of the conflict was substantially embellished by the sixteenth century Suhrawardy author Hamid ibn Fadl Allah Jamali who explained the events leading to the departure (not expulsion!) of Jalal al-Din Tabrizi from Delhi. According to Jamali, the Shaikh al-Islam of Delhi was deeply upset and envious of Jalal al-Din's mystic accomplishments and Sultan Iltutmish's favour to the saint. It was this envy and insecurity that propelled Najm al-Din to bribe a prostitute and frame charges of adultery against Jalal al-Din. These accusations were proved false at an inquest, mahdar, presided over by Baha al-Din Zakariyya, with an audience consisting of mystics and scholars. Jalal al-Din left the city anyway because he did not want to be further sullied by the environment of intrigue and competition present in Delhi.[35]

In this tale of competition, envy, and calumnous accusations preserved in the Chishti and Suhrawardy sources, Shaikh Jalal al-Din Tabrizi emerged as the innocent victim, and Najm al-Din Sughra anything but a paradigmatic sufi.[36] The Chishti and Suhrawardy accounts of the conflict, however, are problematical for their con-

35. Hamid ibn Fadl Allah Jamali, Siyar al-`Arifin (Delhi: Ridwi Press, 1311/1893), pp. 16, 243-247.

36. This is also the interpretation preserved in the writings of K.A. Nizami, Religion and Politics in India during the thirteenth century, pp. 162-4, and S.A.A. Rizvi, A History of Sufism in India, vol. 1, pp. 200-1.

tradictions. If Najm al-Din Sughra was such an immoral person, these sources leave unexplained the basis upon which he built up an affectionate relationship with Mu`in al-Din Chishti. Nor do they account for Iltutmish's surprising choice of Najm al-Din as Shaikh al-Islam, an office which, despite his apparently embarrasing activities, he occupied until his death.[37] Finally there is little reason to expect Chishti and Suhrawardy tadkirat to provide a fair picture of Najm al-Din, especially if the Delhi Shaikh al-Islam had acrimonious relations with saints whose memories were venerated in these biographical compendiums.

The more recent analysis of a fifteenth century Firdausi tadkirat however, has brought to light a completely different picture of Najm al-Din Sughra and provides additional information contradicting the Chishti and Suhrawardy reports. The Manaqib al-Asafiya reported that the Shaikh al-Islam of Delhi was a disciple of the famous Khwarazmian saint Najm al-Din Kubra (died, 618/1221). In the same source Shaikh Najm al-Din was unequivocally described as marde buzurg, sahib-i wilayat, a great man, a saint. This would explain Iltutmish's rationale in appointing Najm al-

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37. This is suggested by Jalal al-Din's own remarks quoted by Nizam al-Din Auliya. See Amir Hasan Sijzi, Fawa'id al-Fu`ad, p. 245. Iltutmish's dismissal of Najm al-Din Sughra was reported by Jamali, Siyar al-`Arifin, p. 168, and faithfully followed by Nizami (p. 164) and Rizvi (p. 201). But this was only a part of the author's exaggerated narration of the conflict between the Shaikh al-Islam and Jalal al-Din.

Din the Shaikh al-Islam of Delhi. As Simon Digby has pointed out "the same source [also] sharply criticise[d] Qutub al-Din Bakhtiyar for the hold he had acquired over the population of Delhi by the display of miraculous powers".[38] Although the Manaqib al-Asafiya does not contain any information about the Najm al-Din, Jalal al-Din imbroglio, it does provide the alternative viewpoint concerning the honourable conduct and piety of the Shaikh al-Islam, forcing us to assess the conflict with a greater amount of scepticism.

The ease with which the protagonist and the antagonist change in the Chishti, Suhrawardi and Firdausi texts certainly emphasises the absence of any standardised norms available to judge the piety of a Muslim in the early thirteenth century. But the conflict surrounding Nur Turk, Bakhtiyar Kaki, Jalal al-Din Tabrizi and Najm al-Din Sughra also brings out the extent of hostility between the Shari\`a-minded \`ulama and the charismatic sufi pirs. For the sufi pirs there was a whole experiential, mystical-magical dimension to Islam which could only be intuitively explored. In a world where "a preacher....was so transported by his own eloquence that he flew away from the

38. Shua\`ib ibn Halal al-Din Maneri, Manaqib al-Asfiya, (Calcutta: Nur al-Afaq Press, 1895), pp. 121-122, cited by Simon Digby, "The Sufi Shaikh as a source of authority in Medieval India" Purusartha, Islam et Societe en Asie du Sud 9 (1986), p. 65.

pulpit (minbar) to a neighbouring wall;...[where] meetings...[took place]...in deserted places with Khwaja Khidr who has everlasting life; ...[where there were] various "fairy people" -- ...abdals who physically fl[ew] above the territories which they protect from harm, ...[where] a holy man [circled] around the vault of the chief mosque at Delhi through the night till the dawn, ...[where] the mardan-i ghaib, men of the unseen, ...appear[ed] and disappear[ed], and sometimes call[ed] away a mortal to join them", the Shari`a-minded scholars did not provide all the answers for Muslims.[39] This was particularly true on Islam's eastern frontier where the "Muslim community" consisted of a large number of recent immigrants for whom life was indeed unpredictable, fearsome and short. There were mysteries in the lives of Muslims which only the mystic saints could explain, or reconcile, and the more charismatic pirs had large followings. They were, however, also feared and regarded with suspicion by those who would seek to order society by predictable, systematised "norms defining outward, socially cognizable behavior". The Shari`a-minded `ulama sought to control the influence of those they regarded as charlatans, who spread superstition which was "injurious to the common folk". Nor were they alone in their quest. The political authorities were also extremely

39. Simon Digby, "The Sufi Shaikh as a source of authority in Medieval India", p. 62.

wary of <u>Sufi pirs</u>, who they could not alienate outright, but whose charisma could on occasion overshadow that of the Sultan. At least one implication of political consolidation in Iltutmish's reign was that together with efforts directed towards reorienting the sentiments of the dispersed communities of Muslims away from regional military lords and towards Delhi, Iltutmish also had to try and diminish the influence of alternate pietistic practises and their exponents, in favour of an Islam supported by Delhi, the emergent sanctuary of Islam in India.

III: Towards homogeneity: the role of the *`ulama*:

Together with the military commanders, the other group that commanded considerable social influence in north India in the early thirteenth century were the *`ulama* (individuals learned in the religious sciences) and the *ahl-i qalam* (people of the pen, which included secretaries, accountants etc.). The terms *`ulama* and *ahl-i qalam* did not define a social or occupational group, but denoted individuals who were believed to possess estimable qualities of piety and learning which differentiated them from the rest of the Muslim community.

Despite their ascriptive status of "learned" and "people of the pen" these individuals were not divorced from military activity. Iltutmish's wazir, Nizam al-Mulk

Junaidi, although involved with the financial and secretarial duties of the realm also led the royal troops into Uchch and Bhakar against Qubacha in 625/1228.[40] In fact, it was the jurist Juzjani who advised people of the need to be constantly armed and prepared to defend themselves, an advice he took to heart himself. Juzjani recorded with some pride the occasion when with his slaves he had repelled a murderous assault upon himself in the Jama\` Masjid in Delhi.[41] Their military skills, however, won the \`ulama and the ahl-i qalam no public notice. Instead it was out of respect for their knowledge of the religious sciences and law, their mastery over the epistolary traditions, and training in accountancy that the Muslim community paid the "learned" so much deference.

Knowledge of the Qur'an, hadith, the exegetical literature and the rules of legal deduction were a part of the learning, \`ilm, of the \`ulama (learned), and Fakhr-i Mudabbir had explained that the \`ulama were ranked after the Prophet and the "world flourished because of the virtue of their learning, religiosity and piety and the injunctions of the Shari\`a and worship [were] entrusted to them".[42]

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40. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 447.

41. Ibid, vol. 2, p. 139, and vol. 1, p. 468.

42. Fakhr-i Mudabbir, Tarikh-i Fakhr al-Din Mubarakshah, p. 10: "jahan basabab-i barkat-i \`ilm wa diyanat wa war\`a-i ishan abadan ast wa ahkam-i Shari\`a wa \`ibadat bamakan-i ishan mufauwaz ast....". K.A. Nizami, Religion and Politics in the thirteenth century, p. 150, also cited

Competence over the religious sciences, however, also distinguished the adept administrator (katib, dabir, wazir, mutasarrif, khwaja, mustaufi, etc.[43]). Recounting the qualities of the ahl-i qalam, Nizami-i `Arudi recorded that if a dabir (secretary) was "well acquainted with the Qur'an, with one verse therefrom he may discharge his obligation to a whole realm."[44] These were special accomplishments, to gain which the individual needed, together with aptitude, a lot of grit and determination.

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this passage but his references should be corrected to pp. 9-12.

43. Although in the literal sense, ahl-i qalam, people of the pen, should have included all those involved in scribal and learning tasks, the `ulama were normally not associated with this group. The term "people of the pen" was normally used for those involved in "non-religious" activities such as revenue or accounting. This sense is carried in incidental remarks like Fakhr-i Mudabbir, Adab al-Harb wa al-Shaja`a, ed. Khwansari, p. 138, where the wazir is described as the epitome of the ahl-i qalam.

44. For an extended recommendation to the dabir to study and excel in the religious sciences see Nizami-i `Arudi-i Samarqandi, Chahar Maqala, trans. Edward G. Browne (Cambridge: E.J.W. Gibb Memorial old series XI.2, Cambridge University Press, 1978 reprint), p. 25, and more generally pp. 22-42. The Chahar Maqala was dedicated to the Ghurid prince of the Bamian lineage, Abu al-Hasan `Ali b. Mas`ud, and its comments enlarge upon Fakhr-i Mudabbir's more taciturn recommendations. Concerning the Barid (reporter, spy) Fakhr-i Mudabbir noted: "all the learned Sahib Barids were masters of composition and reporting, sahib-i tasnif wa akhbar, and on any occasion could pass unusual compositions without equal, tasnifha-yi nadir bi-masl, and because the learned compositions were such, the speakers are [still] alive...". Fakhr-i Mudabbir, Adab al-Muluk wa Kifayat al-Mamluk, ed. Muhammad Sarwar Maulawi, p. 27.

The education of the `ulama was a strenous exercise, achieved over years of discipleship with one or more mentors, mastering a text at a time[45] and travelling from one centre of learning to another.[46] Most ahl-i qalam, however, did not undergo as rigorous a training in the

45. There was a considerable degree of specialisation in the subjects taught by the separate scholars and even when an `alim claimed knowledge of hadith he often clarified the texts on which he was competent. Furthermore, hadith was only one of the subjects studied. The scholar Diya al-Din, who took his classes in the Delhi Jama` Masjid by the minar, apparently only taught law and grammar, fiqh wa nahw. According to Nizam al-Din, Diya al-Din was extremely apprehensive about meeting Baba Farid in case he was questioned on other subjects, `ulum-i digar, outside his area of specialisation. Amir Hasan Sijzi, Fawa'id al-Fu`ad, pp. 153-4.

46. This travelling was much the accepted, even estimable, form of learning for it allowed the student the opportunity to meet, listen and discourse with the great scholars of the day. Because of the prestige involved with travelling in search of knowledge, religious scholars were often later accredited with voyages and educational experiences which were deliberately exaggerated. Unfortunately there are no early tadkirats (biographical compendiums) of the `ulama through which one can follow their perignations in search of knowledge but the early sufis were also accredited with similar kinds of travel and gained prestige from their wide circle of teachers, associates and disciples. This posthumous search for fame has been effectively presented in the case of Mu`in al-Din Chishti in a map detailing the saint's itinerary according to different sources ranging over several centuries. See P.M. Currie, The Shrine and Cult of Mu`in al-Din Chishti of Ajmer, front endpaper (sketch map of Mu`in al-Din's travels according to the Siyar al-Awliya, Siyar al-`Arifin, Siyar al-Aqtab and the Hasht Bahisht). The phenomenon of travelling in search of teachers and religious training has received a useful discussion for the central Islamic lands (where there is also richer source material) by Richard W. Bulliet, "A Quantitative approach to Medieval Muslim Biographical Dictionaries" Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 13 (1970): 195-211.

religious sciences, but their education was often a more exclusive "in-house" affair where they received instruction spanning several years from members within their own family. This was specially true if their learning was of a subject on which lectures were not normally given in the mosque or the madrasa ("college" where instruction in the religious and legal sciences was given), such as siyaqat, or istifa' (arithmetic and accounting) which were of particular value to an administrator. Because of the apprentice like training of many ahl-i qalam, Fakhr-i Mudabbir advised that in appointing a Mustaufi (accountant) a person who was from a family of Mustaufis should be chosen, az khandan-i Mustaufiyan bashad.[47]

It is noteworthy that when Fakhr-i Mudabbir described the qualities of the `ulama he left unexplained how an `alim with "learning, religiosity and piety" could be socially identified. In north India of the early thirteenth century, there was no madrasa infrastructure anywhere near the ranked and institutionalised system of the Ottomans, and as a result an `alim could not be recognised by the diploma of his alumnus. The `alim gained a reputation as a learned man through his demeanour, by belonging to a family reputed for its knowledge of the religious sciences, by the circle of individuals that he had been associated with in

47. See Fakhr-i Mudabbir, Adab al-Muluk wa Kifayat al-Mamluk, p. 17.

the past, by his ability to expound on the texts that he had mastered or his ability to act as a guide to Muslims on matters concerning the faith. It was a social esteem gained partly through an appropriate geneaology, a visibly ascertainable adab or moral conduct, and a learning of law and theology not shared by the rest of the Muslim community.[48] Fakhr-i Mudabbir's description of the `ulama suggests the amount of respect with which Muslims regarded religious specialists. This was obviously true in the case of the relatively more qualified of the `ulama and the ahl-i qalam, a small group whose memory was venerated by future generations.[49] Many others had received a less distin-

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48. It is important to note that much of the training in the religious sciences associated with the `ulama was one that many sufis had also gone through. In fact one of the striking features of Nizam al-Din Auliya's conversations was the number of occasions the Chishti saint explained matters of creed and the Shari`a to his audience, but this counsel was always tempered by the saint's own mystic inclinations. The differences between the `ulama and the sufi was not so much a result of their respective scholastic qualifications but a combination of their distinctive, separate emphases upon the importance of external conduct in the lives of Muslims and their self-chosen roles in public life. The pietistic leanings of the learned were publicly known and it was the members of the local community that recognised an individual as an `alim or sufi pir.

49. See Fakhr-i Mudabbir, Tarikh-i Fakhruddin Mubarakshah, pp. 69-70, where the author's father remembered the renowned qadis of Ghazni from his lifetime. See also Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, pp. 450-1, fn 6, where the editor notes the presence of a list of qadis of Sultan Iltutmish in a variant manuscript, and Nizami-i `Arudi, Chahar Maqala, pp. 24-25, for a list of `ulama, secretaries, litterateurs, and historians, and their writings which should be studied by the secretary to improve himself. Since `ulama was an ascribed status and therefore dependent upon the norms of the observer it is interesting

guished schooling, but even this was sufficient to distinguish them from the larger unlettered masses and together with the sufi pirs, made them highly respected in the local community.

Although individuals from both levels of training had been present in north India, first in the Ghaznawid domains in Punjab and subsequently in the north Indian Sultanates, the fortunes of many pious individuals especially in the smaller urban centres, like the Qadi of Tulak, must have remained unaltered during the changes in the political fortunes of the north Indian Sultanate. If we recall, the `ulama of these small communities had very tenous associations with the Sultan or the regional military commander.[50] In contrast, they had fairly stable relationships with the local communities, where the individual recognised as `alim frequently fulfilled the diverse functions of adjudicator,

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to note that there was little consistency in identifying "learned men" in contemporary literature. It was in the later biographical compilations, tadkirat, that competing and dissenting claims were sometimes resolved.

50. See chapter 1 for the example of the Malik Diya al-Din Qadi Tulak, hardly a ritual specialist, but referred to as qadi because his father had been one. This genealogical association alone, differentiated Malik Diya al-Din from his peers. From a different perspective, the example of Malik Diya al-Din and Malik Baha al-Din Muhammad of Sangwan also clarifies the tenacity with which local communities, in the absence of Sultanate support, organised themselves to defend their own interests. Changes in the Sultanate were unlikely to introduce any major upheavals in the organisation of local societies.

teacher, and religious expert in the crucial life-cycle rituals of Muslims. In the _qasaba_, garrison town, of Patiali, for instance, there does not seem to have been a court appointed _qadi_ or _mudarris_ (teacher). The local school (_maktab_) was run instead by the calligraphist Sa`ad al-Din Muhammad, who also functioned as the local _qadi_.[51] While we do not have a great deal of information to flesh out the relationship of the local community and the _`ulama_ in these small towns, the _qasaba_ of Patiali does not seem to have been an exception. Many ritual specialists in the urban centres were chosen by the local community, and the Delhi Sultan acknowledged the regard accorded to these individuals. It was as a recognition of the piety of these _`ulama_ and an effort to gain their good-will, that out of the plunder seized from the Lakhnauti campaign of 624/1227, the eldest prince, Nasir al-Din, bestowed grants as gifts, _ba-wajh-i tuhaf in`am firistad_, to the _`ulama_, the kin of the Prophet, the pious, and the learned of the capital and all the neighbouring small towns (_qasabat_).[52]

The degree of relative independence available to the _`ulama_ has been obscured by the historiographical concern

51. Amir Khusrau, _Dibacha-yi Tuhfat al-Sighar_, cited by Wahid Mirza, _Life and works of Amir Khusrau_ (Delhi: Idarah-i Adabiyat-i Delli, IAD Religio-Philosophy series no. 3, 1974), p. 20.

52. Juzjani, _Tabaqat-i Nasiri_, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 454: "_`ulama, saadat, zuhhad, ahl-i khirad-i dar al-mulk wa sa'ir qasabat-ra ba-wajh-i tuhaf in`am firistad_".

to study their relationship with the ruling elite. It needs to be remembered, however, that together with the income derived from their varied services rendered as religious specialists, the `ulama were also involved in commerce and industry. While in Afghanistan, Juzjani had led embassies from Tulak and Khaisar to Quhistan in the Alamut region to reopen caravan routes disrupted by Mongol raids. Before his immigration to India Juzjani went to Farah in 623/1226 to purchase raw silk, abrisham, for the requirements of the journey to Hindustan, bajahat-i mayihtaj-i safar-i Hindustan.[53] Nor was Juzjani, a pious man involved in trade, exceptional in any way. In 657/1259 Juzjani recorded the visit of the honoured and respected Sayyid Ashraf al-Din son of Sayyid Jalal al-Din Sufi to Delhi from Samarqand for the purposes of trade.[54] Earlier, in 648/1250, Khwaja Rashid al-Din Hakim Balkhi had also come from Khurasan to trade in India.[55]

These instances from the Tabaqat-i Nasiri can be easily multiplied from the Fawa'id al-Fu`ad. Nizam al-Din occasionally recounted stories of `ulama who were inclined towards trade, niyyat-i tijarat dasht.[56] This "inclination

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53. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 2, pp. 183, 184.

54. Ibid, vol. 2, p. 215.

55. Ibid, vol. 2, p. 117.

56. Amir Hasan Sijzi, Fawa'id al-Fu`ad, p. 405.

towards trade" was apparent in the imam of a mosque in Multan. According to Hasan Afghan's complaint reported by Nizam al-Din, this imam was more preoccupied with dreams of profit from the purchase of slaves from Delhi and their sale in Khurasan than he was with the rituals of prayer.[57] The slave trade yielded enormous profits and Nizam al-Din Auliya narrated the story of a sufi from Bihar who, after increasing his initial capital by 960% through trade, was advised to trade in burdgan (slaves used as domestics, singular, burda) since they fetched an even higher rate of profit especially when these slaves were sold in Ghazni.[58]

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57. Ibid, p. 15.

58. In Nizam al-Din's story, the sufi received 500 jitals from Shaikh `Ali Sijzi (a late contemporary of Bakhtiyar Kaki and Sultan Iltutmish). This capital was invested in trade and within a short time had increased to 30 tankas, and after reinvestment grew further to 100 tankas. Calculated at the rate of 48 jitals to the (silver) tanka the sufi increased his initial capital by 960% in a very short period. Amir Hasan Sijzi, Fawa'id al-Fu`ad, p. 191. There was a flourishing market for "Hindus" in the markets of the central Islamic lands where these slaves could be sold for a profit. Other than the information mentioned above, note also the example of Juzjani who remitted slaves to his sister from Multan. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, pp. 483-4, vol. 2, p. 61. The enormous overland trade in "Hindu" slaves (burda, domestic, kanizik, concubine) into Khurasan and Iran which had existed from the Ghaznawid period onwards (eleventh century) has been overlooked by most scholars, but Ibn Battuta writing in the mid-fourteenth century provided a hint of its magnitude. The Moroccan traveller noted, "...Another reason for our halt was fear of the snow. For upon this road there is a mountain called Hindukush, which means "the slayer of the Indians", because the slave-boys and girls who are brought from the land of India die there in large numbers as a result of the extreme cold and the great quantity of the snow. [The passage of] it extends for a whole day's march." Ibn Battuta, Rehla, trans. H.A.R. Gibb, vol. 3, p. 586.

Many of the pious were very successful businessmen. According to the Siyar al-Auliya, Nizam al-Din's maternal grandfather, Khwaja `Arab, was an extremely wealthy, established merchant, khwaja mumakkan bud, and he possessed numerous slaves. Some of the Khwaja's slaves were involved in manufacturing goods, while some others were involved in trading ventures on behalf of their master.[59]

Rather than frowning or suppressing information concerning pious involvement in trade, the literature of the period shows little hesitation in discussing it. In fact, the casualness with which information about the commercial ventures of the `ulama and the pious is supplied, merely emphasises that it was not regarded as an unusual practise, but a legitimate, and perhaps relative to other occupations, even a preferred activity. The evidence makes it difficult to accept the rather simple historiographical formula of Khaliq Nizami that the `ulama were closely allied to the Delhi Sultan because "they aspired for wealth and worldly prestige and did not hesitate in compromising

59. Amir Khurd, Siyar al-Auliya, p. 104. For a description of the legal position of slaves involved in domestic functions and in trade for their masters see S.D. Goitein, "Slaves and slavegirls in the Cairo Geniza records" Arabica 9 (1962): 1-20.

their conscience if it served their purpose".[60] Such an analysis ignores the fact that in the literature of the period, the `ulama sometimes emerge as well to do people whose functions as teachers and ritual specialists did not preclude their participation in commercial ventures, or strong ties with the local communities. Since Qadis and imams could and did function independently without falling upon penury, when they did choose to associate with the Sultanate, as in Iltutmish's reign, it must have been more than "filthy lucre" that attracted them.

Khaliq Nizami's analysis also presumes that the Delhi Sultan was happy to recruit most notables who sought his service. As the discussion in the previous chapter has explained Iltutmish was extremely judicious in his dispensation of privileges and honours to individuals. When the Delhi Sultan did dispense his favour it was very much with an eye to the fact that these individuals would be useful in his agenda of consolidation. Thus, the recruitment of `ulama and ahl-i qalam was, from a different con-

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60. K.A. Nizami, Religion and Politics in the thirteenth century, p. 152. The author also distinguishes the `ulama into two groups, the `ulama-yi akhirat (otherworldly `ulama) and the `ulama-yi duniya (the worldly `ulama). In the first category were `ulama who functioned "as starving teachers" or "pious preachers and scholars", in the latter were the "government servants". The personal character and greed of the individual determined what kind of an `alim he would eventually become. This characterisation of `ulama is present in S.A.A. Rizvi, A History of Sufism in India, and Aziz Ahmad, "The role of Ulema in Indo-Muslim History" Studia Islamica 31 (1970): 2-13.

text, much like Iltutmish's patronage to the bandagan, a part of a deliberate policy of enrolling strategically important personnel. Rather than the norm, such a large scale recruitment by the Delhi Sultan was certainly the exception.

Iltutmish's lack of hesitation when it came to patronising `ulama and the ahl-i qalam is particularly noteworthy since many of these learned had previously sought sanctuary and patronage from Iltutmish's competitor, Sultan Qubacha of Sindh. In 624/1227 Juzjani himself had migrated to Uchch from Khurasan by way of Ghazni and Banian. In Uchch he had been given charge of the Firuzi madrasa, college, and appointed as the qadi of the army, qadi lashkar, of `Ala al-Din Bahram Shah, son of Qubacha.[61] Juzjani had been preceded into the Sindh region by al-Kufi, the translator of the Chach namah, the epic of the Arab conquest of Sindh, and also by the celebrated qadi and author, Sadi al-Din Muhammad al-Awfi who reached Uchch from Bukhara and Ghazni sometime before 620/1223.[62] Both al-Kufi and al-Awfi had received patronage from Qubacha's wazir, `Ayn al-Mulk Husayn al-Ash`ari.

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61. Ibid, vol. 1, p. 420.

62. See the references to Awfi in E.G. Browne, A Literary history of Persia (Cambridge: University Press, 1964), vol. 2, pp. 478-9, and M. Nizamuddin, An Introduction to the Jawami al-Hikayat wa Lawami'ur-Riwayat, pp. 10-14, 16-18.

It was only after the final defeat and death of Qubacha in 625/1228 when the balance of power shifted in favour of Delhi that one can notice a larger migration of the `ulama and the ahl-i qalam into the Delhi Sultanate. In contrast to those military commanders who were also seeking sanctuary in Delhi, these `ulama and the "people of the pen" were not regarded with suspicion; instead they received immediate support and patronage in the domains of the Delhi Sultan. In the year of the conquest itself, Qubacha's wazir `Ayn al-Mulk was employed as the wazir of Iltutmish's son Rukn al-Din Firuz, governor of Budaun.[63] Almost simultaneously Juzjani found favour with Iltutmish and departed with the victorious troops to Delhi. Subsequently, he accompanied the Sultan on the Gwalior campaign and at regular intervals rallied the troops with his sermons, tazkir. After the fort was captured in 630/1233 Juzjani was appointed qadi, khatib and imam (judge, preacher and religious preceptor) of Gwalior.[64] Al-Awfi did not suffer a change of masters; he attached himself to the Delhi wazir, Nizam al-Mulk Junaidi, and completed his magnum opus Jawami al-Kalim which he had begun

63. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 454.

64. Ibid, vol. 1, pp. 448-9.

under al-Ash`ari's patronage but which he dedicated now to Junaidi.[65]

In his patronage to _`ulama_ Iltutmish favoured the Sunni "scriptural" tradition but, contrary to general scholarly opinion, he seems to have supported scholars who belonged to both the Hanafi and Shafi`i-Ash`ari schools (_madhabs_) of interpreting law.[66] Iltutmish's choice of _wazir_ for his son Rukn al-Din, `Ayn al-Mulk Husayn al-Ash`ari, was, as his name indicates, a follower of the Ash`ari school of theological reasoning and a Shafi`i. So too was Rukn al-Din's other dependent, Baha al-Mulk Husayn Ash`ari.[67] That

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65. This two-stage migration of most refugees is also suggested by the account of Fakhr al-Mulk `Isami's passage to Delhi. According to `Isami, his ancestor arrived in Multan and waited there until all his retinue, _khailash_, arrived. Then while some members of Fakhr al-Mulk's retinue stayed on in Multan, the remainder made their way to Delhi. `Isami was evidently reporting this story from hearsay, _shunidam_, and he might have telescoped the events of the journey. It seems illogical that Fakhr al-Mulk would break journey to wait for his retinue, only to have some of his dependents opt to stay on in Multan. Fakhr al-Mulk may well have sought employment in Multan and moved subsequently to Delhi, the break providing sufficient time for members of his retinue to go their separate ways. See `Isami, _Futuh al-Salatin_, ed. A.S. Usha, pp. 127-8.

66. See Aziz Ahmad, "The role of Ulema in Indo-Muslim History" and for the latest in a series of cliched reasoning (Turks favoured the Hanafi school, Arabs the Shafi`i) see Andre Wink, "Al-Hind: India and Indonesia in the Islamic World-Economy, c. 700-1800 A.D." _Itinerario_ 12 (1988), p. 39, and idem, _Al-Hind, The making of the Indo-Islamic World_ (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990), vol. 1, pp. 69-70.

67. Juzjani, _Tabaqat-i Nasiri_, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, pp. 446, 454, 456. Juzjani also mentioned Sharaf al-Mulk Ash`ari in his account of post-Shamsi Sultans; Juzjani, vol. 2, p. 15.

the Shafi`i jurists were present in some numbers in Delhi is also suggested by Juzjani's report of Nur Turk's criticism of the `ulama who were followers of Abu Hanifa and Shafi`i.[68]

The attraction of Iltutmish's open patronage to Shafi`i and Hanafi `ulama was particularly luring in the context of the Mongol holocaust in the adjoining lands of Afghanistan, Khwarazm and eastern Iran. The dislocation prevailing in the lands facing the Mongol invasions was in marked contrast to the stable Delhi Sultanate which was emerging in north India at this time. A comparison of such factors swayed Shaikh Badr al-Din Ghaznawi's decision to immigrate to Delhi. In the story narrated by Nizam al-Din, Shaikh Badr al-Din Ghaznawi sought an omen, fal, from the Qur'an

68. See above for references. Apparently the Shafi`i madhab still had some followers by the turn of the thirteenth century because Nizam al-Din Auliya mentioned them in his conversations and compares their interpretation of hadith with that of the Hanafis. See Amir Hasan Sijzi, Fawa'id al-Fu`ad, especially pp. 276-7, 312. In an intriguing tale, Amir Hasan Sijzi (p. 408) noted existing hostility between the Chishti saint Qadi Hamid al-Din Nagauri and a group of people mentioned as the Bahris (Bahriyan) led by the `alim Maulana Sharaf al-Din Bahri. Although the Bahris were nowhere identified in the text, Bulliet noticed a family of Shafi`i jurists in Nishapur by the name of Bahiri, one of whom participated in Mahmud Ghazni's campaigns in India. Bulliet's information about the Bahiris ends by 540/1145 and although the connection is tenous, it is worth speculating whether members of this family subsequently made their way into north India and whether Bahri was a corrupt rendering of Bahiri. See R. Bulliet, The Patricians of Nishapur: a Study in Medieval Islamic Social History, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp. 192-200.

to help him decide whether he should go to Delhi from Lahore or return to Ghazni. Although Badr al-Din wanted to return to Ghazni, the Qur'an promised paradise, bihisht, in Delhi, while the reference to Ghazni warned of pain and punishment, `azab. After reaching Delhi, and receiving a warm welcome from Iltutmish, Burhan al-Din discovered that in the meantime the Mongols had destroyed Ghazni and killed his relatives and other inhabitants of the town.[69]

It is also important to note that Nizam al-Din, himself, did not approve of Badr al-Din's close relationship with the elites of the Delhi Sultanate. His criticism of Badr al-Din paralleled Jalal al-Din's comments concerning those "worldly individuals" for whom it was the post of mudarris, qadi, or sadr-i jahan (teacher, judge or chief ecclesiastic) alone that were the chief attractions.[70] But these were criticisms concerning the personal merits of individuals and not service with the Delhi Sultan. In contrast to Shaikh Badr al-Din for example, Nizam al-Din narrated a story of a butcher who possessed mystic powers of making wishes come true. Nizam al-Din Auliya reported that the butcher fulfilled Qadi Fakhr al-Din Naqli's ambition of becoming a qadi. Another supplicant wanted the butcher to

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69. Amir Hasan Sijzi, Fawa'id al-Fu`ad, p. 124.

70. Ibid, pp. 134-5, 402.

make his dream of becoming an amir dad come true.[71] Significantly in Nizam al-Din's recounting of these stories, the ambitions of the notables were not criticised. The tenor of the Chishti saint's remarks suggested instead that these were cases where, through the "saint-like" butcher's intercession, worthy individuals received their just rewards. When altruistic, pious individuals were given public positions as guides and teachers it was for the ultimate benefit of the Muslim community. Because service as a qadi, imam etc. implied undertaking important social responsibilities, self-serving "worldly" `ulama should not receive appointments from the Delhi Sultan. Instead these posts of public significance should be reserved for individuals of unquestioned piety. In a narrower sense Nizam al-Din suggested that serving the Delhi Sultan was not completely abhorrent; despite the relative appreciation of the merits of different individuals and their ambitions, the Chishti saint was unequivocal about the fact that it was the service of the Sultan that appealed to a large number of [morally upright] individuals.

At least during Iltutmish's reign this must have been a fairly strong attraction because in agreeing to serve the Delhi Sultan the pious `ulama also gave their acquiescence

71. Amir Hasan Sijzi, Fawa'id al-Fu`ad, pp. 411-12: "ma-ra mibayad keh qadi shawam.....ma-ra mibayad keh amir dad shawam".

to a degree of administrative ranking and control. Nizam al-Din's report of Jalal al-Din Tabrizi's criticism indicated, for example, that there was an element of hierarchy amongst the posts of mudarris, qadi, and sadr-i jahan, which were in an order of ascendence. This element of hierarchy was also present in Nizam al-Din's statement that Juzjani was qualified to be a Shaikh al-Islam and not a mere qadi.[72] Juzjani's own career bore evidence of this form of progression. In the initial years of service under the Delhi Sultan, Juzjani was very grateful to be appointed qadi, imam and khatib of Gwalior by Sultan Iltutmish. But these offices were not as important as the charge of the Delhi madrasa-yi Nasiriyah and the quda of Gwalior given to him by Sultan Radiyya, or his subsequent appointment as qadi of Delhi and the entire Sultanate, quda-yi hadrat wa kall-i mamalik, in the reign of Mu`izz al-Din Bahram Shah.[73] The gradations amongst these posts occupied by the `ulama must have operationally also meant differences in salaries, responsibilities, extent of influence and patronage available to these individuals, but the sources provide few details on this subject.[74] What seems to have

72. Ibid, pp. 429-30.

73. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, pp. 448-9, 460, 466.

74. Evidence from Juzjani's own life suggests how we should be careful in making hasty generalisations. In 635/1238 Juzjani had been given charge of the madrasa-yi Nasiriyah and the quda of Gwalior. After considerable changes in his fortune, in 643/1246 he again received

had some bearing on status was the relative importance of the region in which an incumbent served. Juzjani's movement to Delhi from Gwalior, for example, marked a definite improvement in his career.

Irrespective of whether the `ulama were appointed by the Delhi Sultan, his notables, or the local urban community, their functional responsibilities were similar in that all relied upon the Shari`a for their decisions concerning legitimate conduct for Muslims. The respective `ulama differed only in terms of the extent of their influence. Thus, the `alim of a qasaba, or a shahr

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charge of the Nasiri madrasa and the quda of Gwalior. This seems to have been a more privileged appointment because on this occasion the charge of the madrasa included with it the superintendence of its endowments, ba-tauliyat-i awqaf-i an. On the earlier occasion somebody else must have held the post of superintendent, mutawalli, and Juzjani's importance must have been relatively reduced. See Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, pp. 460, 470. According to contemporary historians the Madrasa-yi Nasiriyah was constructed and endowed by the younger son of Iltutmish, Sultan Nasir al-Din. See N.N. Law, Promotion of Learning in India during Muhammadan rule (by Muhammadans) (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1916); S.M. Jaffar, Education in Muslim India; being an inquiry into the state of education during the Muslim period of Indian history, 1000-1800 A.C. (Delhi: Idarah-i Adabiyat-i Delli, 1973 reprint), Imdad Sabri, Dihli ke qadim Madaris aur Mudarris (Delhi: Sabri Academy, 1988), p. 64. Recently Munibur Rahman, "Madrasa: II In Muslim India" Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition, s.v., credited Ulugh Khan with the construction of the Madrasa-yi Nasiriyah. Both these ascriptions must be incorrect because according to Juzjani the madrasa was in existence before Sultan Nasir al-Din's accession (644/1246). It is likely that the madrasa was built and endowed by the elder prince Nasir al-Din who died in Iltutmish's reign, hence its name Madrasa-yi Nasiriah.

theoretically performed the same tasks in the local community as the qadi of Delhi, but a smaller body of people recognised his authority and he lacked the moral force to enforce his more unpopular decisions. The qadi of Ajudhan, for example, wanted to declare illegitimate Baba Farid's practise of performing sama` and raqs in the local mosque. He, however, found himself unable to take any action against the popular sufi saint and therefore sought the support of the more influential `ulama of Multan. In the light of the Chishti saint's stature as a sufi saint, however, the `ulama of Multan also declined taking any action against Baba Farid.[75] This was in contrast to the actions of the `ulama of Delhi who were far more forthright in their intent to curb pietistic practises believed to be contrary to the Shari`a. Nizam al-Din Auliya mentioned an instance where the sama` practice of the Suhrawardi Qadi Hamid al-Din Nagauri provoked the `ulama to seek fatwas (legal opinions) prohibiting the holding of these music assemblies. The Chishti saint also recorded an instance where the sama` session of Qutub al-Din Bakhtiyar Kaki and Hamid al-Din was interrupted and opposed by the religious scholar Rukn al-Din Samarqandi.[76] The ability of the `ulama of Delhi to take a more aggressive posture against conduct

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75. Amir Hasan Sijzi, Fawa'id al-Fu`ad, p. 166.

76. Amir Hasan Sijzi, Fawa'id al-Fu`ad, pp. 409, 407-8.

believed to be against the Shari`a came in part from a confidence in their own eminence, but it was also inspired by the tacit support of the Sultan.

The Delhi Sultan in his own turn shared the `ulama's concern regarding the imposition of the Shari`a in his domains. An integral part of Iltutmish's programme of political paramountcy was to project a self-image where the Sultan appeared in the dual role of conqueror and protector of the Holy Law. The investiture from the `Abbasid Caliph in 626/1229 to rule as his "helper" (nasir Amir al-Muminin) was publicly proclaimed because it emphasised Iltutmish's position as the sole legitimate Muslim monarch in north India whose duty, as the lieutenant of the Caliph, was to ensure the promulgation of the Shari`a. The timing was perfect for it coincided with the successful conclusion of the Sultan's campaigns against all competitors.

This self-image of the monarch was publicly proclaimed on the Sultan's constructions and could hardly be missed by the local Muslims. Iltutmish constructed mosques, `idgahs, or mausolea that the local Muslim community would use constantly for their ritual worship, celebration of festivals, and communal services. Although in most of the conquered areas Iltutmish and his subordinates indulged in a hectic building activity, proofs in themselves of his paramountcy and piety, of interest are those occasions when the Sultan added to already existing structures. These were often

extensive additions and were visibly planned to impress the visitor. The Jama` Masjid in Delhi was enlarged to almost double its original size and while Iltutmish's additions were stylistically similar to the preexisting architecture, the screen extensions in the mihrab wall were bigger and more profusely ornamented in the formal floral styles of the Islamic tradition than Qutub al-Din's contribution. Even more striking was the minar within the mosque precinct which was raised to tower three additional floors above its original height.[77] The Delhi Jama` Masjid, which was rivalled in size and grandeur by the congregational mosque of Bayana in Qutub al-Din's reign, was transformed in Iltutmish's rule until it had no peer. Similarly the Arhai din ki Jhopri mosque in Ajmer was enlarged and reworked until evidence of the early structure was barely traceable.[78] By renovating monuments associated with the north

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77. On the basis of inscriptional evidence Iltutmish's additions probably took place post only after the Delhi Sultan had defeated his major adversaries and received the patent of governorship from the `Abbasid Caliph. See J. Horowitz, "The inscriptions of Muhammad ibn Sam, Qutubuddin Aibeg and Iltutmish", p. 23, # XXI, where the date 627/1229-30 is mentioned. Amongst his titles inscribed on the doorway of the second floor of the Delhi Jama` Masjid (ibid, p. 26, #XXIV), Iltutmish recorded Nasir Amir al-Muminin, Helper of the Commander of the Faithful, a title given by the `Abbasid Caliph to the Delhi Sultan only in 626/1229. This would suggest that some, if not all, construction activity in the Delhi Jama` Masjid (or atleast the minar) occured only after this date.

78. J. Horowitz, "The inscriptions of Muhammad ibn Sam, Qutubuddin Aibeg and Iltutmish", p. 15, #s VI, VII, noted two inscriptions dated respectively, 595/1199 and 596/1200 which prove that the original construction in the Arhai din ki Jhopri should be dated to Mu`izz al-Din's

Indian Sultanates Iltutmish made a very deliberate and obvious statement of conquest. The new order was also proclaimed: Delhi was now the unrivalled centre of the Sultanate. The other important urban centres of the Delhi regime, containing either new or refurbished constructions, signified the presence of the new political dispensation.

The extant inscriptional record of the Sultan on his monuments in Delhi, Ajmer, Budaun and Bilgram bears out the seriousness with which Iltutmish sought to propagate the image of protector of the Shari`a and guide of the Muslim community in north India. Many of these statements were couched in the formulaic idiom of the day, "Lord of the necks of the people....heir to the kingdom of Solomon...who renders Islam and Muslims powerful, who bestows security and protection...",[79] but they also contained unique statements like, "master of the kings of the Turks and the Persians" a sentiment particularly relevant given the ethnic

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reign. It is impossible to define the extent of the original construction. The main features of the extant mosque conform to a later style which is associated with Iltutmish. Inscriptional evidence from the mosque confirms Iltutmish's (re-constructional) activity. See also Michael W. Meister, "The Two-and-a-half-day Mosque" Oriental Art 18 n.s (1972): 57-63.

79. These eulogistic phrases are common to almost all of Iltutmish's inscriptions. See J. Horowitz, "The inscriptions of Muhammad ibn Sam, Qutubuddin Aibeg and Iltutmish", p. 22, #XVII; p. 23, #XX; pp. 23-4, #XXII; p. 26, #XXV; p. 27, #XXVI; p. 27, #XXVIa; p. 28, #XXVII; p. 29, #XXIX; and p. 30, XXXII.

composition of the Sultan's audience. The religious and Qur'anic epigraphs of Iltutmish also seem formulaic until one recalls the many streams of piety and the lack of homogeneity within the Muslim community in this period.

Unlike Qutub al-Din's choice of Qur'anic and religious messages, Iltutmish's inscriptions focused less on the need for Muslims to be grateful to God for victory over non-believers. While this idea was certainly present, Iltutmish's inscriptions developed other themes also present in Qutub al-Din's epigraphs -- the need for Muslims to remain united as a chosen community, remember their canonical obligations to their confessor, not to stray, and contrast their privileged status with that of the hypocrites, non-believers and idolators who suffer the wrath of God. While the ideas were the same, the difference lay in the emphasis. This was also evident from the fact that Iltutmish inscribed only two Qur'anic verses (sura 14: 29-30, and sura 62: 9-10) on the minar of the Delhi Jama` Masjid, the site for those celebratory statements acknowledging God's agency in the conquest of infidels. By Anthony Welch's own admission, the messages on the mihrab wall, where Iltutmish's epigraphs prolifate, stressed "instead, the importance of worship, of adherence to the principles of Islam, and of recognition of the obligations incumbent on

believers".[80]

Iltutmish's epigraphs take for granted the indivisibility of the Muslim community and focus upon the believer's personal and social conduct as evidence of his submission to his Confessor. The _hadith_ inscribed on the second arched recess of Iltutmish's _mihrab_ screen in the Delhi _Jama` Masjid_, for example, brought out the Prophet's (and Iltutmish's) emphasis upon the performance of congregational prayer and its benefits:

> The Prophet....said, "whoever offered his morning prayer in congregation got his (worldly) troubles removed by Allah; and whoever offered his afternoon prayer (in congregation) got his living made plentiful by Allah; and whoever offered his late afternoon prayer (in congregation) became (as pure) as on the day he was born; and whoever offered his evening prayer in congregation is considered as if he has given away his wealth and (even) his life (in the way of Allah), and whoever offered his bed-time prayer in congregation received Allah's blessing". (The Prophet)...said "whoever observed these five prayers in congregation would have his way (to Heaven) widened by Allah."[81]

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80. Anthony Welch, "_Qur'an_ and Tomb: the Religious Epigraphs of two early Sultanate Tombs in Delhi" in _Indian Epigraphy: its bearings on the History of Art_ ed.Frederick M. Asher, and G.S. Ghai, (New Delhi: Oxford and IBH Publishing Co., American Institute of Indian Studies, 1985), p. 257. Welch summarised here arguments which he presented in another, apparently still unpublished, article: "Islamic Architecture and Epigraphs in Sultanate India" in _Studies in South Asian Art and Archaelogy_ ed. A.K. Narain, forthcoming.

81. Transcribed and translated by Maulvi Muhammad Ashraf Hussain, _A Record of all the Quranic and non-Historical Epigraphs on the Protected Monuments in the Delhi Province_, (Calcutta: Archaeological Survey of India, Memoirs, no. 47, 1936), pp. 109-110.

On the second floor of the _minar_ in the Delhi _Jama` Masjid_, constructed by Sultan Iltutmish, _Sura_ 62: 9-10 from the _Qur'an_ preached the importance of performing the obligatory rituals of prayer in the midst of one's daily activity.

> O' believers, when proclamation is made for prayer on Friday, hasten to God's remembrance and leave trafficking aside; that is better for you, did you but know.
> Then when the prayer is finished, scatter in the land and seek God's bounty, and remember God frequently; haply you will prosper.[82]

All these Qur'anic and religious inscriptions were naturally enough in Arabic and almost always inscribed in _naskh_, an extremely difficult script to decipher for the initiated, leave alone the lay-man.[83] In the largely unlettered Muslim audience of the early thirteenth century, these inscriptions would have gone unread.[84] It is likely,

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82. Ibid, p. 105.

83. These difficulties dodged the Archaelogical Survey of India as well. Note Horowitz's anguish that the lowest inscribed band on the _minar_ "has suffered much at the hands of an ignorant restorer, who replaced the different fragments in a perfectly arbitrary manner [and] it is not possible to read the whole of it..." J. Horowitz, "The inscriptions of Muhammad ibn Sam, Qutubuddin Aibeg and Iltutmish", p. 16.

84. It is truly surprising that Anthony Welch (for references see above) could argue that "...the epigraphic program of the Qutub _minar_ seems to have been directed towards the non-Muslim populations..." (p. 257). According to the author, _sura_ 48: 6, for example, was "specifically directed towards the non-Muslim majority beyond the walls of the mosque" and since it was "included in the epigraphic

however, that at least the gist of the contents of the Qur'anic and other religious statements in the mosque -- if not the inscriptions themselves -- were conveyed to the congregation in the sermons of the imam, the khatib, and the mutazakkira who preached, harangued and exhorted Muslims to follow the righteous path.[85] At least in terms of goals the `ulama and the Delhi Sultan placed an equal emphasis upon the primacy of the injunctions of the Shari`a (ahkam-i Shari`a), in the lives of the Muslim community.

Although we lack details about how Iltutmish would have liked the `ulama to enforce a conformity of belief and action according to the Shari`a, the stray references con-

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program of the Qutb (sic) minar's first story...[it was on] ....that portion of the mosque complex most visible to believers and non-believers outside the walls" (p. 260). The inscription was visible, perhaps, but intellegible only to that indigene who knew Arabic and the naskh script.

85. There is some information concerning the tazkir, exhortation, given by the mutazakkira. On one occasion Juzjani explained that the tazkir was "intended (the printed text has maqsur, a misprint for maqsud?) to inflame [people] to [participate] in jihad and [gain the religious] merit of ghuzzawat (waging Holy Wars), and exert themselves (jidd namudan) in guarding the dignity of Islam and serving the imperial court and obeying the orders of the commanders (baimtisal awamir ulu al-amr)". Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 2, p. 76. Juzjani had a flair for these exhortations, and Iltutmish also required him to deliver these sermons during his campaigns (ibid, vol. 1, pp. 447, 448.). The themes chosen by the mutazakkira, khatib, and imam were all religious and the sermons were meant to move their audience to abide by the tenets of the shari`a or perform meritorious actions which would benefit the community. This sermonising tone also predominated in the choice of Quranic verses and hadith statements inscribed in the Jama` Masjids of Delhi and Ajmer.

cerning the actions of the Shaikh al-Islam, indicate that he was one individual whose specific function was to guide the conduct of Muslims in his area of jurisdiction, interact with the pious, and most crucially, scrutinise their texts and teachings. Like the qadi, the Shaikh al-Islam was not necessarily an appointee of the Sultan. As in the case of the Suhrawardy saint Baha al-Din Zakariyya, pious and influential individuals were sometimes given this responsibility by the local Muslim community, a decision normally abided and confirmed by the lay authority. Much like the qadi again, the variations in his duties and functions were influenced by the individual Shaikh al-Islam's own pietistic inclinations, his competence as a scholar, his prestige in, and the degree of support from the local community and the immediate political authority. In its normative conceptualisation the function of the Shaikh al-Islam in the reign of Iltutmish does not seem to have differed markedly from its Ghurid predecessor[86] and an anecdote in the Chahar Maqala throws fortunate light on some of its features.

> The Shaikh al-Islam `Abdu'llah Ansari...conceived a fanatical hatred...(towards the

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86. Although the study of Richard Bulliet, "The Shaikh al-Islam and the evolution of Islamic Society" Studia Islamica 35 (1972): 53-67 is weak on the Ghurids and the Delhi Sultanate, it is extremely valuable in tracing the origin of the office to Khurasan and relating its evolution to social changes in the region.

> physician Adib Isma`il)..., and several times attempted to do him an injury, and burned his books. Now this fanatical dislike arose from religious motives, for the people of Herat believed that he could restore the dead to life, and this belief was [injurious to the common folk][87].......Now the Shaikh [al-Islam] fell ill, and......(after the physician succeeded in curing `Abdu'llah Ansari when everybody else had given him up for dead, the physician left this message for the Shaikh al-Islam:) "You should study science, and not burn men's books".[88]

Unlike many sources that ascribe persecution by the Shaikh al-Islam to purely personal motives[89] the Chahar Maqala goes further and explains the reason behind this fanatical hatred. The Shaikh al-Islam had burned Adib Isma`il's books because they were understood to be the source of the heretical belief that the physician could "restore the dead to life". It was especially disturbing since the physician's reputed prowess had "fooled" people and he had gained adherents within the city of Herat.

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87. Edward G. Browne, the translator of the text preferred "injurious to his own pretensions, da`wi ra" which was the reading in the BM Ms., Or. 2,955 and the Tehran lithographed edition (A.H. 1305). The translator noted however, that "injurious to the common folk, `awamm ra" was the reading in the oldest manuscript, BM Ms., Or. 3,507. See Arudi, Chahar Maqala, trans. Browne, p. 129, fn. 2. As will be apparent from my discussion below, I believe that the oldest manuscript preserves the sense of the original passage.

88. Ibid, p. 129.

89. See the above mentioned narration of the hostility between the Shaikh al-Islam Najm al-Din Sughra and Bakhtiyar Kaki and Jalal al-Din Tabrizi in the Siyar al-Auliya and Siyar al-`Arifin respectively.

The activities of the Shaikh al-Islam of Delhi in Iltutmish's reign have also been recorded by several chroniclers and these accounts range over a considerable period of time. Interestingly enough, many of these reports are clearly apocryphal yet they all harmonise with each other and unwittingly emphasise the Shaikh al-Islam's role as a guide and adjudicator of the conduct of Muslims. In Diya al-Din Barani's Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi (a mid-fourteenth century text) the Shaikh al-Islam Sayyid Nur al-Din Mubarak Ghaznawi was remembered by Balban as haranguing Sultan Iltutmish on how the existing customs of governance contravened the sunna of the Prophet and inevitably damned rulers to perdition. Subsequently, the Shaikh al-Islam narrated four precepts, `amal, for the protection of the faith, din panahi, which rulers should follow.[90] As has been frequently remarked, Sayyid Nur al-Din represents the authorial voice of Diya al-Din Barani, and, in the light of the functions of the Shaikh al-Islam, was seen as an apposite choice of character to question and voice aphorisms on moral conduct.[91] That this was no accidental

90. Diya al-Din Barani, Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi, ed. Khan, pp. 41-44, ed. Rashid, pp. 49-52.

91. The Shaikh al-Islam's aphorisms were central in Barani's didactic "mirror for princes", Fatawa-yi Jahandari where they were embellished and discussed in length. See Peter Hardy, Historians of Medieval India (London: Luzac and Co., 1966), p. 29, and K.A. Nizami, Religion and Politics in the Thirteenth Century, pp. 161-2.

choice can be clarified if we recall the evidence of the sixteenth century Siyar al-`Arifin. According to the Suhrawardy tadkirat, in the inquest held to adjudicate Jalal al-Din Tabrizi's conduct, it was the Shaikh al-Islam Najm al-Din Sughra that was the plaintiff, and the judge was the Shaikh al-Islam Baha al-Din Zakariyya.

Just as Adib Isma`il's conduct was problematical for the Shari`a-minded Shaikh al-Islam in Afghanistan, in the north Indian context as "injurious to the common folk" of Delhi were Nur Turk's preaching to the masses or Bakhtiyar Kaki's display of miraculous powers which Iltutmish's Shaikh al-Islam, Najm al-Din Sughra, had sought to curb. In the light of the responsibilities of the Shaikh al-Islam, Najm al-Din's conduct towards Jalal al-Din Tabrizi also becomes more rational. Rather than being motivated purely out of malice it is more likely that the `alim's persecution of Jalal al-Din Tabrizi followed the sufi's failure to meet norms of conduct and doctrine acceptable to Sughra.

It is unclear whether these examples of "supervision and punishment" were restricted only to Delhi or if these instances were a reflection of a wider effort to "discipline and punish", evident in the latter part of Iltutmish's reign. Judging by the aforementioned reports of conflict between the `ulama and Sufi pirs over the validity of mystical practises like sama`, raqs amd namaz in towns such as Budaun, Multan and Ajudhan, Delhi does not seem to have

been an isolated case. Depending upon the individual `alim's confidence, conflict could occur in a qasaba as well, and Juzjani provided information about Qadi Shams al-Din of MHR (?) who persecuted, kofta shudan, a Turkman derwish called Ayub.[92] Impressionistic as the evidence might be, it does suggest that Iltutmish's reign was perhaps unique until the reign of Muhammad Shah Tughluq (725/1325-752/1351) for the reported number of madhars (inquisitions) and demands for fatwas (legal opinion) against Muslims whose conduct or teaching were believed to be against the Shari`a. The evidence also seems to suggest that it was the sufis in particular that felt the brunt of this persecution in Iltutmish's reign. It is not surprising therefore that Nizam al-Din Auliya commented that Juzjani should have been a Shaikh al-Islam and not a mere qadi. Had Juzjani been a Shaikh al-Islam his personal evaluation of conduct would have been influenced more by his well known sufi leanings rather than a "scriptural" understanding of Islam.

This interpretation of Iltutmish militates considerably from the popular image of the pious monarch who had a spe-

92. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 466. This event probably took place in the last years of Iltutmish's reign or very shortly after his death because according to Juzjani in 639/1242 Ayub resided in Delhi where he had gained the favour of Sultan Bahram Shah (637/1240-639/1242) and eventually succeeded in getting Qadi Shams al-Din executed.

cial weakness towards sufis.[93] It is indeed interesting that for one who sought to enforce the Shari`a and regulate religious practise, the Delhi Sultan managed to escape any criticism in the sufi literature. The response of the pious to Sultan Iltutmish's actions is actually not that surprising because the Delhi Sultan was never directly involved with the regulative functions of the qadi or the Shaikh al-Islam. Once a Shari`a-minded individual with the appropriate degree of learning or social support had been chosen, the `alim functioned according to his conscience, the Sultan intervening only to curb excesses. Obviously this latitude of action implied that the Sultan had to be very judicious about the individuals he chose to support as qadis or Shaikhs al-Islam, but maintaining a distance helped in insulating Iltutmish from the frequently unpopular decisions of the `ulama. Iltutmish might receive representations and complaints about the Shaikh al-Islam's actions, but the Sultan was not made ultimately responsible for the decisions of the jurists or censors. In the account of the Siyar al-`Arifin, Iltutmish was reportedly shocked by Najm al-Din's actions and therefore dismissed the Shaikh al-Islam. In `Isami's Futuh al-Salatin, Iltutmish was forced to hold an inquest against Qadi Hamid al-Din

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93. For an uncritical collation of these sentiments see K.A. Nizami, "The religious life and leanings of Iltutmish" in Studies in Medieval Indian History and Culture (Allahabad: Kitab Mahal, 1966), pp. 13-40.

Nagauri, but despite the prompting of the `ulama, the Delhi Sultan could not restrain showing respect and deference when the Sufi pir appeared in court.[94]

IV Conclusion:

Iltutmish's position was particularly difficult when it came to the question of regulating the conduct of his subjects. As a Sultan with considerable political authority Iltutmish could demand obedience but beyond a certain point he could not intervene as a regulator of the conduct of his Muslim subjects. His authority was circumscribed not merely because he could not function as a legislator or interpreter of the Shari`a, but also because by choice Iltutmish had constructed a political system which derived its stability by maintaining a distance from the subject Muslim population. Moreover the "ruled" had a very ambiguous appreciation of the moral qualities of their "rulers". The Amirs and Maliks were wealthy and powerful and therefore sometimes useful as patrons. But these sentiments alone were insufficient to motivate cooperation or loyalty towards Delhi from very dispersed groups of people.

On the other hand the `ulama and the Shari`a-minded sufis commanded considerable respect amongst Muslims. They

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94. `Isami, Futuh al-Salatin, ed. A.S. Usha, pp. 117-120.

were also the one group of people who could legitimately guide and correct the actions and beliefs of Muslims. It was their authoritative status within Muslim society that Iltutmish sought to tap and through them span the divide between the rulers and the ruled. Rather than subvert or manipulate them, Iltutmish lent the pious his support.

This was not an indiscriminate support to the piety-minded. Iltutmish may have been respectful to the pious, but he did not encourage charismatic sufis who could command large followings of disciples and emerge as authoritarian figures in their own right. In contrast the `ulama did not make disciples; they commanded respect as individuals learned in the religious sciences, and guided Muslims in their endeavour to follow the teachings contained in the Qur'anic revelation. Ideally, the `ulama were the one group of people that could help Iltutmish in his goal of promoting social and political stability within his newly conquered domains, by creating the sense of a homogenous Muslim community bound by the dictates of the Shari`a.

This search for social and political stability had also driven the north Indian Sultanates and the Shari`a-minded `ulama into a collaborative effort, but the scale of their efforts did not match that of the Delhi Sultan. Pious support to Iltutmish was forthcoming largely because of the Chingiz Khanid holocaust which had destroyed the vestiges of Islamic civilization dear to the `ulama. Moreover, since

the fury of the Mongol invasions coincided with the establishment of the paramount Delhi Sultanate, the pious seized upon the Delhi Sultan as the final hope for the protection of the community. From the mid-1220's only the domains of the Delhi Sultan were left as a source of sanctuary for the `ulama in north India.

Coming from two completely different ends, the perceptions of the `ulama and Iltutmish coincided concerning Delhi's role in north India. Iltutmish's goal was to make Delhi the paramount power, the centre without any rival. For the `ulama, the Delhi Sultanate was a haven which could become the axis of the Muslim community, where the hitherto disparate and nucleated communities of north India could be integrated into a jama`a ummah which abided by the Shari`a. The two were complementary goals and this was apparent to the `alim Juzjani, whose description of Delhi as the Qubbat al-Islam, conveyed these sentiments succinctly. In its obvious sense qubba meant sanctuary, thus Qubbat al-Islam, referred to the role of Delhi as the sanctuary of Islam at a time when the central Islamic lands were feeling the brunt of the Mongol invasions. Qubba, however, also meant, the centre, the axis, and in that sense Qubbat al-Islam referred to the newly gained role of Delhi, the paramount power in north India, the centre of Islam.[95] In the light

95. See Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 441, and Ch. Pellat, "al-Kubba, Kubbat al-`Alam" in Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition, s.v..

of their congruent aims it is certainly not surprising that the `ulama received a warm welcome in Iltutmish's newly conquered domains, or that they cooperated with the Delhi Sultan.

If we recall the existing varieties of pietistic practises in north India in the early thirteenth century we can more readily appreciate the achievements of the Shari`a-minded during the reign of Iltutmish. Judging by the many protests of the pious from several towns in the Sultanate, the `ulama had some success in introducing norms through which they could supervise the conduct of Muslims. Nur Turk, Bakhtiyar Kaki, Jalal al-Din Tabrizi, and Qadi Hamid al-Din Nagauri were all contemporaries of Iltutmish and their protests date from the last years of the Delhi Sultan's reign. The Shari`a-minded could indeed take credit for ensuring that no sufi in Iltutmish's reign succeeded in establishing a charismatic position in the Delhi Sultanate akin to Nizam al-Din Auliya in the early fourteenth century.

By the 1230's the primacy of Iltutmish in the political world in and around the urban centres of north India was complete. The Shari`a-minded `ulama were an important group of individuals whose association with the Delhi Sultan enabled him to consolidate his newly conquered domains. As the next chapter points out however, within ten years of

the Delhi Sultan's death, the domains of the Delhi Sultanate were fractionalised amongst new war lords. Although political break-up did not mean the loss of the sentiments of a "Muslim community", the _Shari`a_ was not the only foundation on which it would hereafter be based. In the post-Iltutmish period, _sufis_ (and not just the _`ulama_) gained increasing importance as the keepers of the public conscience. This was, however, only one amongst a number of significant changes that took place in the nature of political relations in the Sultanate of Delhi between 633/1236 and the end of the thirteenth century.

Chapter 4

NEW ELITES AND A NEW SULTANATE: FROM THE SHAMSI TO THE GHIYATHI DISPENSATION 633/1236-689/1290

On Shams al-Din Iltutmish's death his lineal descendents succeeded to the throne of Delhi, but the political power within the Sultanate devolved to his notables. All historians have focused upon the fact that the "nobles" controlled effective power while the Sultans Rukn al-Din Firuz Shah (633/1236-634/1236), Radiyya (634/1236-637/1240), Mu`izz al-Din Bahram Shah (637/1240-639/1242), `Ala al-Din Mas`ud Shah (639/1242-644/1246) and Nasir al-Din Mahmud (644/1246-664/1266), reigned but did not rule. In a recent article Peter Jackson has studied the manner in which military slaves monopolised power in the post-Shamsi period. He was able to show how the Shamsi bandagan resisted the challenge posed to their authority by the free-born notables and the slave retinues of some of Iltutmish's successors. Jackson's work has also been valuable in providing a method for ordering the events of these

extremely confused and strife filled years into a comprehensible pattern. The author's deliberately focused attention on the role of the military slaves in the conflict for political power, left out of the discussion, however, the larger question of the implications that this conflict came to have on the composition of the elites in the Delhi Sultanate.[1]

Although Iltutmish's successors were unsuccessful in finally restoring authority to the Delhi Sultan, by Jackson's own admission this was not for want of trying. Iltutmish's successors did attempt to establish their own following by dispensing privileges and offices to people of their choosing and these individuals were not always military slaves. The efforts of the Delhi Sultans to consolidate their power was met with resistance by the slave and free Shamsi notables. In the ensuing conflicts each

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1. Peter Jackson, "The Mamluk institution in early Muslim India" Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1990): 340-358. One of the strengths of Jackson's study of the bandagan in the Delhi Sultanate is its emphasis on the comparative method where the experience of military slavery in mamluk Egypt is used to enlarge the information provided by the relatively sketchy Sultanate sources. As the usage of "institution" in his article suggests, Jackson feels that there were certain common identifiable properties in the mamluk systems over time and space. Yet, there were also many distinguishing features in the way each Sultan organised and deployed his slaves, and the differences were important because they reflect the local social and political milieu. While the comparative method explains why mamluks were used at all, it glosses over the nature of the political systems without which one really cannot explain why Mu`izz al-Din's slaves were deployed differently from Iltutmish's.

contending group relied upon an assortment of alliances to strengthen their power base. This implied the recruitment of supporters by contending groups, a development which often meant a delegation of power to new groups of people.

On one level these entrants into the politics of the court were hardly "new"; many of them (slave and non-slave) had been junior functionaries in the court or the army in Iltutmish's reign and were therefore nominally a part of the larger Shamsi group of notables. But since they had not been involved as active agents in the Shamsi political system, they were relatively unimpressed by the traditions of the Sultanate which had been Iltutmish's creation. These new entrants into the political arena were in constant conflict with other incumbents, and they consolidated their own regional principalities sometimes as rival Sultans. As a result not merely did the conflict in the years between 639/1242 and 652/1254-5 involve new individuals, but the role of Delhi as the paramount authority in north India also came to be a subject of dispute.

These transformations provide the context in which we need to situate Ghiyath al-Din Balban's (664/1266-689/1290) rise to power. Although Ghiyath al-Din Balban displaced the lineage of Shams al-Din in 664/1266, this dynastic change in itself did not account for the major transitions in political elites within the Delhi Sultanate. The changes had occurred earlier. As the deputy (na'ib) to the Sultan

Nasir al-Din Mahmud (644/1246-664/1266), Ulugh Khan (the future Sultan Ghiyath al-Din Balban) had already occupied one of the most powerful political positions in the Delhi court for several years. Especially in the years after 652/1254 Ulugh Khan dispensed political power to his dependents and allies and energetically consolidated his power. But because of the changes in the Delhi Sultanate during the years of conflict, the members of the Ghiyathi dispensation had to be deployed to meet new and different challenges to the monarch. In the years after 652/1254, not merely was there a new Ghiyathi dispensation, but the structure of the Delhi Sultanate had also altered. These transitions can be most usefully highlighted by a study of the series of conflicts within the ruling elite, and between the elites and the Delhi Sultans during the years 633/1236-639/1242, 639/1242-653/1255, and 653/1255-689/1290.

I Conflict between the Delhi Sultans and Shamsi notables, 633/1236-639/1242:

To be able to understand the nature of the conflict in the years immediately following the death of Sultan Iltutmish we need to be aware of the composition and organisation of the various groups involved, and the reasons why their mutual interests drove them into competition. The

conflict in this period centred around the heirs of the Delhi Sultan, three of whom were deposed within six years. Contemporary historians have followed Juzjani and Barani in ascribing the inability of these Sultans to emerge as authoritative figures like their father, to the fact that they were weak, incapable individuals who lacked the moral virtues to attract the respect or obedience of their subordinates.[2] Yet, Juzjani's history of the period does show some of these same Sultans leading campaigns, recruiting supporters, and occasionally enforcing harsh punishments on their father's notables. It is also frequently forgotten that Iltutmish's successor, Rukn al-Din had served as a governor for eight lunar years in his father's dominions, first in Budaun and then Lahore.[3] As a governor he commanded a military retinue, and members of this group would have been important when the prince became Sultan. Although Juzjani included no details about Rukn al-Din's military following, in a reference to Beg Timur Orkhan-i Rukni, who as his eponymous nisba suggests was a banda of Sultan Rukn al-Din, we have a hint to at least a part of the larger

2. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, pp. 457, Barani, Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi, ed. Khan, p. 26, ed. Rashid, pp. 30-1.

3. Rukn al-Din was appointed governor of Budaun in 625/1228 and sometime after 631/1233 to the governorship of Lahore. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, pp. 454, 449.

TABLE 4

JUZJANI: SHAMSI BANDAGAN IN THE POST-SHAMSI PERIOD

# in Tabaqat 22 ed. Habibi	REFERENCE in Habibi ed.	NAME OF SHAMSI SLAVE ethnic background	DEPLOYMENT OF NOTABLE IN RUKN AL-DIN'S REIGN 633/1236	DEPLOYMENT OF NOTABLE IN RADIYYA'S REIGN 634/1236 - 637/1240	DEPLOYMENT OF NOTABLE IN BAHRAM SHAH'S REIGN 637/1240 - 639/1242	DEPLOYMENT OF NOTABLE IN `ALA AL-DIN'S REIGN 639/1242 - 644/1246	DEPLOYMENT OF NOTABLE IN NASIR AL-DIN'S REIGN 644/1246 - 664/1266
2	II:5-7	KABIR KHAN AYAZ AL-M'UIZZI Rumi, Turk from Anatolia.	iqta` of Sunam > rebelled >	iqta` of Lahore> rebelled 636/1238-9> Multan 637/1239-40>	Took title: SULTAN of Sindh and Uchch. Died 639/1241. Succeeded as ruler by son Taj al-Din Abu Bakr Ayaz.		
4	II:8-9	MALIK SAIF AL-DIN AI-BEG UCHCH Of Turkish origin.	unchanged) Uchch >	Died as muqta` of of Uchch.			
6	II:10-13	MALIK NUSRAT AL-DIN TAYISI AL-MU`IZZI Of Turkish origin.	unchanged? Bayana Sultankot, shahnagi of Gwalior? >	(After Ghiyath al-Din ibn Iltutmish's death) iqta' of Awadh > Loyal to Radiyya > died 634/1237.			
7	II:13-18	MALIK `IZZ AL-DIN TUGHAN KHAN TUGHRIL Qara Khita Turk.	unchanged) muqta` of Lakhnauti >	(unchanged): still occupied Lakhnauti; autonomy recognised by Radiyya >	(unchanged): still occupied Lakhnauti autonomy recognized by `Ala al-Din >	seized Karah & Manikpur> lost Lakhnauti to Tamar Khan> 643/1245 received Awadh>	died 644/1246.
8	II:17-18	MALIK TAMAR KHAN Qipchaq Turk.	unchanged? Amir-i Akhur? >	iqta` of Qanauj> Kara in 634/1237 & death of Malik Tayisi: Awadh>	continued in the iqta` of Awadh>	642/1245 sent to aid Tughan Khan; seized Lakhnauti > in rebellion >	died 644/1246.
9	II:18-19	MALIK HINDU KHAN MUAYYID AL-DIN MUBARAK AL-KHAZIN "Hindu"	unchanged? tashtdar, & khazanedar	loyal to Radiyya > wilayat and fort of Uchch >	Jalandar > died there.		
10	II:19-20	MALIK IKHTIYAR AL-DIN QARAKASH KHAN AI-TEGIN	iqta` of Multan >	iqta` of Lahore > supported Radiyya against Bahram Shah >	muqta` of Lahore > expelled by Mongols > Bayana > imprisoned in Delhi with Ikhtiyar al-Din Yuzbeg >	amir hajib> Bayana> Kara > in Lakhnauti expedition with Tamar Khan>	died in Kara 644/1246.
11	II:20-22	MALIK IKHTIYAR AL-DIN ALTUNIA-I TABARHIND ? ethnic origin	unchanged ? sar chatr dar >	iqta` of Baran> Tabarhind > rebelled imprisoned Sultan Radiyya >	married Sultan Radiyya & rebelled > died 637/1240.		
12	II:22-23	IKHTIYAR AL-DIN AI-TEGIN Qara Khita Turk.	unchanged? iqta` of Kajakot & Nandana >	iqta` of Budaon > amir hajib > rebelled	regent to monarch with royal paraphernalia > married Sultan's sister > murdered, ca. 637/1240.		

TABLE 4 (continued)

# in Tabaqat 22 ed. Habibi	REFERENCE in Habibi ed.	NAME OF SHAMSI SLAV ethnic background	DEPLOYMENT OF NOTABLE IN RUKN AL-DIN'S REIGN 633/1236	DEPLOYMENT OF NOTABLE IN RADIYYA'S REIGN 634/1236 - 637/1240	DEPLOYMENT OF NOTABLE IN BAHRAM SHAH'S REIGN 637/1240 - 639/1242	DEPLOYMENT OF NOTABLE IN `ALA AL-DIN'S REIGN 639/1242 - 644/1246	DEPLOYMENT OF NOTABLE IN NASIR AL-DIN'S REIGN 644/1246 - 664/1266
13	II:24-25	MALIK BADR AL-DIN SUNQAR AL-RUMI Rumi, of Byzantine origin.	unchanged? na' in amir akhur? >	iqta` of Budaon (when Ikhtiyar Al-Tegin appointed amir hajib?)>	with death of Ikhtiyar al-Din: Amir Hajib > rebellious > exiled Budaon > executed		
14	II:25-27	MALIK TAJ AL-DIN SANJAR QUTLUQ Qipchaq Turk.	unchanged? shahnah akhur? >	iqta` of Baran > Sursuti >	unchanged?>	iqta` of Budaon > murdered	
15	II:27-28	MALIK TAJ AL-DIN SANJAR KURET KHAN Qipchaq Turk.	unchanged? shahnah bahar wa kishtiha? >	unchanged? shahnah bahar wa kishtiha? >	unchanged? shahnah bahar wa kishtiha? >	rebelled against vizier Khwaja Muhazzab al-Din > shahnah-i pil > sar jandar > iqta` of Baran > Budaon > Awadh > Died in campaign at Bihar.	
16	II:28	MALIK [IKIT/BAT] KHAN SAIF AL-DIN AI-BEG KHITAI Khitai.	unchanged? jandar? >	unchanged? jandar? >	unchanged? jandar? >	sar-i jandar> iqta` of Kuhram & Samanah > Baran > exped. against Mongols in Uchch & Multan 643/1246 >	wakil dar (after Raihan's death?) > died in Santur expedition.
17	II:28-29 & 60	MALIK TAJ AL-DIN SANJAR TARKHAN Karakhi Turk.	?>	?>	amir akhur>	unchanged? amir akhur? >	naib amir hajib> iqta` of Jhanjhana> iqta` of Kasmandi & Mandiana when Ulugh Khan in exile> Baran when Ulugh Khan restored> after Ikit Khan's death in 656/1256 wakil-i dar & muqta` of Budaun > Awadh after Arsalan Khan
18	II:30-33	MALIK IKHTIYAR AL-DIN YUZBEG TUGHRIL KHAN Qipchaq Turk.	special confidant > amir majlis > shahnagi pilan > rebelled>	amir akhur>	unchanged? amir akhur? imprisoned 639/1241-2 with Malik Qaraqash >	muqta` Tabarhind> Lahore> rebelled > reinstated > with Jalal al-Din ibn Iltutmish's departure: Qanauj >	Awadh> mamlikat-i Lakhnauti> SULTAN OF LAKHNAUTI title: SULTAN MUGHITH AL-DIN > killed during Kamrud campaign. Succeeded by son `Izz al-Din Balban Yuzbegi.
19	II:33-35	MALIK TAJ AL-DIN SANJAR ARSALAN KHAN AL-KHWARAZMI ?; probably Khwarazmi Turk.	unchanged? khasah dar? >	chashnigir > iqta` of of Balaram>	unchanged? iqta` of Balaram? >	unchanged? iqta` of Balaram? >	iqta` of Bayana> wakil dar> 651/1254 Tabarhind, conflict with Sher Khan> Awadh, conflict with Qutlugh Khan> 657/1259 seized Lakhnauti from `Izz al-Din Yuzbegi> died (date?) succeeded by son Tatar Khan.

TABLE 4 (continued)

# in Tabaqat 22 ed. Habibi	REFERENCE in Habibi ed.	NAME OF SHAMSI SLAVE ethnic background	DEPLOYMENT OF NOTABLE IN RUKN AL-DIN'S REIGN 633/1236	DEPLOYMENT OF NOTABLE IN RADIYYA'S REIGN 634/1236 - 637/1240	DEPLOYMENT OF NOTABLE IN BAHRAM SHAH'S REIGN 637/1240 - 639/1242	DEPLOYMENT OF NOTABLE IN `ALA AL-DIN'S REIGN 639/1242 - 644/1246	DEPLOYMENT OF NOTABLE IN NASIR AL-DIN'S REIGN 644/1246 - 664/1266
20	II:36-40	MALIK `IZZ AL-DIN KUSHLU KHAN AL-SULTANI Qipchaq Turk.	unchanged? iqta` of Baran? > rebelled >	? imprisoned > freed? >	?honoured? > rebelled >	proclaimed himself SULTAN in Delhi > submitted & recognised Sultan Mas`ud > received bilad of Nagaur, Mandor & Ajmer + special muqta` of Nagaur & special privileges > Nagaur and Multan >	Multan & Uchch (+ forcibly retained Nagaur) > forced to give up Nagaur > Lost Multan to Qarluqs & then Sher Khan> Lost Uchch to Sher Khan> given Budaun> During Ulugh Khan & Sher Khan's exile: Multan & Uchch > When Ulugh Khan returned, sought Mongol sanctuary > allied with Qutlugh Khan against Ulugh Khan> retained Multan under Mongol shahna protection >
21	II:40-42	MALIK SAIF AL-DIN ARKALI DAD BEG Qipchaq Turk.	?>	Sahm al-Hasham>	amir dad of Karah>	amir dad of Delhi with iqta` of office >	iqta` of Palwal & Kamah & office of dad beg > iqta` of Baran > Kasrak + Mir Dad > Baran >
22	II:42-43	MALIK BADR AL-DIN NUSRAT KHAN SUNQAR SUFI Rumi, Turk from Anatolia.	?>	?>	?>	rebelled against vizier Muhazzab al-Din > Amir of Kol>	Iqta` of Bayana > When Sher Khan moved to Bayana then received Tabarhind, Sunam, Jhajhar, Lakhwal & ferries over R. Beas >
23	II:43-44	MALIK NUSRAT AL-DIN SHER KHAN Ilbari (Yimak) Turk	?>	?>	?>	643/1246 iqta` of fort & environs of Tabarhind>	seized Multan from Qarluqs 648/1250 > seized Uchch from Kushlu Khan 649/1251 > conflict with Ulugh Khan 651/1254, migrated to Mongols > conflict with Taj al-Din Arsalan Khan over Tabarhind > given Kol, Bayana, Balaram, Jalesar, Baltarah, MHR, & Mahawan >

TABLE 4 (continued)

# in Tabaqat 22 ed. Habibi	REFERENCE in Habibi ed.	NAME OF SHAMSI SLAVE ethnic background	DEPLOYMENT OF NOTABLE IN RUKN AL-DIN'S REIGN 633/1236	DEPLOYMENT OF NOTABLE IN RADIYYA'S REIGN 634/1236 - 637/1240	DEPLOYMENT OF NOTABLE IN BAHRAM SHAH'S REIGN 637/1240 - 639/1242	DEPLOYMENT OF NOTABLE IN `ALA AL-DIN'S REIGN 639/1242 - 644/1246	DEPLOYMENT OF NOTABLE IN NASIR AL-DIN'S REIGN 644/1246 - 664/1266
24	II:45-47	MALIK KESHLI KHAN SAIF AL-DIN AI-BEG AL-SULTANI MALIK AL-HUJJAB Ilbari (Yimak) Turk	unchanged? slave in dargah-i khass? >	unchanged? slave in dargah-i khass? >	sar-i jandar>	Amir-i Akhur>	647/1249 Amir Hajib + Nagaur > during Ulugh Khan's exile, 652/1254 Kara> With Ulugh Khan's return: Amir Hajib > with death of Qutub al-Din Hasan Ghuri, 653/1255: Meerut > died 656/1259. Son: `Ala al-Din made Amir Hajib.
25	II:47-89	AL-KHAQAN AL-MU`AZZAM AL-KHAN AL-`AZAM BAHA AL-HAQQ WA AL-DIN ULUGH KHAN BALBAN AL-SULTANI Ilbari (Yimak) Turk Ilbari (Il-bari?) Turk	?> in rebellion > imprisoned >	khasah dar> amir shikar >	Through Badr al-Din Sungar al-Rumi's intervention: iqta` of Rewari > involved in plot to remove Sultan >	iqta` of Hansi> Amir Hajib 642/1244-5>	Amir Hajib > 647/1249 title of Ulugh Khan + na'ib > 651/1253 deposed from power & sent to Hansi > Nagaur > 653/1255 return to power in Delhi > death of Raihan & conflict with Qutlugh & Kushlu Khan > 664/1266 SULTAN OF DELHI>

composition of this retinue.[4] There is little doubt about the fact that the rapid dethronement of the Sultans brought younger princes into the political arena, and they had not had Rukn al-Din's administrative experience or the opportunity to recruit their supporters. Yet, while the ability of the competing Shamsi notables to control and influence the Delhi Sultan increased over time, Iltutmish's heirs still had the capacity to seize the political initiative on a number of occasions.

Amongst the Shamsi notables the most powerful were the bandagan-i Shamsi, the military slaves of Sultan Iltutmish whom we have considered in some detail in an earlier chapter. If we recall, these were slaves who had been purchased, fostered (parwarish), trained, and gradually trusted with the crucial military commands in the Delhi Sultan's dominions. Since they were socially dead and natally alienated they were dependent entirely upon the Sultan's favour, and Iltutmish gave the bandagan the considered treatment worthy of precious investments. Those slaves who had spent the greatest amount of time in his service and with whom he had established ties of trust and affection were given greatest honour and were regarded as the senior slaves, the bandagan-i khass. These slaves could be either given territorial commands or kept in the capi-

4. Ibid, vol. 1, p. 490, vol. 2, p. 29.

tal. Also resident in Delhi were younger slaves who functioned as domestics and pages. Because the dyadic bonds between the master and these pages had not yet been consolidated, they had not been trusted with independent commands, and at least relative to the bandagan-i khass their ties of association with the Delhi Sultan were much weaker.[5]

Iltutmish's death changed the basis upon which ties between slave and master were formulated. The Shamsi bandagan had close dyadic bonds with their master and patron, and while the legal rights of ownership and clientship over the slave were inherited by the son, the ties of affection and loyalty were not transferable. Thus the dependability of the father's slaves as subordinates was a serious question for Rukn al-Din and succeeding Sultans, especially since most of the important commands were in their control.

There was considerable variation in the response of the slaves to Iltutmish's heirs. Some of the bandagan-i khass, like Malik Saif al-Din Ai-Beg (#4 in Table 4), Malik Nusrat al-Din Tayisi (#6 in Table 4), Malik Hindu Khan (#9 in Table 4), remained loyal to the lineage of their master, and continued to serve his successors even when other

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5. Junior slaves who functioned as domestics and pages would carry titles like chatrdar, jandar, khasah dar. See Table 4.

Shamsi slaves rebelled. There were others whose loyalty to Iltutmish was more doubtful and these slaves rebelled after Iltutmish's death. They included, at one extreme, the banda-i khass Kabir Khan Ayaz, who had been disgraced and removed from his appointment by Iltutmish (#2 in Table 4),[6] and on the other, those junior slaves who were pages in the Sultan's court. The ties between such pages like Ulugh Khan (#25 in Table 4) and Iltutmish -- and even more so with his successors -- were still extremely weak, and after their master's death some of them had little hesitation in attempting to seek their fortunes independently.[7] As Juzjani's information makes clear (see Table 4), for the majority of the Shamsi slaves, the death of their master did not mean a change in their fortune. The continuation of the status quo must have been reassuring for it implied that the new incumbent in Delhi would continue to rely upon

6. Kabir Khan had originally been appointed as the muqta\` of Multan, but had been removed by Iltutmish and given the command of Palwal (see the discussion in chapter 2). Juzjani contradicted himself when he mentioned Kabir Khan as the wali (governor) of Multan in his account of Rukn al-Din's reign (vol. 1, pp. 455-6). In his biography of the Shamsi notable, however, Juzjani noted that Kabir Khan had received the command of Sunam from Sultan Rukn al-Din and rebelled sometime after he had received this charge (vol. 2, p. 6). It was only in 637/1239-40 that Kabir Khan reacquired the command of Multan.

7. Ibid, vol. 2, pp. 48, 51. Juzjani only provides information concerning Ulugh Khan. We can infer that his compatriots in rebellion were his peers and because they are not mentioned by name and were resident in Delhi, in all likelihood pages in the court of Iltutmish.

his father's slaves. Thus, while they were not necessarily motivated by any sense of deep affection for their master's heir, they accepted the successor as long as he did not seek to disturb the Shamsid dispensation of power.

The free military notables, on the other hand, were very eager to alter the existing Shamsid dispensation of power. Juzjani recognised the presence of Maliks `Izz al-Din Muhammad Salari and Saif al-Din Kuchi as the respective commanders of Budaun and Hansi in 633/1236, but as we have seen in a previous chapter the free notables as a group were not trusted with high commands.[8] Nor by their actions did they suggest any attachment to the Delhi Sultan or his successors. In a bid to improve their fortunes, they were in almost immediate rebellion against Rukn al-Din.

The other group of free notables, the tajiks, were involved with the secretarial and administrative functions

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8. `Izz al-Din Muhammad Salari had been the most distinguished free Malik in Iltutmish's reign and had held the post of Amir Hajib in 625/1228 (Juzjani, vol. 1, p. 446, and Barani, ed. Khan, p. 39, ed. Rashid, p. 46). Juzjani noted subsequently that in 633/1236, when `Izz al-Din rebelled, he was the muqta` of Budaun. It is unclear when the notable was given this charge. There is no information on Malik Saif al-Din Kuchi from Iltutmish's reign, but Juzjani notes that he was the muqta` of Hansi when Iltutmish died (ibid, vol. 1, p. 456). We can guess that he was a free notable because of the presence of his brother Fakhr al-Din within the Delhi Sultanate (ibid, vol. 1, p. 459). Although there is the example of the two brothers Ulugh Khan and Keshli Khan who were both Shamsi slaves, as Juzjani noted, it was a very unusual coincidence that both were enslaved, sold, and purchased separately by the same master (ibid, vol. 2, pp. 45-6, 48).

of the court and the Sultanate. The tajiks were sometimes involved in military duties, and they did possess their armed retinues,[9] but they seldom made bids to seize power outright. Rukn al-Din had a considerable tajik retinue from his years as governor, and they followed him to Delhi.[10] Their help to the Delhi Sultan in establishing his independent position in Sultanate politics invited the wrath of the Shamsi slaves who decimated their ranks. The tajiks did seek to improve their position in Sultanate politics, but unlike the Shamsi slaves and the free military commanders they seldom acted independently. Their greatest success came when they associated with the free Maliks, but on occasion they did ally with the ambitions of individual slaves.[11]

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9. Note for example the case of Mihtar Jattan Farrash, a banda of the wazir Khwaja Muhazzab al-Din, who in attempting to defend his master wounded the Shamsi commander Taj al-Din Sanjar Kuret Khan (#15 in Table 4). Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 2, p. 27. See also the example of Juzjani cited in chapter 3.

10. It must have been this retinue that was killed by the Shamsi slaves. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 456. S.B.P. Nigam, Nobility under the Sultans of Delhi, p. 28, was correct in assuming this continuity, although his assertion that Rukn al-Din's wazir, `Ain al-Mulk Ash`ari, was given the title Baha al-Mulk Ash`ari, is not borne out by the evidence. The titles do suggest that they might have been kinsmen, certainly members of the same school of law (madhab); see chapter 2 and 3.

11. Note the instance when the wazir Khwaja Muhazzab al-Din associated with the free-Malik Qutub al-Din Hasan Ghuri against the Shamsi bandagan. Both emerged as the most powerful notables in the realm. Earlier Khwaja Muhazzab al-Din associated with the slave Badr al-Din Sunqar (#13 in Table 4). Note also the earlier instance when the wazir Nizam al-Mulk felt threatened, he fled from the Sultan's

To a large extent the authoritarian regimen maintained by Iltutmish left the fate of all of these groups in the balance when the Delhi Sultan died. While most Shamsi slaves wanted the distribution of power and office to continue unchanged, this could only be done in opposition to the interests of Iltutmish's successors, the free notables and tajiks. The biggest challenge to all the Shamsi notables, free and unfree, came from Iltutmish's heirs and their efforts to rule as independently and effectively as their father. In the traditions of the existing political system the status of notables was derived either out of their own efforts -- seized outright -- or it had been dispensed to them by the reigning authority; there were no "nobles". Each generation would see conflict over authoritative rights, and after Iltutmish's death political competition was provoked by his son Rukn al-Din's efforts to consolidate power.

The scant details concerning Rukn al-Din's reign have been repeated by several historians; suffice it to note here that the evidence suggests that the Sultan was almost immediately involved in attempts to consolidate his authority. These were visible in his hostility and execution of

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capital and sought succour with the free Amir `Izz al-Din Muhammad Salari. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, pp. 466-7, 464, 455-6.

siblings, always possible competitors;[12] and reliance upon tajiks who had served him in the past. These do seem insufficient to appear as a challenge to the Shamsi dispensation, but it appears that Rukn al-Din's attempts to search for new supporters went much further. In his description of Rukn al-Din's immoral qualities, certain disqualifications for his continuation as Sultan, Juzjani noted that "to all the mahouts, pilbanan, there was great profit from the Sultan's largesse and kindness, az daulat wa ahsan-i u nasib-i tamam bud.[13] Although no historian has given any importance to these remarks, Juzjani's comments derive significance when placed in the context of Simon Digby's arguments that the war horse and elephant were crucial military resources in the Sultanate. Digby has provided detail to substantiate his argument that the Delhi Sultans invested considerable man power and energy to gain elephants, the "medieval battle tanks".[14] The logic in Digby's arguments can be pushed further, for if elephants were important so too were their mahouts.

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12. Qutub al-Din b. Iltutmish was executed and Ghiyath al-Din Muhammad Shah rebelled in Awadh. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habib, vol. 1, p. 455.

13. Ibid, vol. 1, p. 457.

14. Simon Digby, War Horse and Elephant in the Delhi Sultanate: a Study of Military Supplies (Karachi: Orient Monographs, 1971), pp. 55-82.

There was a consistency in Rukn al-Din efforts to develop this part of the armed forces as an additional prop to his authority. Earlier he had appointed Ikhtiyar al-Din Yuzbeg Tughril Khan (#18 in Table 4), a junior slave, as the shahnagi pilan.[15] The Shamsi bandagan may have eventually felt threatened by Rukn al-Din's favour to the mahouts, a development that the superintendent of the elephant stables would have noticed fairly quickly. Ikhtiyar al-Din's withdrawal and subsequent rebellion together with other Shamsi slaves makes sense if we understand Sultan Rukn al-Din's dispensing favour to a socially unimportant group with considerable military potential as a part of an attempt to challenge the Shamsi slaves' monopoly of power.[16]

Radiyya's accession and the support of the Shamsi notables has often been presented as a restoration of her legitimate rights to accession prescribed in Iltutmish's will. Juzjani does not provide sufficient details to

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15. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 2, p. 30.

16. Writing in the middle of the fifteenth century `Isami, Futuh al-Salatin, had very astutely understood the contradictions in the relationships between the Delhi Sultans and the Shamsi slaves. Concerning Rukn al-Din he wrote: "within three or four months rather than following his father's customs he followed his own conclusions (az rusum-i pidar Shah-i khud rai gasht)...I have heard, that towards his father's slaves, each of whom was a world conqueror, he adopted an angry and arrogant demeanour (khishm wa gardan-kashi saz kard)" (p. 130).

ascertain the validity of this point of view, but certainly Radiyya's accession was convenient from the point of view of the patriarchical sentiments of the day.[17] A Queen in purdah could hardly have been expected to possess the initiative to challenge her father's notables, and there is little doubt that relative to Rukn al-Din, her own retinue must have been less threatening. Nevertheless, despite her disability of not having had the "good fortune of being accounted amongst men (az hisab-i mardan dar khilqat nasibi niuftah bud)", as Juzjani would put it, Radiyya's intentions of establishing her independence of the Shamsi slaves by giving up the purdah and appointing her habashi (Ethiopian) slave Yaqut as commander of the horses (amir akhur) were seen to be threatening enough to warrant her removal.[18] Since the political system and the form in which

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17. One can get an insight into this male-centred universe from the conversations of Nizam al-Din Auliya. Sijzi noted that in his conversations Nizam al-Din recounted many stories concerning the value (thamara) of virtuous (salahiyat) women. It is the word-play here that is interesting for thamara (value, profit) has the associated meaning of fruit and in conjunction with (thamara-)baksh/dar meant fruit-bearing/yielding. The value of women was therefore their procreative, fruit bearing potential, and virtue, salahiyat, was synonymous with their chastity. Male honour, naturally, resided in the protection of their women's chastity. When Nizam al-Din did discover a woman who was a paradigm of virtue he recalled that Baba Farid used to say that she was actually a man whom God had created in the form of a woman! Amir Hasan Sijzi, Fawa'id al-Fu`ad, op. cit., p. 35.

18. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 407.

power was consolidated had not changed since Rukn al-Din's reign, the provocation which led to conflict, rebellion and the ultimate removal of Sultan Radiyya was also very similar.

Nor can we notice any change from the reign of Sultan Mu`izz al-Din Bahram Shah who was chosen by the Shamsi bandagan to replace Radiyya. One would have assumed that the new Sultan would have been unable to challenge the coterie of slaves and tajiks who controlled power in the capital: a slave (#12 in Table 4) had installed himself as regent and brother-in-law of the Sultan, and he received cooperation from the tajik, Khwaja Muhazzab al-Din, who was the wazir.[19] Although Juzjani does not discuss Mu`izz al-Din's supporters at all, his account of the reign of the Sultan recognised that the monarch possessed the wherewithal to have his regent murdered, and his amir hajib (Chamberlain) exiled.[20] The princes of the Shamsi lineage, possible contenders if their cause was espoused by the notables, were also imprisoned.[21] Mu`izz al-Din's hostility towards the overpowering influence of the Shamsi slaves was

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19. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, pp. 462-3.

20. Ibid, vol. 1, p. 464.

21. This must have occured in Mu`izz al-Din's reign, for Juzjani notes that Sultan `Ala al-Din Mas`ud's was released from imprisonment on Bahram Shah's death. Ibid, vol. 1, p. 468.

unmistakeable, and it is in the conflict with his father's bandagan that we come across references to the Delhi Sultan's retinue, led by his own slave, Fakhr al-Din Mubarak Shah Farrukhi. Fakhr al-Din's slave status was evident in his laqab (title) of "Farrash" (carpet spreader, janitor), always used by Juzjani for this notable in a derogatory sense.[22] Fakhr al-Din sought to create an exclusive power base for his master and he spurned Malik Ikhtiyar al-Din Qaraqash (#10 in Table 4) and Ikhtiyar al-Din Yuzbeg's (#18 in Table 4) offer for support and imprisoned the two Shamsi slaves. A sizable support for the Delhi Sultan must have been established, for by Juzjani's own admission the monarch's retinue did put up a strong and prolonged resistance. Nevertheless, in the conflict between members of rival dispensations, Iltutmish's heir succumbed once again.[23]

While the nature of the conflicts in the years 633/1236-639/1239 suggest the persistence of preceding

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22. Ibid, vol. 1, pp. 467-8, vol. 2, pp. 20, 30, 163. Juzjani reported another slave with the title "Farrash" (vol. 2, p. 27). Here the author notes clearly that Mihtar Jattan Farrash was a slave of the wazir Khwaja Muhazzab al-Din. Jackson ignored the example of Fakhr al-Din but included the more doubtful example of `Ala al-Din Mas`ud's support to habshis which is mentioned only in the mid-sixteenth century chronicle of Yahya b. Ahmad Sihrindi, Tarikh-i Mubarakshahi, ed. S.M. Hidayat Hosain (Calcutta: Bibiotheca Indica, 1931), p. 34. Jackson, "Mamluks in Muslim India", op. cit., p. 348, and fn. 39.

23. Ibid.

structures of political relationships and methods of consolidating authority, the conflicts introduced significant changes in the ranks of the Shamsi notables. The heirs of Iltutmish introduced this change by attempting to recruit the support of some Shamsi bandagan and it is interesting to study who received their favours. Amongst the slaves were Ikhtiyar al-Din Yuzbeg (#18 in Table 4), Ikhtiyar al-Din Ai-Tegin (#12 in Table 4), Ikhtiyar al-Din Altunia (#11 in Table 4) and Badr al-Din Sunqar (#13 in Table 4). In Iltutmish's reign they had all been junior slaves, propelled subsequently to the centre of Delhi politics by their master's successors. Each of these slaves had spent some years in service within the Delhi Sultanate but these ties did not bind them to their new patrons. Instead many of them consolidated their own positions by mustering a military retinue. Amongst those recruited by these junior bandagan were the young Shamsi slaves, the least influential within the slave cadre, who had been pages in Iltutmish's court. Rather than seeking the help of the Delhi Sultans who were attempting to create their own exclusive body of supporters, these pages in their own turn sought the support of senior slave members who they were familiar with. The rise to prominence of slaves like Ulugh Khan, who received his first command as muqta` of Rewari because of the fatherly affection (shafaqat-i pidarana) of Badr al-Din

Sunqar, dates from Mu`izz al-Din Bahram Shah's reign.[24]

The rise of the junior slaves to important commands introduced a group into the politics of the court who had considerable military resources and who did not share Iltutmish's vision of the structure of the Delhi Sultanate. Although these slaves had gained power through the patronage of the Delhi Sultans, they were more interested in protecting their own positions. The difference in attitudes is perhaps spelt out most clearly when we notice that the rebellions in this period were all led by junior slaves; the bandagan-i khass remained either supportive to the Sultan or neutral.[25] The difference in the political expectations of the various slaves, in association with their increasingly individualistic ambitions for power, introduced considerable stress and competition between the Shamsi bandagan. As Diya al-Din Barani effectively managed to bring out, the rationale for this conflict lay in the very organisation of the bandagan cadre:

> ...and each one of the bandagan-i Shamsi was the slave of the same master (khwaja tash) and [since] each of the "forty" slaves had become great simultaneously, one would not bow to the other (sar furu ni'awardi) or submit (ita`at) to another. In [the dispersal of] iqta`s, soldiers, honours and territories, they demanded equality and similarity with each

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24. Ibid, vol. 2, p. 52.

25. With the exception of Kabir Khan Ayaz (#2 in Table 4), on whom see above.

> other. Yet, each would boast "none like me". Each would ask the other: "what are you that I am not", and "what have you been that I have not been"...[26]

Once their master was dead, it was a matter of time before the corporate sense of belonging within the slave retinue was replaced by a competition generated by the fact that each regarded himself as the equal of the other. The competition at least in the period between 603/1236-609/1242 did not yet extend beyond efforts at consolidating their individual positions; the next phase would see outright conflict between notables.

The efforts of the junior bandagan at consolidating their support is also visible in their relationship with the ambitious free notables who were attempting to improve their fortunes. In their bid to alter the dispensation of power the free Amirs rebelled against Delhi, and although the early conflicts were ostensibly between the free military notables and the Sultan, it was actually directed against the Shamsi bandagan who had effective control of

26. Barani, Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi, ed. Khan, p. 28, ed. Rashid, p. 33. Barani's history summarised developments which occured between Iltutmish's death and Balban's accession. As a result, his analysis of the reasons for the conflict between notables often needs to be contextualised from the information present in Juzjani. For example, when Barani mentioned the "forty slaves", Chihilgani, he was not referring to Iltutmish's original bandagan-i khass, but those slaves who had subsequently become powerful like the khass slaves of yore. In a similar sense, the decline in the corporate sentiments of the bandagan-i Shamsi was in evidence from Bahram Shah's reign and onwards.

power within the Sultanate. Juzjani recognised this when he noted that "between the Turk Amirs [read bandagan] who supported the stirrup of sovereignty and the disaffected [free] Amirs repeated conflict occurred".[27]

The defeat and death of most of the powerful free notables, however, did not curb the ambitions of this group. Since the organisation of the Shamsi bandagan had started altering, free Amirs collaborated with some of these slaves in their common bid to improve their fortunes.[28] In Bahram Shah's reign, the slaves Ikhtiyar al-Din Ai-Tegin and Altunia (#s 12 and 11 in Table 4) together with the wazir Khwaja Muhazzab al-Din controlled power.[29] Later Badr al-Din Sunqar (#13 in Table 4) sought to ally with the wazir in a bid to depose the Sultan. The free notables had not forsaken their ambitions for final authority, but rather than achieving this through military conflict with the Shamsi slaves they sought to reach the same ends through their alliances, or in a more conspiratorial

27. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 458. See also vol. 2, p. 36, where Juzjani was clearer about the identities of the contending parties: "Maliks [Saif al-Din] Kuchi and [`Ala al-Din] Jani and Sultan Radiyya and the Turk Amirs who were Shamsi slaves in the service of Radiyya's court".

28. The evidence contradicts Barani's more general statement that because of the weakness of Iltutmish's successors, the Shamsi bandagan were destroying the free notables. See Barani, Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi, ed. Khan, p. 27, ed. Rashid, p. 32.

29. Ibid, vol. 1, p. 463, 462.

manner. The attempts of the wazir Khwaja Muhazzab al-Din and the free Amir, Qutub al-Din Hasan Ghuri to create discord between the Sultan and the slaves was eminently successful and Bahram Shah was deposed.

In his recent study of this period, Peter Jackson has wondered why the Sultanate survived after the removal of Bahram Shah by the Shamsi slaves.[30] He did have cause to wonder. In 639/1242 all the remaining Shamsi princes were very young and in prison. Iltutmish's banda-i khass, Malik `Izz al-Din Kushlu Khan, finally took the step that no slave had dared, and declared himself Sultan of Delhi. Yet, the slaves unanimously opposed this development and raised Rukn al-Din's son `Ala al-Din Mas`ud to the throne.[31] The reason why the Shamsi lineage was continued with lies in the role that the Delhi Sultan was expected to play in a new structure of power relationships noticeable in the years between 639/1242 and 653/1255.

30. Peter Jackson, "Mamluks in Muslim India", op. cit., p. 352.

31. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 468. Juzjani (vol. 2, p. 36) identified the Maliks who repudiated Kushlu Khan's claims as: Ikhtiyar al-Din Ai-Tegin-i Kuhram (#10 in Table 4?), Taj al-Din Sanjar Qultuq (#15 in Table 4), and Nusrat al-Din Ai-Tamar (?).

II The Shamsi notables and the
Delhi Sultan, 639/1242-653/1255:

In the preceding phase the Shamsi notables, free and slave, had been in conflict with Iltutmish' successors over who should possess preeminent power in the Sultanate. Although the Shamsi slaves had, with very few exceptions, emerged victorious in these conflicts, the attempts of the Delhi Sultans to extend their influence through their circle of dependents cannot be dismissed. In contrast to the degree of influence that the Delhi Sultans had possessed in the years 633/1236-639/1242, `Isami noted about Sultan Nasir al-Din 644/1246-664/1266:

> [He] sought the goodwill of the army chiefs and cordially wished each one of them well. He did not take any decision (ra'y zadi) without their knowledge (be `ilm-i shan), or moved a foot without their orders (na be hukm-i shan dast wa pa'y zadi). He did not drink a drop of water, nor sleep a moment without their knowledge (be `ilm-i shan)....[32]

No preceding Sultan from the Shamsi lineage had been pictured in this way, and although `Isami's report of Nasir al-Din's subservience to his "masters" was undoubtedly tinged with exaggeration, yet his account does bring out the impact that the decline of the Delhi Sultan had on observers a century later.

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32. `Isami, Futuh al-Salatin, ed. Usha, p. 146.

The incarceration of the Shamsi princes during Bahram Shah's reign had a great deal to do with their weak political positions as Sultans. Unlike the preceding monarchs who had their own retinues when they ascended the throne, removal from the political arena had denied `Ala al-Din Mas`ud and Nasir al-Din the opportunity to recruit a following.[33] By contrast, the Shamsi notables in power had consolidated their position in the years of conflict after Iltutmish's reign and their influence in Delhi was complete. The increase in the level of competition between the military slaves was also an important reason why the Shamsi bandagan persisted with the lineage of their master. In a

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33. By the end of his reign, `Ala al-Din Mas`ud made some efforts to regain command. Writing in the middle of the fifteenth century, Yahya Ahmad Sihrindi, Tarikh-i Mubarakshahi, ed. Hosain, p. 34, explained that it was the Sultan's favour to Ethiopian slaves (habshis) that turned the Shamsi notables against him. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 2, p. 56, noted that the Sultan's disposition (mizaj) changed (paziraft) towards the notables, he withdrew from the army and was inclined to rebellion. Elsewhere (vol. 1, pp. 471-2) he noted that some worthless people (na-kasan) encouraged the Sultan's rebellious inclinations. `Isami, Futuh al-Salatin, ed. Usha, pp. 143-4, concluded that the Sultan's rebellious inclinations were provoked by greater self confidence after his success against the Mongols (643/1245-6). The evidence of Sihrindi, Juzjani and `Isami would suggest the presence of trends noticed in the last phase, but for the fact that no conflict between the Sultan's supporters and the Shamsi notables reportedly occured. The Sultan was replaced by his uncle through the mutual agreement of the Shamsis. It is doubtful if `Ala al-Din had a military retinue; he was certainly disaffected with his situation and `Isami is probably right in ascribing a greater self confidence in the monarch after the Mongol campaigns. The Sultan's disaffection might have been used by individuals who were marginalised in the distribution of power in the court.

political climate where the sentiments of belonging to one house az yek khana, and one threshold, az yek asitana was unable to obviate conflict between Shamsi slaves, the overriding concern was of precedence over one's peer.[34] Juzjani had sensed the change in this period when he commented:

> Never could there be a more amazing case than this, for they were all alike of one purse and messmates of one dish, ba-ham az yek kisa wa ham namak bar yek kasa, between whom accursed Satan had brought forth such discord, tafriqa zahir shud.[35]

The change in the political climate also made itself evident in the fact that most of the conflicts in this period involved the Shamsi notables directly. Their quest for preeminence led them into conflict with each other, but the fact that there was a balance of power between the contenders, at least until 653/1255, meant that the Delhi Sultan still had a relevance. As long as he occupied the throne of Delhi, no Amir could claim to be Sultan and, by virtue of that fact, senior to his peers. Thus, Malik `Izz al-Din Kushlu Khan's attempt to become Sultan was quickly neutralised by the Shamsi slaves.

34. Ibid, vol. 2, p. 38. Juzjani recorded these statements in the context of the conflict between Sher Khan and Malik Kushlu Khan.

35. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, vol. 2, p. 73. Peter Jackson, "Mamluks in Muslim India", p. 351. I have used Jackson's translation of the passage.

A compromise to avoid conflict between Shamsi notables was attempted briefly after `Ala al-Din's accession when the Shamsi slaves, still the dominant political element, associated with free born notables. In the new dispensation of authority in the capital, the slave Ikhtiyar al-Din Qaraqash became the amir hajib (#10 in Table 4), and the free notables Qutub al-Din Hasan and Khwaja Muhazzab al-Din, the na'ib and wazir respectively. Such a distribution of power depended upon a deliberate limitation of authority by the powerful notables a presumption shown to be naive when Khwaja Muhazzab al-Din assumed regal airs and attempted to marginalise the Turk slaves.[36]

After the murder of Khwaja Muhazzab and his supporters, the competition between the notables in Delhi turned into an open conflict for precedence. The Shamsi slaves in these conflicts can be arranged into two major groups, the first led by the banda Ulugh Khan (#25 in Table 4) and the second which came to include the Shamsi slaves `Imad al-Din Raihan, Malik Kashlu Khan, and Qutlugh Khan. While Ulugh Khan's group appears in Juzjani's account as the more powerful one, we should not undermine the extent of `Imad al-Din Raihan's support. Certainly judging from the years that the two groups controlled power in Delhi (Ulugh Khan: 642/1244-5 to Shawwal 650/December 1253, and from Di'l

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36. Ibid, vol. 1, pp. 468-9.

Q`ada 652/January 1255 onwards; Raihan: 651/1254 to 652/1254) Ulugh Khan was the more dominant; yet Raihan showed himself capable of deposing him at his height of power. The conflict between the two camps has received considerable attention from scholars, of more interest here is a study of the notables, and the composition of the rival groups for what it tells us about the changes in the military elites in the Delhi Sultanate.

We have fewer details about Raihan's group, but the available information suggests that it included notables cobbled together not because of any sense of loyalty towards Raihan but purely because they shared the common goal of opposing Ulugh Khan. Important in the group were the Shamsi banda-i khass `Izz al-Din Kushlu Khan (#20 in Table 4), and Qutlugh Khan, a junior Shamsi slave, and Raihan himself, a eunuch, about the same age as his rival Ulugh Khan. Associated as subordinates were individuals like `Izz al-Din Balban Yuzbegi, the son-in-law of Qutlugh Khan, who was appointed na'ib-i amir hajib when the group seized power, and Prince Rukn al-Din, son of Nasir al-Din who was given the post of Amir Hajib.[37] In deposing Ulugh Khan and his followers, Raihan's group were successful in

37. Ibid, vol. 2, p. 64. `Izz al-Din was also the son of Ikhtiyar al-Din Yuzbeg who was at this time governor of Lakhnauti. It is important to note that all these individuals were not allied together at the same time; Malik Kushlu Khan and Qutlugh support became apparent after Raihan's coup against Ulugh Khan had already begun.

their goal of "removing each of the officers who had gained privilege through Ulugh Khan's patronage".[38] Raihan's group had several powerful figures, authority within the group was diffuse, and the alliance was sustained purely as a counter to a political challenge perceived individually by the various notables. In this sense, members of Raihan's group were very much in line with the traditions of political associations of the period.

Many of the notables who originally united with Ulugh Khan against Raihan were very similiar to their antagonists in background and motivation. They too were associated for the specific purpose of removing Raihan or the titular monarch Nasir al-Din. Amongst the original confederates were Malik Taj al-Din Sanjar Arsalan Khan (#19 in Table 4), and the Sultan's brother, Prince Jalal al-Din Mas`ud. Of these Prince Jalal al-Din was merely being used as a threat to coerce Sultan Nasir al-Din, and once Raihan was defeated, Jalal al-Din was ignored and left to reside in Lahore.[39] Malik Taj al-Din was senior to the other supporters of Ulugh Khan, he had also been previously favoured

38. Ibid, vol. 2, p. 64: "har shughl dari keh batarbiyat-i Ulugh Khani ikhtisas dasht, jumleh ra tabdil farmud."

39. Ibid, vol. 1, p. 489.

by Raihan,[40] and his loyalty to Delhi, as we will see, would continue to be uncertain.

Ulugh Khan's support, however, also consisted of a very stable element of notables, who felt that their fortunes were mutually interrelated. These included his brother Saif al-Din Keshli Khan (#24 in Table 4), and notables like Saif al-Din Ikit Khan Ai-Beg (#16 in Table 4), and Taj al-Din Sanjar Tarkhan (#17 in Table 4).[41] These were all junior slaves who had become important in the politics of the Sultanate only in `Ala al-Din Mas`ud's reign, coincident with Ulugh Khan's own rise to importance in the Delhi court. At least in Nasir al-Din's reign they owed their appointments to Ulugh Khan. Together with these Shamsi bandagan Ulugh Khan also introduced his own slaves into the ranks of military elites of the Delhi Sultanate. Ikhtiyar al-Din Ai-Tegin Mui-Daraz was appointed as the na'ib-i amur akhur (deputy commander of the horses)[42] and his banda-i

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40. Ibid, vol. 1, p. 487, vol. 2, 34.

41. Ibid, vol. 1, p. 488-9 on Ikit Khan's support to Ulugh Khan.

42. Ibid, vol. 2, p. 60. In the Habibi edition the name is transcribed Ikhtiyar al-Din Ai-Beg Muidaraz, but see fn. 11, for the variant Ai-Tegin. The slave is the same as Amin Khan Ai-Tegin Mui-daraz mentioned in Barani, Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi, ed. Khan, pp. 24, 83-4, ed. Rashid, pp. 29, 98.

khass, Qara Jamak, was entrusted with delicate diplomatic negotiations between contending Shamsi slaves.[43]

All contenders to political power in the past had associated similar individuals in their groups, and Ulugh Khan was not unique in that sense. Yet, no Shamsi Malik had been successful in introducing so many rank outsiders inside the privileged circle of court elites. Ulugh Khan's supporters were very different from Raihan's associates because they had sufficient internal solidarity for observers to start identifying them as a group. Members of this group were not dependent upon the Delhi Sultan for their position, but owed their status to Ulugh Khan. Whereas Raihan's group were bound by self interest in opposing Ulugh Khan, and not by the ties of being servants of one master, Ulugh Khan's followers thought of themselves as being khwaja tash, only they did not have Iltutmish as their master in mind. By 653/1255 it was the Ghiyathi group of notables (supporters of Ulugh Khan, the future Sultan Ghiyath al-Din) that emerged as the most powerful group in the Delhi court.

In the areas outside Delhi the Shamsi notables, however, still commanded power. As early as 637/1240 Malik Kabir Khan Ayaz (#2 in Table 4) had broken away from Delhi, and taken the title of Sultan. Yet, Kabir Khan Ayaz, disgraced by Iltutmish, disaffected under his early succes-

43. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 2, p. 67.

sors, was a special case, and one can doubt the strength of his attachment to the Delhi Sultanate. He had managed to establish his effective independence in the Sindh region and his son Taj al-Din Abu Bakr Ayaz had succeeded him to the throne.[44] Both Kabir Khan and Taj al-Din's dependents continued to control areas of Sindh after the death of their master. Juzjani refers to Taj al-Din's eunuch, Mukhlis al-Din, and Kabir Khan's slave, Aq-Sunqar, who were respectively the kotwal and amir dad of Uchch in 643/1245-6.[45] In a similar fashion, while the competition between the Shamsi notables and the Delhi Sultan raged between the years 633/1236 and 639/1242, the governor of Lakhnauti ruled unchanged and in virtual autonomy. Unlike Kabir Khan, however, Malik `Izz al-Din Tughan Khan (#7 in Table 4), the governor of Lakhnauti continued to acknowledge the Delhi Sultan who in turn never interfered in his principality.[46]

From 639/1242, conflicts between the Shamsi slaves started spilling over into the wings of the Delhi Sultanate. If in the conflicts in the court the Delhi Sultan was only a nominal figure, he was virtually irrelevant in the regional competition between notables.

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44. Ibid, vol. 2, pp. 6-7.

45. Ibid, vol. 2, p. 54. See especially fn. 5, and Habib's record of the reading from a variant manuscript. The variant manuscript presents the relationship of the slaves to their individual masters more clearly.

46. Ibid, vol. 2, pp. 13-4.

Coincident with the change in the Delhi Sultan's authority after `Ala al-Din's accession, Malik Tughan Khan seized the territories of Awadh and Kara. These areas were still regarded as an integral part of the Delhi court, and preceding monarchs had made appointments in the region. Now, in `Ala al-Din's reign, their conquests by a notable who claimed to be a subordinate of the Delhi Sultan provoked no reactions from the capital at all.[47] More interestingly, when Tughan Khan did request aid from Delhi, Malik Tamar Khan (#8 in Table 4), the leader of the relief forces, went beyond his brief. He seized Lakhnauti, deposed Tughan Khan, and between 642/1244 and 644/1246 commanded and ruled the region without any check on his authority, lashkar kashi wa kamrani kard.[48] The ability of the Shamsi bandagan to seize political initiative to improve their positions was hardly a unique instance in this period, nor was the fact that this drove them into conflict with each other. But that Delhi, the Qubbat al-Islam, could have such little relevance in the lives of slaves raised to serve the Delhi Sultan, suggested a spatial dimension to the conflict within the Shamsi notables, where the sentiment of the "contiguous Sultanate" was getting to be an anachronism. And indeed at a later date the slave Ikhtiyar al-Din Yuzbeg

47. Ibid, vol. 1, p. 469, vol. 2, p. 14.

48. Ibid, vol. 2, p. 18.

(#18 in Table 4) established his independence in Lakhnauti as Sultan Mughith al-Din Yuzbeg.[49]

Lakhnauti was not a unique area where conflicts of this nature were occurring; they were as visible in the areas of Multan, Uchch and Nagaur. The Delhi Sultan's authority in this area had already suffered because of Kabir Khan's independence, but it was further complicated by the presence of Ulugh Khan's competitor, Malik Kushlu Khan (#20 in Table 4), and the incursions of the Qarluqs, Mongols, and recalcitrant autochthones. The Delhi forces under Ulugh Khan frequently intervened in the region because of the Mongol threat.[50] But despite this supervision the Shamsi

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49. G. Yazdani, "The Inscriptions of the Turk Sultans of Delhi -- Mu`izz al-Din Bahram, `Ala'u-d-Din Mas`ud, Nasir al-Din Mahmud, Ghiyathu-d-Din Balban and Mu`izzu-d-Din Kaiqubad" Epigraphica Indo-Moslemica (1913-14), pp. 19-22, has made a plausible argument that Jalal al-Din Mas`ud Shah Malik Jani must have controlled Lakhnauti sometime around 647/1249 (the date of his inscription in Malda). Subsequently Malik Tamar Khan (#8 in Table 4) possessed independent power in the region. The year of Yuzbeg's accession is unclear, but it must have occured sometime after 644/1246 and the death of Malik Tamar Khan. As a coin dated 653/1255 suggests Ikhtiyar al-Din had taken the title of Sultan Mughith al-Din Yuzbeg sometime around the first half of Nasir al-Din's reign. H. Nelson Wright, Catalogue of the Coins in the Indian Museum Calcutta including the Cabinet of the Asiatic Society of Bengal (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907), vol. 2, p. 146, and Part II, plate I, #6. Sultan Mughith al-Din must have died sometime just before 657/1259 when his son `Izz al-Din Balban Yuzbegi was defeated and deposed by Taj al-Din Sanjar Arsalan Khan. See Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 2, p. 34.

50. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, pp. 479, 486, vol. 2, p. 56. Campaigns took place in 643/1245-6, Rajab 644/November 1246, Sh`aban 646/November 1248, and Shawwal 650/December 1252.

slaves in Multan and Uchch were regularly in conflict with each other, again without any interference from the Delhi court. The case of `Izz al-Din Kushlu Khan (#20 in Table 4) is telling. After having lost Multan to the Qarluqs, Uchch was seized from him by Malik Sher Khan (#23 in Table 4). Sher Khan was not punished for his impertinence, nor was Kushlu Khan restored to his lost command. Lest it be assumed that Sher Khan was not chastised because he was Ulugh Khan's cousin, we need to note Juzjani's information that during Ulugh Khan's exile in Nagaur there was conflict between the two kinsmen. This must have been serious enough to cause Sher Khan to seek sanctuary with the Mongols.[51] Ironically by the late 1240's and early 1250's, political conflict between members of the Shamsi dispensation had reached such a stage that for notables like Sher Khan, Kushlu Khan and Iltutmish's own son Jalal al-Din Mas`ud, the Mongol dominions, and not Delhi, provided sanctuary.

The semblance of the Shamsi order was breaking down as the military notables seized political initiative. Yet, Shamsi slaves had always possessed considerable initiative for independent military action, but during Iltutmish's reign this freedom had not gone beyond their right to lead plunder raids into areas in the neighbourhood of their gar-

51. Ibid. For the clearest account see vol. 2, p. 44. The event is also described in vol. 1, p. 487. The hostility between the two continued after Ulugh Khan became Sultan. See below.

rison camps. In the period between 633/1236 and 639/1242 the Shamsi slaves had fought with competitors over the control of Delhi and they had consolidated their own iqta`s. For the first time, in the period between 639/1242 and 653/1255, Delhi was immaterial to these commanders. Their interests centered more around specific territorial units which they sought to convert into autonomous appanages, where their own interests and local political compulsions influenced their decisions. Delhi, and its Sultan, was not the paramount authority in the lives of these notables, who were hardly Shamsi anymore.

III The Ghiyathi[52] dispensation, 653/1255-685/1286:

Ulugh Khan's restoration to power in 653/1255 did not mark the end of the competition for the control of Delhi. Conflict between Ulugh Khan and his rivals dragged on until 655/1257 and it occurred over a swathe of territory including the regions of Budaun, Bharaich, Awadh, Kara, Manikpur, Santur, Mansurpur and Samana. By the time that the military conflicts dragged to a close in 658/1260, Ulugh Khan's

52. This was the nisba of affiliation taken by at least one slave who identified himself in an inscription dated 684/1285 as Qutlugh Sultani Ghiyathi. See G. Yazdani, "The Inscriptions of the Turk Sultans of Delhi", op. cit., # XV, plate XIIIb (Inscription from a mosque in Sakit), pp. 28-29. "Balbani" is one of the alternative forms used by Barani.

rivals had been removed from Delhi -- Raihan was dead, Qutlugh Khan and Kushlu Khan had fled to the Mongols -- and the capital had also been protectively encircled by his followers in their new military commands.

In the areas east of Delhi, Malik Taj al-Din Sanjar Tarkhan (#17 in Table 4), a Shamsi slave "particularly devoted to [Ulugh Khan's] interest and friendship (bakhidamt wa hawadari)", was given the command of Budaun. Taj al-Din Arsalan Khan (#19 in Table 4), who had transferred his allegiance from Raihan to Ulugh Khan, was appointed governor of Awadh.[53] Adjacent to Delhi, Ulugh Khan's brother Malik Keshli Khan (#24 in Table 4), the newly appointed amir hajib (Chamberlain), was given the charge of Meerut which he extended up to Roorkee and Miapur (?, Malhipur?). To the west of Delhi, Malik Badr al-Din Nusrat Khan Sunqar Sufi (#22 in Table 4), who had joined Ulugh Khan in the conflict with Kushlu Khan, was rewarded with the command of Tabarhind, Sunam, Jhajjar, Lakhwal (? near Dipalpur?) and the ferries over the River Beas. The areas adjacent to Delhi and to the south-west, Hansi and Rewari, Sirsa, Barwala, and Jind (the Siwalikh ter-

53. This was a transitory appointment and when Arsalan Khan showed signs of dissatisfaction he was sent to Kara. It is from Kara that he marched into Lakhnauti. When Arsalan Khan was removed from Awadh, Taj al-Din Tarkhan (#17 in Table 4), was given Awadh. See Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 2, pp. 34-5, 29.

ritories)[54] were the personal command of Ulugh Khan, where, as Juzjani reported, the future Sultan had muta`alliqan wa khuddam, administrators and servants (slaves?) in each town, qasbat, and fort.[55] To the south, Sher Khan (#23 in Table 4) was mollified with a large command extending from Gwalior, Mahaban, MHR, Jalesar, Balaram, Bayana and into Kol.[56]

There is little doubt that from 653/1255 onwards, Delhi under Ulugh Khan started reasserting its power in north India. This was no easy task for the Shamsi notables had possessed considerable political initiative during the last two decades. In fact one of the interesting developments that occurred during the years of conflict between notables, was that in their efforts to establish locally stable power bases the Amirs and Maliks had gained the support of the autochthon rulers. Whereas in Iltutmish's reign military hostility went together with economic and cultural interchange, in the years of conflict between Ulugh Khan

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54. The extent of Ulugh Khan's iqta` are clarified by Juzjani, vol. 2, p. 71.

55. Ibid, vol. 2, p. 61.

56. There is evidence of competition between Sher Khan and Ulugh Khan, see above for one instance. He was also in conflict with Taj al-Din Arsalan Khan over the latter's appointment in Tabarhind which were Sher Khan's early commands. Ulugh Khan adjudicated between the two and Sher Khan received Gwalior etc., and Arsalan Khan was given Awadh. Badr al-Din was then given Tabarhind. Ibid, vol. 2, pp. 44, 34, 43.

and other Shamsi notables, the relationship of the indigenes with the Sultanate military commanders had altered to the extent that they provided sanctuary to one of the contending parties in an internecine quarrel. There is not a great deal of information on this subject in the literature of the period, but the two examples that we possess are important in enabling us to contextualise the problems facing Balban when he sought to establish a paramount Delhi Sultanate once again.

The first example concerns Qutlugh Khan, a rival of Ulugh Khan who had set up his base in Awadh after he had been expelled from Delhi. When Qutlugh Khan found it impossible to continue conflict with Ulugh Khan in Awadh (655/ 1257), he marched through the mawas (difficult, inhospitable terrain) until he came to Santur (capital of Sirmur) in the foothills of the Himalyas. There he received assistance from indigenes, and their King Rana Ribal/Dibal/Ranbal (?). Juzjani explained that it was the custom amongst those indigenes to offer sanctuary, `adat-i an jama`at muhafazat-i multajiyan budi. He further explained that Qutlugh Khan, a powerful notable had claims, haquq-i thabit dasht, on all the people, so that wherever he went, he received assistance.[57] Between the indigene willingness to render sanctuary and the "moral accounts"

57. Ibid, vol. 2, pp. 71-2.

owed to the Shamsi slave, Qutlugh Khan managed to escape Ulugh Khan. Not so, however, Rana Ribal (?), who "suffered a severe chastisement", plunder of his capital and destruction of his market (bazargah) for the assistance rendered to an enemy of Delhi.[58]

This is a particularly well-documented case and it helps to enlarge upon some other similar instances which are mentioned more briefly in Juzjani. After Ulugh Khan's restoration and successful campaigns against Qutlugh and Kushlu Khan, some of his supporters became anxious of his increasing authority. Prominent amongst them were Taj al-Din Arsalan and Jalal al-Din Mas`ud Jani (referred here by his other title Qilich Khan).[59] In 656/1258 these Shamsi notables had hesitated to muster their forces in the campaigns against the Mongols, and Ulugh Khan decided to lead a campaign against them before they actually rebelled. Interestingly enough, Ulugh Khan's campaigns in the Kara and Manikpur region were not initially directed against the Shamsi notables, but against the local Kings, ranagan, of

58. Ibid, vol. 2, p. 72.

59. Although Arsalan Khan was one of Ulugh Khan's confederates against Raihan and his associates, yet Sher Khan and he were the only individuals who had advanced in their careers without Ulugh Khan's patronage. They regarded each other as peers and did not willingly accept Ulugh Khan's authority. Finally, in 657/1259 Arsalan Khan broke away from Delhi marched into Lakhnauti, defeated and killed `Izz al-Din Balban Yuzbegi and established his independent base. Ibid, vol. 2, pp. 34-5, 77-78, and below.

the region who were "severely punished". As a result, Arsalan and Mas`ud Jani did not offer resistance to the Delhi forces. They dispersed, sent their troopers and dependents into the mawasat for shelter, and then commenced negotiations with the Delhi forces.[60]

Mawas, (plural, mawasat) as Hodivala has eminently shown, was a difficult terrain outside the control of the Sultanate, but which was "a natural fastness" for the indigenes. As Hodivala has also detailed, mawas had the associated sense of "disturbed, troubled territory" which Habib, in his study of the Sultanate economy, translated as "rebellious areas".[61] These were "disturbed" or "rebellious" only from the Sultanate point of view, however. In the conflict between Shamsi notables, especially in the context of a reassertive Delhi under Ulugh Khan, the mawas was also a place of sanctuary for Shamsi notables. Certainly as the examples of both Qutlugh Khan and Arsalan Khan's associates suggest, in the years of conflict in the post-Iltutmish period, Shamsi notables had built up their own network of alliances to consolidate their local power.

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60. Ibid, vol. 2, p. 76: badarurat-i khayl wa atba` ra dar miyan-i mawasat firistadand.

61. Hodivala, Studies in Indo-Muslim History, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 226-229. Hodivala's explanation of mawas cannot be improved: "....Mawas was a tract or district which was a sort of sanctuary or place of refuge on account of the physical features which made it a natural fastness...[where]... indigenes had retreated...". Irfan Habib, "Slavery" in The Cambridge Economic History, vol. 1, p. 90.

In a transformation of an earlier limited dialogue between the urban militia and the country, these networks of alliances spread out to include ranagan, the autochthones. Other than overcoming the challenge of the Shamsi notables, it was the possibility of a "Rana-Malik" combine that Ghiyath al-Din Balban had to counter to make Delhi paramount in north India once again.

It is unfortunate that we are unable to detail the process through which Ulugh Khan emerged as Sultan Ghiyath al-Din Balban. We know from Barani that competition between "Shamsi, Nasiri and some Balbani Maliks" continued into the early years of Balban's reign.[62] Yet, since no source covers the crucial years between 658/1260 and 664/1266 we can only surmise from Balban's relations with his notables about the potential threats that must have existed to his authority. There is sufficient evidence to understand the manner in which Balban consolidated his authority, and this information has been used to ascertain the changes that occurred in the elites and the structure of the Sultanate during the reign of the Sultan 664/1266-685/1286.

There is little doubt that the privileged place within the Ghiyathi dispensation was occupied by the slaves of the Sultan. Barani sought to convey their status and proximity to the monarch through his descriptions of the court where

62. Barani, Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi, ed. Khan, p. 119, ed. Rashid, p. 140.

the ranks of slave officers, together with the junior pages surrounded the Sultan.[63] The slaves were military elites, many of whom were kept as a protective force in Delhi and with whom the Sultan ritually went on military maneuvers disguised as hunting expeditions. The falconers, khasadaran wa mihtaran-i shikaradar, mentioned by Barani who were a part of the "hunting expeditions" were junior slaves.[64] Balban himself had been a khasadar in Iltutmish's reign. Included in the hunting expeditions were also "a thousand" senior slaves, yek hazar banda-yi qadim. This would seem to be an opportune moment to train junior slaves, and build up a bond of association within the slave cadre.[65]

Certainly, the notion of seniority within the bandagan cadre, based upon intimacy with the master was apparent to Barani. Concerning Malik Ikhtiyar al-Din Begtars, Barani reported that "of all the slaves close to Sultan Balban none was more senior or trusted", az Malik Begtars...hich

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63. Ibid, ed. Khan, p. 30, ed. Rashid, pp. 35-6.

64. In one such "hunting" expedition against the recalcitrant Meos near Delhi, Barani noted that the slave "Yek-Lakhi" was killed. The name is unclear. If it is derived from lak, 100,000, then the slave name "One Hundred Thousand" (of ?) would have reflected the price paid for him by the Sultan. Barani, however, calls him bandagan-i khass, which is unlikely for the slave would have been remembered by his title and not mentioned with so much informality. Ibid, ed. Khan, p. 57, ed. Rashid, p. 67.

65. Ibid, ed. Khan, p. 55, ed. Rashid, p. 64.

banda nazdik-i Sultan khwasstar wa mahramtar na bud.[66] Many of Sultan Balban's senior slaves must have served him while he had been Khan. The banda Ikhtiyar al-Din Ai-Tegin Mui-daraz, was appointed amir akhur in the dispersal of honours in 647/1249.[67] When his master became Sultan he was entitled Amin Khan and given the charge of Awadh. Unfortunately, in the absence of a chronicler like Juzjani, we are unable to follow the careers of the Ghiyathi slaves over a period of time. Despite this lacuna in our information, we can tell from the charges under their command, that Balban, very much in the tradition of the period, reposed considerable trust in them. Awadh was given to the bandagan Amin Khan Aitegin Mui-daraz and Haybat Khan in succession.[68] Before his death Malik Baq Baq was the muqta\` of Budaun, Malik Sewinch Sarjandar the commander in Sunam and Samana, and from his inscription we know that Ikhtiyar al-Din Begtars commanded Garhmuktesar.[69] Finally, before

66. Ibid, ed. S.A. Khan, p. 61, ed. Rashid, p. 71.

67. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 2, p. 60.

68. Ibid, ed. Khan, pp. 83, 40, ed. Rashid, pp. 98, 48.

69. Ibid, ed. Khan, pp. 40, 85, ed. Rashid, pp. 48, 99-100, and G. Yazdani, "The Inscriptions of the Turk Sultans of Delhi", op. cit., pp. 28-29. Rashid noted, p. 100, fn. 1, that in a variant manuscript the Malik's name is spelt SIWNJ. Although both he and Khan both favoured SWNJ (Sonj) as the Malik's name, I have followed Jackson, The Mongols and India, p. 104, in reading the Malik's name as Sewinch which is closer to the Turkish form.

the provinces were appanaged to the princes, Tughril had the charge of the province of Lakhnauti.[70]

It was apparent to observers that the Ghiyathi bandagan were a powerful element in the political dispensation of the Sultan. When Barani substantiated his statement that Balban did not distinguish between high and low when enforcing justice, he uniformly chose the examples of elite slaves as examples of how even the powerful were punished. Thus, the slave Baq Baq, despite his power and position was executed for a crime against a lowly farrash (janitor), and Haibat Khan escaped a similar fate by paying blood money.[71] The execution and punishment meted out to the senior Ghiyathi slaves should not make us doubt their value as subordinate, dependable servants of the Sultan. Instead, Barani's evidence confirms that military slaves were repositories of power and authority during Balban's reign, and his examples also serve to remind us of the extreme alienation and dependency of slaves. Since bandagan were property, distanced from free society, and solely dependent upon their master, they had little social and legal protection other than the one provided by their corporate group. This protection was frequently insufficient to protect bandagan from the whim of their owner, and as in the

70. Ibid, ed. Khan, p. 82, ed. Rashid, p. 96.

71. Ibid, ed. Khan, pp. 40-1, ed. Rashid, pp. 47-8.

case of the Ghiyathi slaves, even sudden and violent death. As the case of Malik Amin Khan Mui-daraz brings out, the bandagan were ideal tools for the making of political power. Balban had raised him until he was the governor of Awadh and one of the most powerful commanders in the Sultanate. This was at the Sultan's pleasure, however; Balban's displeasure was sufficient to warrant the slave's immediate removal and execution.[72]

While we should not diminish the important role of the Ghiyathi slaves in Balban's organisation of political authority, we must remember that the Delhi Sultan also favoured several other groups as well. It has been frequently assumed that Balban's rise to prominence meant the end of the Shamsi notables in the Delhi court.[73] This was certainly true insofar that a large number of Balban's early Shamsi supporters died of old age. Of his allies in 655/1257, Malik Keshli Khan, Taj al-Din Arsalan, and in all likelihood, Badr al-Din Nusrat Khan as well, were dead. Barani further noted that the Shamsi notables feared for their lives since, after his succession, Balban was poison-

72. Ibid, ed. Khan, pp. 82-84, ed. Rashid, pp. 96-99.

73. K.A. Nizami, "Sultan Balban and Kaiqubad: (vi) Balban and the Turkish nobility" in A Comprehensive History of India: The Delhi Sultanat, pp. 285-6; idem, Religion and Politics in India, pp. 143-5; Jackson, "Mamluks in north India", p. 352; and Aziz Ahmad, Political History and Institutions of the early Turkish Empire of Delhi, p. 272.

ing them off.[74] Despite the fact that Barani provided only the example of Sher Khan who was murdered circa 669/1270,[75] historians have assumed that this was a wider phenomenon in evidence in Balban's reign.[76] The absence of many Shamsi notables in the Ghiyathi dispensation has often been used as a negative proof to substantiate Barani's general statements.

Even with the scanty information that we possess, we can notice that some of the Shamsi slaves included in Juzjani's chronicle continued to serve Balban, only they were now a part of the Ghiyathi notables. Barani remembered Sher Khan, Timur Khan Shamsi, and `Adil Khan Shamsi as important notables in the Ghiyathi dispensation. Of these `Adil Khan Shamsi `Ajami must have been the same as Malik Saif al-Din Arkali (#21 in Table 4), and Timur Khan was in all likelihood Malik Taj al-Din Sanjar Tarkhan (#17 in Table 4). `Imad al-Din Rawat-i Ard was another Shamsi slave mentioned by Barani, but he might have been a junior slave of Ilutmish for he did not draw Juzjani's attention. Notably, while `Adil Khan and Timur Khan Shamsi are both described as khwaja tash, companions of one master, Barani clarified

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74. Ibid, ed. Khan, pp. 47, 65, ed. Rashid, pp. 56, 77.

75. Ibid, ed. Khan, p. 65, ed. Rashid, p. 77.

76. Most recently, Peter Jackson, "Mamluks in north India", p. 352, and references above.

that this companionship did not result in competition and strife; they were yaran-i mihtar, special friends of the Sultan.[77] These notables continued to occupy important posts in Balban's reign. After Sher Khan's death, Tamar Khan Shamsi was given the charge of supporting prince Muhammad from his commands of Samana and Sunam.[78] `Imad al-Mulk was the muster master (ard-i mamalik) of the military retinue.[79]

If one persists in seeking continuities between the remnants of the Shamsi dispensation into Balban's reign and studies the 655/1257 confederates of the Sultan one notices that often the children of the dead allies of Ulugh Khan succeeded to their father's position. Thus Malik `Ala al-Din Chajju succeeded his father Keshli Khan as Amir Hajib, and this was despite the fact that there was no warmth in the relationship between uncle and nephew.[80] Similarly, Taj al-Din Arsalan Khan was succeeded in Lakhnauti by Tatar Khan, and Balban did recognise his tributary status.[81] Barani noted the presence of another son of a Shamsi slave,

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77. Ibid, ed. Khan, pp. 37, ed. Rashid, pp. 44.

78. Ibid, ed. Khan, pp. 65, ed. Rashid, pp. 77.

79. Ibid, ed. Khan, pp. 114, ed. Rashid, pp. 134.

80. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 495, Barani, Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi, ed. Khan, pp. 24, 35, 36, 113-114, ed. Rashid, pp. 29, 42, 43, 132-134.

81. See above for references.

Malik Taj al-Din ibn Qutlugh Khan Shamsi, who participated in the first Lakhnauti campaign.[82] Even as Khan, Balban had appointed children of some notables that he respected to their father's positions. Juzjani noted that after the deaths of Jamal al-Din Bustami, Hamid al-Din Marigalah, and Kabir al-Din, all of which occurred in 659/1260, their children succeeded to their posts.[83]

The nature of Balban's dispensation of power was far more complicated than Iltutmish's because of the number of diverse people that the Sultan had recruited during his extremely long political career.[84] Some, like his administrators, the ahl-i qalam and the tajiks, we know little about from Barani, but they must have followed Balban in his transition from Malik to Khan and Sultan. Juzjani is perhaps the best example that we possess of one such `alim who allied with Balban while he was still Khan. He was brought to Delhi from Lakhnauti by Balban in 643/1246, and

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82. Barani, Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi, ed. Khan, pp. 83, ed. Rashid, pp. 98.

83. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 495.

84. Peter Jackson's argument that Balban sought to substitute Shamsi notables with his own slaves who constituted his new power base is a rather mechanical description of these developments. Peter Jackson, "Mamluks in Muslim India", p. 353.

prospered in his service.[85] His fortune was allied closely enough with Balban and his patron's years of exile from Delhi, were years of wilderness for him as well.[86] Although Juzjani was alive when Balban became Sultan, Barani merely acknowledged his presence and recorded that as Sadr-i Jahan Juzjani was one of the important `ulama in the realm.[87] In a similar fashion other old accomplices were honoured, and these included individuals like Malik Fakhr al-Din Kotwal. Although we do not know about his early years of service, he was trusted sufficiently by the Sultan to be appointed deputy of Delhi during his absence.[88] By the end of his reign Balban had honoured him by referring to him as "brother, Malik of Amirs", baradar Malik al-'Umara. In the intervening period Fakhr al-Din had consolidated his position in Delhi with a wide circle of relatives and well wishers, until in Kaiqubad's reign (685/1286-689/1290) he was universally respected.[89]

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85. For evidence of his patron's generosity see Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, pp. 470, 480, 481, 484, 485, vol. 2, p. 61.

86. Ibid, vol. 1, pp. 487, 488, 489.

87. Barani, Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi, ed. Khan, p. 111, Rashid, p. 131.

88. This took place when the Sultan campaigned in Lakhnauti against Tughril. Ibid, ed. Khan, p. 85, Rashid, p. 100.

89. Ibid, ed. Khan, pp. 131, 135-8, Rashid, pp. 152, 156-160.

The existing evidence helps to put Barani's observations concerning the fate of the Shamsis in some context. Barani noted Sher Khan's fear that he would be poisoned because he was aware that the elite Shamsi slaves were removed under one pretext or the other, bandagan-i buzurg-i Shamsi ra ba-har bahaneh daf`a mikard.[90] Barani's statement was clarified elsewhere when the author noted that only those Shamsi Khans and Maliks were murdered who wanted to associate in kingship, shuraka-yi mulk, and obstruct Balban's authority, muzahim takht-i khud.[91] This definition certainly applied to Sher Khan, who, as we have noticed, always attempted to maintain his independence, sometimes in conflict with Balban. Barani sensed the basis upon which notables could protect themselves when he noted that Shamsi notables survived, sadr-i hayat manda budand, into the Ghiyathi dispensation not because of any long standing claim on Sultan Balban, but only if they had gained his support and protection, himayat-i Balbani.[92] In that sense, many of the Ghiyathi notables had been present in earlier dispensations. Yet, their continuity as elites in Balban's reign depended upon the removal of any links with previous masters and relating only to Balban.

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90. Ibid, ed. S.A. Khan, p. 65, ed. Rashid, p. 77.

91. Ibid, ed. Khan, p. 48, ed. Rashid, p. 56.

92. Ibid, ed. Khan, p. 50, ed. Rashid, p. 59.

Just as Balban's early allies in the struggle for power were rewarded for their assistance and loyalty after his accession to the throne, so too were some children of his old senior slaves, mawlazadgan (singular: mawlazada, the son of a slave), who had died in his service. The children of freed slaves were not a part of Balban's slave retinue, but some of them were sufficiently trusted to be appointed to important military commands. The commander of Amroha and later Awadh, Malik `Ali Sarjandar (also known as Hatam Khan), was a mawlazada. He must have had considerable influence and wealth to attract Amir Khusrau, when the poet was just starting his career.[93] Similarly, despite the indiscretions of his father Malik Baq Baq (see below), the malikzada Malik Qerabeg was still favoured in 676/1277 with the iqta` of Sonepat.[94] These examples should not lead us to assume that Balban was bound by any emotional attachment to the memory of his slaves; like Iltutmish he did not recognise status which was claimed as a birthright. He showed remarkable discretion in supporting his own kinsmen; the nephew was supported but not his cousin. In the same way Balban seemed willing to patronise the children of

93. Ibid, ed. S.A. Khan, pp. 24, 36, 118-119, ed. Rashid, pp. 29, 43, 138-140, and Wahid Mirza, The Life and Works of Amir Khusrau, op. cit., pp. 66-73.

94. See G. Yazdani, "The Inscriptions of the Turk Sultans of Delhi..." Epigraphica Indo-Moslemica, op. cit., # XI, plate X b (in mosque attached to the tomb of Imam Nasir, Sonepat), pp. 27-8.

those slaves who had served him satisfactorily and won his affection. But as the rejection of the mawlazada Kamal Mahiyar showed, this did not translate into a general policy.[95]

Barani's report suggests, however, that the mawlazadgan possessed enough corporate identity and influence to become noticeable as a group to observers. Not all of them possessed commands, but by his own acknowlegement some of them did possess financial and military resources.[96] This would

95. Ibid, ed. S.A. Khan, pp. 36-37, ed. Rashid, pp.42-3. Barani's narration of Kamal Mahiyar's candidature for the post of khwaja, accountant, of Amroha needs to be contextualised with the author's own negative sentiments regarding the "base born", kam aslan. The need to distance individuals of such background from political power was the theme of the twenty-first nasihat (advice) of his normative text, Fatawa-yi Jahandari and Barani transposed these didactic ideas into his history as well. Ibid, ed. Khan, pp. 29-30, 34, ed. Rashid, pp. 34-5, 40. See also Barani, Fatawa-yi Jahandari, ed. A. Salim Khan (Lahore: Idarah-i Tahqiqat-i Pakistan, #25, 1972), pp. 295-304, where the ideas contained in the Tarikh... are repeated in similar episodes with new characters. Contemporary scholars have assimilated Barani's moralisations into a "Balban's theory of kingship". See for example, K.A. Nizami, "Sultan Balban and Kaiqubad: (iii) Theory of Kingship" in A Comprehensive History of India: The Delhi Sultanat, pp. 280-284, R.P. Tripathi, Some Aspects of Muslim Administration, pp. 34-37, Muhammad Aziz Ahmad, Political History and Institutions of the Early Turkish Empire of Delhi, pp. 260-263, and most recently, Andre Wink, al-Hind, p. 22. Historians who have used Barani to argue that Balban never associated with the low born, merchants, and other commoners, have of course forgotten the important role that the bandagan played in his domains.

96. Ibid, ed. S.A. Khan, p. 135, ed. Rashid, p. 155. The text in Rashid's edition varies, but is clearer: some of Sultan Balban's mawlazadas had become powerful Maliks and had huge establishments: b`adi mawlazadgan-i Sultan Balban keh az muluk-i kabar shuda budand wa khail khana-yi bisyar dashtand.

suggest that Ghiyathi notables were able to transmit some of their material resources to their descendants thus shoring up their status in society. After Balban's death, their position in Delhi was prominent enough to be seen as a threat by the Ghiyathi slaves.

In fact, Barani's usage of the term mawlazadgan directs us to a major problem that faced the Delhi Sultan in his attempts at consolidating his authority. Barani used mawlazadgan in a restricted form to refer only to the sons of those slaves who had served Balban. The technical meaning of the term, however, is universally applicable to the children of all slaves. It is important to remember, in this context, that by the time Balban became Sultan there was already in existence the debris of several previous political dispensations. These were personnel recruited and raised to political power by previous Sultans and notables. With the death of their master, they lost their positions, many their lives, but some must have retained a part of the resources won during their years in service.[97] Barani provides a very confused picture of such people. In a

97. Ibid, ed. Khan, p. 133, Rashid, p. 154. Barani unfortunately did not explain if the term mawlazadgan excluded the children of other Shamsi slaves as well. By the time that Balban came to power a large number of these second generation descendents of Iltutmish's slaves must have also been present near Delhi. It is perhaps likely that after Balban's death people remembered the descendents of slaves as one general category without differentiating between their nisba of association.

couple of different places in his history he refers to members of Iltutmish's central contingent (qalb, which always included some slaves as well) who had received iqta`s in the do-ab, and were required to fulfill certain military obligations. By Balban's reign these iqta`s were being treated as outright grants, many of the recipients were too old, and in other cases the grants had devolved to the heirs of the Shamsi soldiers. According to Barani, Balban tried to revoke these grants, and bring the land into the khalisa (inalienable land). The author's narrative suffers considerably from excessive moralisation which was interwoven into the story, but the kernel seems authentic enough.[98] In the terms of our discussion, Barani was describing the problem faced by Balban who had to deal with members of a previous dispensation whose privileges continued over a passage of time, and had become inheritable. Crucially also, these individuals were not involved with

98. Ibid, ed. Khan, pp. 60, 61-64, ed. Rashid, pp. 70, 72-76. According to Barani, when Balban revoked the grants the old and infirm soldiers appealed to Fakhr al-Din Kotwal who interceded on their behalf. The plea was that old servants should not be cast away when their utility is over. The story was very close to Barani's own experience -- he was a close confidant of Sultan Muhammad Shah (725/1325-752/1351) who lost everything when Firuz Shah (752/1351-790/1388) succeeded -- and should be seen as a plea for patronage from Firuz Shah, the Sultan to whom the Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi was dedicated. In Barani's story, Balban was moved to tears, and although he did demand that the young and able should perform military service, the old servants were allowed to keep their grants. This was much what Barani would have liked Firuz Shah Tughluq to do as well.

the Delhi politics, but had their interests in land in the do-ab. Since Iltutmish's death the Sultanate had extended out of its urban frontiers, and by the second half of the thirteenth century, there existed a situation where members of the elite and their descendents had interests in the land and its resources.

If Balban had to consolidate his authority successfully, it could no longer be carried out in the same manner as Iltutmish. Balban had to set up structures of government and deploy personnel in both the urban areas as well as the adjoining countryside, the emerging agrarian base of the Sultanate. But first the land had to be settled, the "disturbed, intractable lands", mawasat, cleared. According to Barani this was uppermost on Balban's agenda and he led campaigns in his very first year against the Mewattis in the lands adjoining Delhi.[99] These campaigns had actually been initiated when Balban was still Khan, and Juzjani described the fortifications of the Mewat chieftains with the greatest degree of respect. He also provided a description of the head- hunt that the campaign of 658/1260 involved: whoever brought the head of a Meo received one tanka, whoever brought a man captive received two tankas.[100]

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99. Ibid, ed. Khan, p. 55, ed. Rashid, p. 65.

100. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 2, p. 80.

Barani described other dimensions of Balban's campaigns in the Mewat region which were ignored by Juzjani. According to Barani, the Mewattis were using the forest cover to approach the capital and harass its environs. The fear of their presence was sufficient to keep the western gates, darwazaha-yi samt qibla, shut after the evening prayers. Slaves could not go to the reservoir near Delhi to fetch water and people did not stir out in the evening.[101] Together with a military response to the threat, the Delhi Sultan initiated a systematic policy of deforestation wherever he was faced with rebellion. Thus forests were cleared in the environs of Delhi, the areas near Kampil, Patiali and Bhojpur and in the neighbourhood of Budaun, Amroha, Sambhal and Kanuri (?). The attack on the mawasat was carried out by the military retinue as well as large numbers of wood-cutters, tabar-zan. Roads were cut and land cleared for settlement.[102]

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101. Barani, ed. Khan, ed. Rashid, p. 66.

102. Ibid, ed. Khan, pp. 55-59, ed. Rashid, pp. 65-70. Note especially the account of the campaign in the areas near Budaun against the Katheriyan, the people of Kather. In Iltutmish's reign, it had been Raja Man who had opposed the Sultanate armies in the area around Budaun. In Balban's reign the leader of the rebellion is left unclear. Hodivala, Studies in Indo-Muslim History, vol. 1, p. 259, gave some possible etymologies for the word kather. The word could be from the sanskrit, kastha, wood, or the Hindi, katheri, woodman or carpenter. If he is right, then it is possible that what the Sultanate was facing in Balban's reign in the northern do-ab was an attack from pastoral, forest-dwelling people. The need for the Sultanate army to carry wood cutters, tabar-zan, would then be quite logical.

After the campaigns were over, the military cantonments were regarrisoned and refortified. To improve security new forts were constructed at Gopalgir in the Mewat region and Jalali in the do-ab.[103] The interesting feature here is that the garrisoning of these areas was carried out by the Afghans, a new element introduced into the Sultanate political system by Balban. The chroniclers of the early Delhi Sultans do not mention their service in previous military retinues where Afghans may have been used as a mercenary element for specific campaigns and then demustered. They had been first used by Ulugh Khan as a part of his retinue in the 658/1260 Mewat campaigns and at that time Juzjani had described them as a strange, awesome force where

> each one of them, one could say, is like an elephant with two pony-tails (literally cow-tails, du ghazhgha) on [their] broad shoulders (bar-kutf nihada), or is like a bastion...[104]

Within six years from their first recorded deployment, the Afghans controlled the garrison towns in the vicinity of Delhi and the Ganga-Jumna do-ab as a security buffer to

103. Ibid, ed. S.A. Khan, pp. 57-8, ed. Rashid, pp. 66-8. Bhojpur has been misprinted as Bharajpur in the Rashid edition, p. 57. Hodivala tentatively identified Gopalgir as Gopalgarh on the frontier of the Mewati territory. S.H. Hodivala, Studies in Indo-Muslim History, vol. II, p. 83.

104. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, vol. 2, p. 80.

the capital. That Balban chose Afghans is interesting because as a socially unimportant group, foreign to the politics of the Delhi court, they were loyal to their patron and benefactor. But in line with the changes that had occurred in the Sultanate, Afghans were deployed not in the capital but in the country.

There is an obvious parallel between the deployment of the Afghans and that of the natally alienated and socially dead bandagan, and it is therefore of significance that the deployment of the Afghans was not like that of any other military contingent. The Afghans were given land adjoining the urban centres which were declared mafruz, separated from the revenue register. Barani noted that in each qasaba Muslims and Afghans were given these lands.[105] In effect the conquest of disturbed, intractable lands, followed the classical pattern of extending of settled cultivation: cutting down forests, driving away pastoral and other forest dwellers, and sponsoring the extension of an agrarian economy. The multi-dimensional form of the expansion into the country was also evident in the change in the qasaba. It was still an armed camp, but now its role in the agrarian and commercial economy of the region was in greater evidence. The residents in the qasabat were given rights to cultivate land in the neighbourhood, and, as Barani noted

105. Barani, Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi, ed. Khan, p. 58, ed. Rashid, pp. 67-68.

after the resettlement of Kampil, Patiali, and Bhojpur, the area and trade routes leading to it had been secured. As a result, the caravans and merchants could now come and go, karwaniyan wa saudagaran dar amad wa shud shudand.[106].

An important feature of this development is the careful choice of people through whom the colonisation of the land was carried out. If there was potential challenge to the Ghiyathi dispensation from the countryside as well as the urban centres, Balban dispensed power and privileges to a cadre of people who would depend upon him, and located them in exactly those strategically important zones. There were also geographical parameters within which Balban emphasised an intervention in the countryside. The resources of the Sultanate were channelised within those areas where there had been the greatest amount of conflict between notables in the post-Iltutmish period. This was also within the confines of the territory first distributed by Ulugh Khan amongst his confederates after the defeat of Raihan and his collaborators. The direct supervision of the countryside, "the internal frontier" of the Sultanate, tapered off once one proceeded eastwards into Awadh, and it did not exist beyond Samana and Sunam in the west. This is suggested by the fact that after 679-80/1280-81, there is not a single record of an appointment in either of the two wings of the

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106. Ibid, ed. Khan, p. 57, ed. Rashid, p. 67.

Sultanate; the lands to the east were given as an appanage to the younger son Bughra Khan, and those in the west to the older son Muhammad.

This political arrangement should not be seen as a deliberate delimitation of the Sultanate by Balban. The Delhi Sultan's ability to command resources had certainly not become insignificant; Barani's history notes that he managed to raise a levy of 200,000 soldiers and support personnel in Awadh on his way to Lakhnauti in 679-80/1280-81, and Deyell has shown how relative to the Delhi Sultanate, the economies of the neighbouring realms were faltering at this time.[107] Instead the appanages were conceived as an attempt to maximise resources from areas difficult to control. The princes were given considerable autonomy in their respective domains to implement their agendas with the intention that it would ultimately enable a greater consolidation of the heartland.[108]

Controlling the eastern provinces with as much rigour as the heartland would have been extremely difficult. By the last years of Nasir al-Din's reign Sultanate authority in the east beyond Awadh had become practically non-existent. Taj al-Din Arsalan had already established his

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107. Ibid, ed. Khan, p. 86, Rashid, p. 100 and John Deyell, Living Without Silver, op. cit., pp. 221-226.

108. The rationale behind the appanaging of provinces to the princes was described by Barani, ibid, ed. Khan, p. 53, ed. Rashid, pp. 62-3.

independence in Lakhnauti with the title of Sultan Mughith al-Din and after his death his son Tatar Khan succeeded him.[109] Delhi interfered in these developments only in so far that it favoured competition in the region by patronising several rivals simultaneously. Thus, the rights of both `Izz al-Din Balban Yuzbegi and Jalal al-Din Mas`ud Jani over Lakhnauti were recognised.[110] By the time of Balban's accession Tatar Khan, son of Taj al-Din Arsalan, had emerged as the master of Lakhnauti, but there was only the most tenuous of connections between the eastern provinces and the capital. Barani described the joyous celebrations in Delhi when sixty-three elephants from Tatar Khan reached Delhi around 662-4/1264-6.[111] This was an unusual show of subordination for Lakhnauti, but it summed up the nature of the relationship expected from the distant province; it was expected to remit resources considered valuable to Delhi and in return be allowed considerable autonomy.

It is not certain when Balban conquered Lakhnauti, nor when his slave Tughril was appointed to govern it. No major change seems to have occurred in Delhi's ability to control

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109. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 495, Barani, ed. Khan, pp. 24, 35, 36, 113-114, ed. Rashid, pp. 29, 42, 43, 132-34.

110. For `Izz al-Din Balban Yuzbegi, see Juzjani, vol. 2, p. 35, and Jalal al-Din Mas`ud Jani see, vol. 1, p. 495.

111. Barani, Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi, ed. Khan, p. 53, ed. Rashid, p. 63.

its eastern province and Tughril revolted, circa 679-80/1280-81. After three attempts, when the rebellion was finally subdued, it was given as an appanage to Balban's younger son Bughra Khan. Balban was aware of the enormous difficulties involved in controlling Lakhnauti. During his own campaigns against Tughril, Balban had been forced to rely upon the help of Bhoj Rai, the ruler of Sonargaon.[112] It is likely that Balban would have been satisfied with more limited control of the area provided the remission of elephants, essential war material continued uninterruptedly. Barani presents this as Bughra Khan's agenda in Lakhnauti.[113]

Although Balban impressed the senior role of Delhi in this political arrangement upon his son, Bughra Khan was still given considerable freedom in his principality. For Balban the division between the countries (iqlim, literally, climates) of Delhi and Lakhnauti lay along the River Saryu. The distinction between the two lands, diyar, was presented very forcefully by Barani in an anecdote where Balban ordered that no soldier in the Delhi army should be allowed to stay in Lakhnauti, and none from

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112. Ibid, ed. Khan, p. 91, ed. Rashid, p. 107. See also Yahya Sirhindi, Tarikh-i Mubarakshahi, ed. Hosain, pp. 42-3, where the King's name is given as Rai Dhanuj, and Balban is forced to accede to the "Hindu" ruler's demand that the two should meet standing, on equal terms.

113. Ibid, ed. Khan, p. 53, ed. Rashid, pp. 62-3.

Lakhnauti to migrate into Hindustan.[114] The direct supervision of the Sultan extended upto Awadh, which was placed under the command of Malik `Ali Sarjandar (also known as Hatam Khan).[115] In effect, Bughra Khan was the autonomous governor of Lakhnauti where he established his own base of power. The Prince's eventual alienation from the capital is best brought out by the fact that when Balban desired to appoint Bughra Khan his successor in Delhi, the prince preferred the throne of Lakhnauti.

Unlike the east, the frequent Mongol incursions forced the Sultanate to keep a far closer watch on its western provinces. Although by 664/1266, Mongol invasions were no longer led by commanders of the Great Khan, the Neguderid (also referred to as Qaraunas) pressure on the Sultanate frontier did not provide any respite to Delhi and its commanders.[116] Since Iltutmish's reign, the frontier of the

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114. Ibid, ed. Khan, p. 106, ed. Rashid, p. 125.

115. Ibid, ed. Khan, pp. 24, 36, 118-119, ed. Rashid, pp. 29, 43, 138-140, and Wahid Mirza, The Life and Works of Amir Khusrau, pp. 66-73.

116. These Mongol invasions have been detailed in the dissertation of Peter Jackson, The Mongols and India 1221-1351, pp. 84-112. The Neguderids were the armed forces commanded by Neguder, a subordinate of Jochi the Khan of the Golden Horde. On the Neguderids see also, Jean Aubin, "L'ethnogenese des Qaraunas" Turcica 1 (1969): 65-94. An early recognition of the Neguderids/ Qaraunas in the Delhi Sultanate sources occurs in an elgy written on the death of Prince Muhammad by Amir Khusrau. Amir Khusrau was briefly captured by a person that he described as a Qarauna. The poet's elegy (Mathi'a) is preserved in Badauni, Muntakhab al-Tawarikh, vol. 1, p. 153.

Sultanate had moved eastwards until it lay along the River Beas. Partly through the exertions of Ulugh Khan, Delhi had regained control over areas around Lahore.[117] The need to neutralise the Neguderids, however, led Balban to open negotiations with Hulegu (654/1256-663/1265), the Il-Khanid ruler,[118] and make efforts to reorganise his western command. This had to wait until after the death of Balban's cousin, Sher Khan (circa 670-671/1271-72), the powerful governor of Lahore, Dipalpur, Tabarhind, Sunam, and Bhatnair.[119] Subsequently, the command of Multan was given to Balban's eldest son Muhammad, and Samana to his younger son Bughra Khan. The princes were supported by the slave commanders, Tamar Khan Shamsi[120] also in Samana and Sunam, and

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117. This must have occured sometime after 652/1254 when Jalal al-Din Mas`ud, son of Iltutmish, and ally of the Mongols controlled Lahore. It was only after Jalal al-Din retreated into the Chaghtayid domains, and Lahore came under Sher Khan's influence, that Mongol presence diminished in the region; Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, vol. 1, p. 489, vol. 2, pp. 66-7, 44. See also Peter Jackson, "Lahawr" in Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition, s.v.. Note also Barani's remarks concerning Balban's appointment of gumashtagan wa me`mar, superintendents and architects and the reconstruction and resettlement of Lahore and its neighbouring towns, qasbat, and villages, deh. Barani, ed. Khan, p. 61, ed. Rashid, pp. 71-2.

118. These negotiations have been described in Jackson, The Mongols and India, pp. 100-01, who also notes an embassy from Berke, the Khan of the Golden Horde.

119. Barani, Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi, ed. Khan, p. 65, ed. Rashid, pp. 76-7.

120. Probably the same person as Malik Taj al-Din Sanjar Tarkhan whose name has been variously spelt in the manuscripts of the Tabaqat-i Nasiri. See Habibi's notes, Juzjani, p. 28, fn. 6, and Jackson's discussion, "Mamluks in Muslim India", p. 350, fn 46.

the Ghiyathi bandagan-i khass, Malik Ikhtiyar al-Din Begtars.[121] According to Barani by the 15th or 16th regnal year, the frontier had stabilised on the Beas River, and Mongol incursions had diminished.

Coincident with this greater stability was a reorganisation of the frontier commands especially necessary when Balban left Delhi to subdue the rebel Tughril in Lakhnauti (circa 679-80/1280-81). At that time, the prince Bughra Khan and Malik Ikhtiyar al-Din Begtars were removed from their commands and ordered to march east with the army.[122] Samana and Sunam were given to another Ghiyathi notable Malik Sewinch Sarjandar, and the surrounding region broken up into smaller administrative charges, shiqqs, under subordinate officers.[123] The area of eastern Punjab

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121. Barani, ed. Khan, pp. 65, 66, 80, 81, ed. Rashid, pp. 77, 79, 94, 95.

122. Ikhtiyar al-Din Begtars eventually received the governorship of Garhmuktesar in the northern Ganga-Jumna do-ab. Jackson, Mongols and India, p. 104, has argued that Garhmuktesar was his command at the time when he was required to support the princes against the Mongols in the west. But this is unlikely because of the distance involved. There is an inscription of Begtars al-Sultani from Garhmuktesar dated 628/1283, and the slave must have received this charge after the Lakhnauti campaign. For Begtars participation in the Lakhnauti campaign see Barani, Tarikh=i Firuz Shahi, ed. Khan, p. 88, ed. Rashid, p. 102. For the 628/1283 inscription of Malik Begtars, see G. Yazdani, "The inscriptions of the Turk Sultans of Delhi..." Epigraphica Indo-Moslemica, op. cit., # XI, plate X b, pp. 27-8.

123. Ibid, ed. Khan, p. 85, ed. Rashid, pp. 99-100.

upto the River Beas and the province of Sind were left as the appanage of the older prince Muhammad. It is from these areas that Prince Muhammad was required to remit many choice, chidah wa bisyar, Bahri? and Tatari horses to Delhi.[124] Barani also noted that less expensive mounts were bred closer to Delhi in the regions of Samana, Sunam, Tabarhind, Thanesar, in the camps (talwandiha-yi) of the Khokars and the domains of the Jats and Mundahirs. Rather than relying upon trade from the Mongol lands, since these indigenous horses were acceptable mounts the Prince was required to acquire and remit them to the capital.[125]

Barani reported that prince Muhammad would come annually to Delhi with the treasures and retinue, ba-khazana wa pa'igah, of Multan to pay his allegiance to his father, but after 680/1281, there is not a single report of the Sultan's intervention in the north-west. The stability of the frontier may have been partly responsible for the treatment of the Sindh and eastern Punjab region as the virtually autonomous appanage of Muhammad, and at least in that region the prince behaved as the lord. Muhammad behaved with sufficient independence and impertinence that

124. The variant manuscripts of Barani spell the word differently: ibid, ed. Khan, p. 53 (BHRJI), ed. Rashid (BHRUJI), p. 62. On the basis of his personal manuscript, Simon Digby has argued that BHRI, for bahri, sea-borne, should be the correct reading. Digby, War Horse and Elephant, op. cit., p. 21, fn 34.

125. Ibid.

he managed to antagonise the Delhi notables. The reason according to Barani remained unclear (the author felt that it may have had something to do with women), but it did mark a distancing from the world of the Delhi court. It was because of this alienation that Muhammad's son Kaikhusrau was an unacceptable heir to the Ghiyathi notables in Delhi.[126] In defiance of their master's wishes, the Ghiyathi notables chose Bughra Khan's son, Kaiqubad, as the next Sultan.

IV Conclusion:

Balban dispensed power to subordinates from a variety of backgrounds. The composition of these notables changed through his reign, and his "Shamsi" associates, and early slave following were probably the first to retire. The Delhi Sultan managed to maintain a relationship with some of his early supporters through the recruitment of their children, the mawlazadgan. Stability within the realm was also accomplished by the Ghiyathi bandagan whose utter dependence upon their master was made startlingly clear by Barani.

In contrast to the successors of Shams al-Din Iltutmish, Balban displayed his authority as Sultan with his

126. Ibid, ed. Khan, pp. 67, 122, ed. Rashid, pp. 79, 143.

capacity to remove any member from his favour. Sher Khan was made into an outstanding example for the Shamsi notables, the mawlazadgan had their Kamal Mahiyar, and the sudden execution of Amin Khan Mui-daraz reminded the Ghiyathi bandagan of their servile status. Conversely, individuals could be raised to the heights of power. Amongst the Shamsis, the relatively unknown `Imad al-Mulk emerged as an extremely powerful notable; similarly Amir `Ali Sarjandar from amongst the mawlazadgan, and the banda Ikhtiyar al-Din Begtars reached some of the most powerful commands in the Sultanate. Old associates like Juzjani or Fakhr al-Din were trusted, and despite their peculiarities -- or rather, because of their peculiarities -- the Afghans were deployed. The Ghiyathi dispensation was apparently open to people from a variety of backgrounds; it was exclusive in the sense that individuals could only gain access if the Sultan appreciated their merits and loyalty. Barani had understood the logic of the dispensation when he noted that survival within Balban's political system rested on the Sultan's patronage alone, az himayat-i Balbani.[127]

Balban had managed to appropriate sufficient power within his cadre of subordinates to function effectively, and he had managed to accomplish this by relying upon political traditions which, in the north Indian context,

127. Ibid, ed. S.A. Khan, p. 50, ed. Rashid, p. 59.

were at least a century old. The political structure of Mu`izz al-Din Ghuri as much as that of Ghiyath al-Din Balban was reliant on asymmetrical dyadic bonds between master and servant, which were, in practice, extensions of the relationship between master and slave. In this entire period that we have discussed, political status, and authority were "dispensed" by the monarch; Iltutmish's successors were politically ineffective because they were not able to break the monopoly over power retained by their father's notables. Since political relationships were extremely individualistic, a commander with vast resources had the options of either seizing power himself, or striking off and creating his own principality.

Yet, if Balban continued to abide by the traditions of political relationships and governance of his masters, these had to be implemented within a domain which bore little resemblance in character to Iltutmish's "contiguous Sultanate" where urban centres were connected by tenous channels of communications. By the 1260s one can more confidently notice a state whose territories could be mapped, whose authority extended beyond the city walls and into the countryside. Much of this change was the result of the prolonged conflict between the subordinates of Sultan Shams al-Din Iltutmish. In the years after Iltutmish's death, there had been a considerable dispersal of power amongst Shamsi notables of all ranks, and the more ambitious and

powerful commanders had established autonomous principalities and accomodative relationships with the autochthonous ranagan in the countryside. There were also many other junior subordinates, and demobilised soldiers with grants and privileges in the do-ab who had managed to perpetuate their privileges into the second generation.

For the Sultan of Delhi to be effective in 664/1266 he had to control the country as well, and Balban took some decisive steps towards controlling areas recognised as mawasat. This was a political, geographical and ecological categorisation of land by the sedentary, city-dwelling wielders of power, and, as Balban's reign brings out, both land and people had to be tamed. Yet, while the structure of the Sultanate had changed, its political system had not. To control the country, the Delhi Sultan introduced another "foreign" people, removed from their homelands and bequeathed power, influence and property; the Afghans were reincarnated bandagan dependent and therefore loyal to their master.

The Delhi Sultans were very resistant to change. Balban was the first Delhi monarch to rule effectively over a Sultanate which encompassed substantial areas of the countryside and yet his methods for consolidating power were very similar to that of his master Sultan Iltutmish. The Delhi Sultanate would see at least two other monarchs with considerable resources and ability to wield power --

Sultan `Ala al-Din Khalaji (695/1296-715/1316) and Muhammad Shah Tughluq (725/1325-752/1351) -- and both would use similar forms of governance. The efforts of these Sultans would extend Sultanate intervention into the countryside, yet their political structures would continue to be patterned along lines similar to Balban. Consolidation would imply the establishment of a new dispensation of power, where the old supporters would be dispossessed.[128] A new form of political organisation would be evident only after Timur's invasion, where partly because of their geographical locale and the presence of powerful ranagan, and partly because of the Sultan's inability to marshall sufficient resources in personnel and wealth, the Sultanates would rely upon a broader support base. This would include the debris of previous dispensations, immigrants, and support from the autochthones, a form of political organisation in evidence under the early Mughals.

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128. This has been discussed in my study of Ghiyath al-Din Tughluq (720-724-5/1320-1324-5), see Creation and Representation of Order: Ghiyath al-Din's Tughluqabad. Note also from a different perspective, Athar Ali, "Nobility under Muhammad Tughluq" Proceedings of the Indian History Congress 42 (1981): 197-202.

Chapter 5

CONCLUSION:
THE SULTANS IN DELHI

In 689/1290, when Balban's successor Kaiqubad was murdered, a century had passed since the first Sultan had ruled from Delhi. Between 588/1192 and 689/1290 the domains of the Delhi Sultan had altered significantly. In 588/1192, north India had been the frontier for the Muslims, where only the intrepid travelled or the socially dispossessed gambled with their lives to make their fortunes. By 633/1236 and the end of Iltutmish's reign, it had altered into a sanctuary for Muslims fleeing from the Mongol invasions. The relatively small world of the garrison towns and their environs in Iltutmish's reign, had expanded by 685/1286 into the countryside and by the end of Balban's reign, the Sultanate had started developing an agrarian base.

During the thirteenth century, the political structure of the Delhi Sultanate had also transformed. The traditions

of corporate sharing of power within the Shansabanid family had influenced the way in which Mu`izz al-Din had deployed his bandagan as governors with a considerable degree of independence. It was this arrangement of power that Shams al-Din Iltutmish inherited in 607/1210. Despite increasing numbers of immigrants, Iltutmish relied upon his cadre of military slaves to consolidate his conquests, which were separated from one another by distance, jungles, inhospitable terrain and people over which he had no control. Yet, his conquered domain cohered to form a Sultanate, an achievement in which the bandagan-i Shamsi had an important role to play.

In the years of conflict after Iltutmish's death, the Shamsi notables were in conflict with the Sultan and with each other, to protect or enhance their fortunes. The lineage of Iltutmish remained in place as long as there was a relative balance of power between the contending groups. When the future Ghiyath al-Din Balban disturbed this balance, the last Shamsi Sultan was also removed. As we have seen, the role of these conflicts in transforming the Sultanate was crucial, but the Sultan played a minimal role in these developments. When Ghiyath al-Din became Sultan, he responded to the changes that had taken place since Iltutmish's death. The areas in which he had to intervene differed from those of his master and this forced Balban to focus on the Sultanate's internal frontier, leaving the

state's eastern and western provinces under the control of his sons.

The making of the Delhi Sultanate, however, was not merely the achievement of the bandagan and the notables of the Sultan. In the reign of Iltutmish it had been the support of the Shari`a-minded `ulama that had been crucial in curbing heterodox practises and introducing a semblance of unity within the dispersed Muslim communities of the urban centres. It was partly because of their association with the endeavour of the Sultan to establish a contiguous Sultanate, that Delhi could emerge as the axis of the Muslim community in north India.

Iltutmish's death, and the decline in authority of his successors did not diminish the importance of the pious or their immigration into north India. They had dispersed into the urban centres of the Sultanate, and established their bases of education and ritual training. Already by 651/1253 we have a reference to qadi Shams al-Din Bharaichi; his nisba indicating that he hailed from the town of Bharaich near Awadh.[1] Men like him were still in a minority, however, and his contemporaries were still identified with areas outside the subcontinent: Juzjan, Kashan, Sham/Syria,

1. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 487.

Bust, etc. .[2] This regional "rooting" of the pious, and the process of identifying with areas within north India had progressed sufficiently into Balban's reign until Barani could identify amongst the pious at the close of the century, "the important Sayyids of Kaithal, Sayyids of Jhajhar, Sayyids of Bayana, Sayyids of Budaun" and two pious carrying the nisba of Samana: Sayyid M`uin al-Din, and Qadi Rukn al-Din Samana.[3] These were `ulama who were at least second generation migrants, but even more, they had sufficient confidence in the training that they had received in their regional establishments to seek public acclaim on that ground.

Although these `ulama persisted with their aim of guiding the Muslim community along the path of the Shari`a, they received less help now from the Delhi Sultan. Rather than continuing with their father's grand design of associating with the `ulama to make Delhi the axis of the Muslim community, the sons of Iltutmish were involved with the Shamsi notables to retain some semblance of authority in Delhi. By 637/1240 and Mu`izz al-Din Bahram Shah's accession, the Delhi Sultans were not merely losing control of Delhi, but they had also given up their father's vision of

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2. This is evident from their names. Note, for example: Minhaj al-Din Siraj Juzjani, Jalal al-Din Kashani, Sheikh Muhammad Shami, and Jamal al-Din Bustami.

3. Barani, Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi, ed. Khan, p. 111, ed. Rashid, pp. 130-131. Khan read Jhajhar as Janjer.

supporting the Shari`a-minded `ulama. Instead, Juzjani noted that Mu`izz al-Din had been impressed by a Turkish derwish by the name of Ayub, and he had gained the confidence, taqarrub, of the monarch. Under his influence the Sultan ordered the execution of Qadi Shams al-Din MHR.[4] This was a complete reversal of roles for the Delhi Sultan, who in the past had always leaned towards the `ulama against the sufis.

One can only guess at the motivations that prompted the Delhi Sultans to opt for the sufis. Ironically, it might have been exactly the authoritarian element in sufism that had made Iltutmish very careful in his dealings with the mystics. An important aspect of sufism was the claim made by the saints to possess esoteric knowledge (nur-i batin) denied to the rest of the community. This knowledge also placed the mystic in a special relationship with God, where the saint could act as intercessor on the Day of Judgement, his grace (baraka) had curative, protective properties, and he was believed to possess miraculous powers. The disciple of the saint profited through this association, and became a special person close to God, protected in his endeavours by his master's special mystical powers.

The execution of the qadi of MHR shocked the `ulama and in 639/1241-2 they allied with the Shamsi notables to

4. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. Habibi, vol. 1, p. 466.

depose Sultan Bahram Shah.[5] Rather that maintaining their earlier association with the Delhi Sultan, from this time onwards one can notice a far closer relationship between the `ulama and the notables, where each `alim was allied with one or the other Shamsi commander. Balban, for instance supported Qadi Jalal al-Din Kashani who was brought from Awadh and appointed qadi of the realm. Upon his death in 648/1251 an old friend, Juzjani, was given the post.[6] Balban's rival, Raihan, had his own support from the `ulama, most notably Qadi Shams al-Din Bharaichi. When Raihan deposed Ulugh Khan, Qadi Bharaichi was appointed qadi of the realm.[7] The participation of the `ulama in the conflict between notables over Delhi became more obvious in later years. When Qutlugh and Kushlu Khan were on the defensive against Ulugh Khan, they received letters from Qadi Shams al-Din Bharaichi, the Shaikh al-Islam Jamal al-Din and Sayyid Qutub al-Din who were in Delhi:

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5. Juzjani noted the presence of the following `ulama, all important dignitaries in the Delhi court: Sadr al-Mulk Sayyid Taj al-Din `Ali Musawi, Qadi Kabir al-Din, Shaikh Muhammad-i Shami, Qadi-i Mamalik Jalal al-Din Kashani. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, vol. 1, pp. 464-5.

6. Ibid, vol. 1, pp. 483, 484, 485, vol. 2, p. 62.

7. Ibid, vol. 1, p. 487. The friendship between Raihan and Qadi Bharaichi went back to the time when Sultan Nasir al-Din, still a prince, had been sent to Bharaich. The eunuch Raihan had probably accompanied the household at that time. For Nasir al-Din's years in Bharaich see vol. 1, p. 470.

> the doors of the city are in our hands, darwazaha-yi badast-i ma ast, you must come to the capital, for Delhi is devoid of troops, shahr az hashm khali ast. You are from the slaves of the court, and are not unknown [to us], beganagi dar miyan-i nai. When you come to the capital, and attach yourself to the service of the crown, Ulugh Khan with all his troopers will be left outside, ba-an lashkar birun bamanad.[8]

The plans of the `ulama were neutralised by Ulugh Khan and his followers in Delhi, and they were exiled. But more important for our discussion was the statement of the conspirators that Qutlugh and Kushlu Khan were "not unknown to [them]". Although we have no knowledge about what qualities attracted the Shari`a minded to the cause of Balban's competitors, we do know that Balban favoured the sufis. This might have been an important consideration in motivating important `ulama to support Ulugh Khan's rivals.

The popularity of the sufis, especially that of the Chishti saint Baba Farid, had increased substantially during the period of conflict in Delhi. The saint had established his khanqah, hospice, on the banks of a ford across the River Sutlej, a major stop on trade routes from Delhi to Multan. In an age when Shamsi notables and `ulama were competing for power, the supervision of sufi activity was not nearly so rigorous, and it helped Baba Farid that his khanqah was not situated in any major urban centre. With

8. Ibid, vol. 1, p. 492, vol. 2, 74.

time Ajudhan became a busy place for commercial exchange and disbursement of charity. According to Nizam al-Din Auliya although Baba Farid chose to live in the wilderness, dasht wa biyaban, innumerable people still visited the Shaikh, and the doors of the khanqah were kept open late into the night. Apparently Baba Farid's personal choice to live as an indigent did not apply to the visitors of the khanqah, and Nizam al-Din noted that

> due to the generosity of God, silver (sim), food (ta`am), and comforts (ni`amat) were present [in the khanqah], and those who came and went received a part of it, and no one who came went away without something. It was miraculous provisionings (`ajab quti), a wonderful life (`ajab zindagani)....[9]

Sufi ideas of "spiritual domain", wilayat, and the protective grace, baraka, of the saint Baba Farid gained extraordinary currency in this time, and travellers would approach the saint for an amulet, ta`wid, to guard against danger. These beliefs were reported by Nizam al-Din Auliya in a story concerning `Abd Allah Rumi who sought a du`a' (benediction) from Baba Farid as he journeyed from Ajudhan to Multan. Baba Farid told him that he could provide protection in his own wilayat which only extended part of the way to Multan. The remainder of the distance was Baha al-Din Zakariyya's wilayat where Rumi would have to rely upon

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9. Amir Hasan Sijzi, Fawa'id al-Fu`ad, p. 125.

the Suhrawardy saint's grace for protection. Although these ideas were old, it is only from Baba Farid's time that they were being popularly invoked and relied upon.[10] In a world where an old order was breaking down it was these friends of God, auliyas, who introduced stability and provided protection. A traveller from Lahore to Budaun was quizzed by Shadi, an old resident of Lahore, about conditions in his hometown. When the traveller told him about excessive rain and fire ruining the city, Shadi asked if his sufi master, pir, resident in Lahore was dead.[11]

Not everybody was pleased with this resurgent mysticism evident in the post-Iltutmish period. Certainly not Sher Khan, cousin of Balban, governor of Lahore, Dipalpur, Tabarhind, Sunam and Bhatnair, in whose territories Baba Farid's hospice of Ajudhan was located. Nizam al-Din reported that because Sher Khan did not believe in Baba Farid's charisma, dar haqq-i Shaikh al-Islam Baba Farid....`itiqadi nadasht, the saint foretold future disaster for the Malik in the following verse:

> Unfortunately about my grace you do not know,
> Sorrow will drown you, alas, when you come to know.[12]

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10. Ibid, p. 236, see also Simon Digby, "The Sufi saint as a source of Authority in Medieval India", op. cit., pp. 62-3.

11. Ibid, pp. 261-2.

12. Ibid, pp. 323-4: Afsus keh az hal-i minnat nist khabar, wa angah khabar shawad keh afsus khuri!

After Baba Farid's death, Sher Khan, naturally, suffered the Mongol invasions, but not so the firm believer Balban, resident in distant Delhi. Rather than attempting to curb this resurgent mystic popularity Balban sought to rely upon it to win additional support for himself. Nizam al-Din reported an instance where together with his soldiers Ulugh Khan travelled to Ajudhan and offered gifts in cash and land to the mystic.[13] Balban's reponse to the sufis was in marked contrast to that of Sher Khan, and it is important to recall the competition and mistrust between the two cousins. Baba Farid's grace favoured one of the two commanders; Sher Khan was murdered and Balban became Sultan.

There is scant information concerning Balban's relations with the Sufis and the `ulama when he became Sultan, but there is little to indicate that the relationship that he had established with the sufis when he had been Khan was given up. Certainly Balban made no attempt to base his regime on the old relationship between the court and the Shari`a-minded `ulama. Sufism had already become too popular and powerful a force to undergo the kind of supervision that Iltutmish had introduced. Instead Balban seems to have favoured jurists like Juzjani, whose Shari`a-mindedness did

13. Ibid, p. 171.

not exclude mystical leanings as well. Balban's partiality towards _sufis_, however, should not mean that they were directly a powerful influence on the state. He sought their blessings, recognised their eminence and local influence, but significantly no major _sufi_ hospice reportedly existed in Delhi during his reign.

Nevertheless even this was to change soon enough, and in the last years of Balban's reign, Baba Farid sent his disciple Nizam al-Din Auliya to reside in Delhi. By the reign of Balban's successor, Kaiqubad, Nizam al-Din Auliya had set up his _khanqah_ near the Jumna, and his popularity increased until his disciples entitled him: _Sultan al-Awliya', Qutub al-`Alam, Sultan al-Masha'ikh wa al-`Arifin_, Sultan of Saints, the Axis of the World, Sultan of the Shaikhs and the Pious.[14] A major challenge to the authority of the Delhi Sultans would be posed by these _sufis_. In the post-Timur period they would be encouraged by the regional Sultanates in an effort to extend the influence of the court into the countryside. But Delhi would see matters otherwise. Just as the Sultanate was unable to keep pace with the changing political environment, Muhammad Shah Tughluq (725/1325-752/1351) would attempt to stem the tide of social change, and try to introduce order in his domains

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14. Ibid, p. 369.

by curbing the sufis in Delhi in much the same manner as Iltutmish had done more than a century before.[15]

15. As Richard M. Eaton, "The Political and Religious Authority of the Shrine of Baba Farid" in Moral Conduct and Authority: The place of Adab in South Asian Islam, ed. Barbara D. Metcalf (Berkeley: California University Press, 1984), pp. 333-356, has argued the early Tughluqs did support the shrine of Baba Farid, but this was also to counter the influence of the Chishti saints who had become extremely influential in Delhi, especially Nasir al-Din Chiragh-i Dehli.

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